Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud:
A Psychoanalytic Critique and Reconstruction of Marxism

Subramaniam Chandran

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Contents

Abbreviations

Preface 6

1 Introduction 8

2 Methodological Premises 15

3 Homo Faber and Psychic Structure 28

4 Class Consciousness and Group Psychology 43

5 Economic Foundation and Psychic Determinism 59

6 State and Human Emancipation 81

7 Conclusion 107

Bibliography 115

Abbreviations

C : Marx, Karl (1867): *Capital*, 3 Volumes, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986

CGP : Marx, Karl (1875): *Critique of Gotha Programme*, Selected Works, vol.3, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989

CHPR : Marx, Karl (1843): *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Collected Works, vol. 3, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974

CP : *Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud*, 5 Volumes, edited by James Strachey and Jean Riviere, London: Hogarth Press, 1957

CPE : Marx, Karl (1859): *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989

CSF : Marx, Karl (1850): *The Class Struggles in France*, Selected Works. vol. 1, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989

CW : *Marx and Engels: Collected Works*, 50 Volumes, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975

CWF : Marx, Karl (1871): *The Civil War in France*, Selected Works, vol.2, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989

EBLB : Marx, Karl (1852): *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Selected Works, vol. 1, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989

EPM : Marx, Karl (1844): *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977

EW : *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, translated and edited by T.B. Bottomore, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964

G : Marx, Karl (1858)(1973): *Grundrisse*, Harmondsworth: Penguin

GI : Marx, Karl and Engels, F (1846): *The German Ideology,* Collected Works, vol. 5, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976

HF : Marx, Karl and Engels, F (1845): *The Holy Family*, Collected Works, vol. 4, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975

MCP : Marx, Karl and Engels, F (1848): *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Selected Works, vol. 1, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989

NRZ : *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*

NYDT : *New York Daily Tribune*

OJQ : *On the Jewish Question*, CW 3

PCEF : Marx, Karl (1857)(1966): *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, trans by Jack Cohen, New York: Harper

PFL : Pelican Freud Library, *Collected Works of Sigmund Freud*, 15 Volumes, edited by Angela Richards and Albert Dickson based on James Strachey's *Standard Edition*, 1975-85, Harmondsworth: Penguin

PP : Marx, Karl (1847): *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977

SC : *Marx and Engels: Selected Correspondence*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982

SE : *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 Volumes, edited by James Strachey, London: The Hogarth Press, 1953-74

SW : *Marx and Engels: Selected Works*, 3 Volumes, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989

TF : Marx, Karl (1845): *Theses on Feuerbach*, Collected Works, vol. 5, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976

TSV : *Theories of Surplus Value*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989

WLC : *Wage, Labour and Capital*, SW 1

WPC : *Writings on the Paris Commune*, edited by Draper, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1971

WPP : *Wages, Price and Profit*, SW 2

Preface

The writings of Karl Marx have been understood and interpreted by scholars in different ways. This work is one such exercise which attempts to interpret his theories by using the psychoanalytic approach of Sigmund Freud. The paradigm of dream interpretation claims that the text distortion can be eliminated by understanding the latent content of the text. Methodological premises condense and displace the latent content of the text. When political theory is constructed on a philosophy of subjectivity and rationality, the validity of theory requires a search for a correlation of psyche and polis. The symptomatic reading of the text discloses what is ignored, omitted, unexplained, intended and over-projected or repeated. This book examines with the help of psychoanalytic insight, the incomplete theory of human nature; problems in the formation of class consciousness; internalization of social and political control and the conformity to the established system; and political beliefs without representing economic interests.

This book revolves around five main arguments. First, the normative-emancipatory tendencies of the latent content of Marx's thought has been condensed and displaced into manifest contest by embracing Hegel's dialectics and economic reductionism. Having constructed the texts on fragmentary empirical evidences and fused with deterministic nature of methodological premises, the validity and universality of Marxism have been challenged. Second, Marx's conception of man is incompatible to comprehend the phenomenon of alienation, since Marx did not study the relationship between human rationality and instinctual substratum. Freud maintains that repression is carried throughout life and human beings are hardly compatible with any kind of system. Third, the emergence of class consciousness and class conflict requires a careful sublimation of eros and death instinct. The conflict depends upon the expansion of the love-hate relationships of the oedipal sources. The irrational longing of pleasure submits itself to manipulation and instrumental rationality or the dominant class. This would result in the creation of an authoritarian character rather than a revolutionary character. Fourth, the unconscious repressed wishes and the non-rational tendencies undermine the determining relation between the economic structure and the superstructure. There exists a link between instinctual repression and capital accumulation process. Finally, the continuity of state can be justified as the state being an object of identity or personified authority for the eros longing for libidinal ties. The eros may provide hope for a classless society but not a stateless society. Freudian psychoanalysis would suggest that besides material well-being, communist society requires a certain amount of repression and creating its own ego-ideal in order to legitimate the system. Freudian theory perceives certain limits to social and political change and often emphasizes finding a mediation and reconciliation.

This work is an outcome of my doctoral dissertation entitled, 'Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud: A Psychoanalytic Critique and Reconstruction of Marxism,' submitted to the University of Madras. I was awarded the Ph.D degree in 1994. I am grateful to Professor Koteswara Prasad for his meticulous guidance suggestions. I would like to thank Professor C.A. Perumal, R. Balasubramanian and V.K. Padmanabhan for their help in various stages of research. I used to get research publications from Professors Wolfenstein, Fred Alford and Szymanski from USA. Professor Gohler from Berlin and D.P. Singh from Lucknow appreciated the study much. I remember with gratitude the illuminating discussion with Fred Dallmayr, Packey De Professor, University of Notre Dame, USA. I wish to point out the impressions of my friends while reading the research work about its academic classification whether the study comes under politics, philosophy or psychology. My reply was that the study might come under all those disciplines. At the same time, it is trans-disciplinary in academic sense.

1

Introduction

Political theory implies a possibility of distortion when the latent content of theory is condensed and displaced into manifest content through text. When subjectivity with its unconscious determinants and rationality are objectified through language and methodological premises, the intended meaning and the intrinsic goal of theory encounter the problem of authenticity of representation. When political theory is constructed on a philosophy of human nature, a parallel study of the relation between the psychic structure and the outer-world is also necessary to understand the validity of theory. The validity of theory requires a search for the correlation of psyche and polis instead of reducing one dimension to the other.

Critique implies reflection on the conditions of possible knowledge and on the system of constraints which are humanly as well as historically produced. Critique also implies a particular narrative structure in which the potentialities for development of a given mode of thought are latent within the very structure (Connerton, 1980). When the latent content of thought is discovered, the process of reconstruction can also be made. Reconstruction provides the theoretical basis for the revision of the represented views in order to achieve its intrinsic goal better (Habermas, 1971). The present study makes use of Freudian psychoanalysis as a method of critique and reconstruction of Marxism.

Marxism has been interpreted in different ways. Marx's own theoretical inconsistencies are also the causes for conflicting interpretations. The delayed publication of his early writings *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and *The German Ideology* (1846) in 1932 made the scholars to adopt two-Marx positions emphasizing either on the notion of alienation and self-realization of man or on economic structure (Althusser, 1969). The advantage of considering the entire writings of Marx as an integral whole is also recognized (Avineri, 1968; Schaff, 1970; Ollman, 1971). The importance of individual and interpreting Marxism with methodological individualism also received attention (Elster, 1985). The theory-practice gap in socialist state and the system adjustment in late capitalism to avoid crisis, further, made the thinkers to look into the theoretical sources of Marxism and subsequently attempts have been made to complement the Marxian theory (Korsch, 1923; Lukacs, 1923; Gramsci, 1929-35). The non-Marxist schools of thought - like phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, psychoanalysis- also exerted considerable influence to clarify the meaning, the structure and

the validity of Marx's writings. Besides these there are interpretations with mystification or considering Marxism as parallel with religious system (Olssen, 1968; Tucker, 1961).

Marx was apparently a slow and painstaking writer who constantly revised and elaborated his ideas. Since he was rarely satisfied by anything he wrote, many of the texts were never brought to finished forms and fewer were actually published by Marx (Rockmore, 1989, 29). He was not only preoccupied with Hegel's logic, but also filled with the hopes and dreams of a Saint Simon, a Robert Owen, and a Fourier (Rubel and Manale, 1975, X). Marx in his doctoral thesis *The difference between Democritus and Epicurus Philosophy of Nature* (1841), attacked Democritus' mechanistic determinism and praised Epicurus for the idea of spontaneity. His first article on the Prussian Governments' new decree concerning Press censorship was written for the *Deutsche Fahrbucher* but this was confiscated. However, Marx was able to publish a series of articles in *Rheinische Zeitung* with the young Hegelian writers Adolf Rutenberg, Frederich Engels, Moses Hess, Bruno Bauer, Karl Kopper and Max Stirner. Marx himself edited the paper from October 1842 to March 1843 and denounced the pseudo-liberalism of the Prussian Government and stood up for the oppressed peasantry (Kolakowski, 1978, 120).

In 1843, Marx produced a manuscript *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* to evaluate Hegel's political philosophy which gave him scope to criticize the existing political institutions and to discuss the relationship between politics and economics. He argued for recovery of the social dimension of man's nature that had been lost ever since the French Revolution leveled all citizens in the political state and accentuated the individualism of bourgeois society. In the unfinished manuscript Marx proclaimed universal suffrage as the solution to the split between civil society and political state. In *On the Jewish Question* (1843), Marx argued for the abolition of the gap between civil society and state by making the civil society as universal, communal or species essence of man inherent in the state.

In *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* Marx attempted to provide a philosophical analysis of the basic concepts, capital, rent, labour, property, money, commodity, wages, needs and estrangement. He explained socialism as a general world-view and not merely a programme of social reform, and related economic categories to a philosophical interpretation of man's condition in nature, which is also taken as the beginning of the investigation of metaphysical and epistemological problems. When this work was first published, it was thought by many to portray a humanist and existentialist Marx, different from the later writings of Marx, and this discrepancy gave rise to a proletariat debate on the continuity or discontinuity of Marx's thought. Marx and Engels jointly wrote *The Holy Family*, ironically referring to Bruno Bauer and his brothers. In this work they discredited the ideas of the

young Hegelians and praised Proudhon for exploring the inhuman effects of the existence of private property. *The Holy Family* is a polemical rather than a constructive work and so contains no systematic presentation of Marx's ideas. Marx termed his standpoint as `real humanism' and he was obviously still under the influence of Feuerbach. At the same time this work is the first of Marx's writings to show clearly the imprint of the materialist conception of history (McLellan, 1977, 131). Although Marx was influenced by Feuerbach, he was critical of Feuerbach and summarized his disagreements in eleven theses. *The German Ideology*, perhaps some parts of the manuscript were also lost, was primarily an attack on Feuerbach and Max Stirner. The central thesis concerned with the work is that the social existence would determine the consciousness. It became the basis of the materialist interpretation of history which was developed by Marx in later writings in detail.

When Proudhon published his *System of Economic Contradictions* subtitled *as The Philosophy of Poverty*, Marx criticized in his *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Proudhon's attempt to use Hegel's dialectic and pointed out the difference between Proudhon's abstract speculation and his own discovery of the real movement of the productive relations. In the same work, Marx put forth the working class movement which would abolish class antagonism and political power.

At the Communist League Congress in London in November 1847, Marx and Engels were asked to draw up a statement for a clear formulation of the League's principles. Engels had already written a draft after the June Congress, and Marx incorporated some of his material when he wrote the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* published in 1848. Marx continued to recognize this pamphlet as a classic expression of his views on materialist conception of history and proletarian revolution. Marx wrote a series of articles during 1850 originally entitled `1848-49' and were republished by Engels in 1895 under the title *The Class Struggles in France*. He analyzed the changes in the 1848 revolution in France viewed against a background of class and economic interest. Engels described them as Marx's first attempt to explain the contemporary history by means of his materialist conception and considered an economic crisis as the necessary precondition for any revolution. Marx wrote a series of articles when Louis Napolean seized power in France in 1851. They were published by his friend Weydemeyer under the title *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. The title is an allusion to the date of Napolean Bonaparte's coup de tat in 1799. The intention was to demonstrate how the class struggle in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero's part. Marx showed the importance of the changes from class-in-itself to class-for-itself for the concrete class consciousness.

The *Grundrisse* is a very lengthy manuscript written by Marx during 1857-58 but published in 1941. It covered six parts into which Marx intended to divide his study of economics. Of the six parts the only one to be finished was *Capital* which itself eventually grew into four volumes. The *Grundrisse* has wider scope than any of his writings and it takes up themes from the earlier works. The idea of alienation, man as a social being, the dialectical categories of Hegel reappear in this work. *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), intended as a writing- up of the first selection of *the Grundrisse,* was largely taken up again in the first chapters of *Capital*. The *Theories of Surplus Value*, the fourth volume of *Capital*, contains extracts from classical economists Adam Smith, Ricardo and Malthus. *Capital* is the most coherent and systematic expression of Marx's notion of the unavoidable internal contradictions of capitalism such as the incongruity between the socialization of production and the private ownership of the means of production. *Capital* represents only a part of the work on economics that Marx had planned out in the *Grundrisse*. The four volumes of *Capital* were completed in reverse order. The *Theories of Surplus Value* was completed in 1862-63; the third volume in 1864; and the first volume in 1865-66. Marx in *Capital* did not relinquish his earlier speculative discussions of the human alienation and emancipation, rather he muted the philosophical dimension and amplified the analysis of capitalism in order to develop a model of capitalist crisis and socialist transformation. Marx described a model for Commune in *The Civil War in France* (1871). The described model of the Commune was more decentralized than outlined in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. In 1875, Marx wrote *Critique of the Gotha Programme* in which he criticized the vagueness in the concept of equality and free state. Apart from these works, Marx tried to show the exceptions of his own theory in some of his letters and essays.

The tension in Marx's writings; between dialectic and materialism; between Hegelianism and Positivism; between philosophy of history and social science; and between humanist and scientific tendencies necessitates the textual understanding in its latent meaning. Besides these, the incomplete theory of human nature; problems in the formation of class consciousness; internalization of social and political control and conformity to the established system; political beliefs without representing economic interest; and increasing powers of state both in capitalism and socialism require a psychoanalytic study on the theoretical system and the practical implications of Marx's writings.

Attempts have been made to apply the concepts and the theories of psychoanalysis to interpret Marxism and to synthesize these systems of thought to complement and enrich Marxism. Wilhelm Reich (1946) applied Freud's instinct theory to explain the causes for the continuation of fascist tendency and anti-Semitism and also the changing character structure of man in socialist society. Horkheimer (1947) and Adorno (1950) studied the role of family

in internalizing the authority and the idea of domination by using Freud's libido theory. Herbert Marcuse (1955) attempted to integrate Marxism with Freudian psychoanalysis after surpassing Freud's pessimism on the idea of liberation. Erich Fromm (1955; 1965) claimed that psychoanalysis provided the theory of human nature that was absent in historical materialism. Norman O. Brown (1959) brought out the psychoanalytic meaning and the unconscious determinants in the philosophy of history. Paul Baran(1960) and Phil Brown (1965) brought out the parallel aspects of Marxism and Freudian psychoanalysis on materialism and dialectical conflict. Reuben Osborne (1965) argued that Marxism was adequate to explain the objective social facts but inadequate in explaining subjective facts and Marxism must be supplemented by the psychoanalytic explanation of subjective facts. Habermas (1971) looked Freudian psychoanalysis essentially as a methodological model for the critique of ideology and for the reconstruction of theory with the help of the paradigm of dream interpretation. Althusser (1969; 1970) borrowed, from Freud the concepts such as `symptomatic reading' and `overdetermination' to study the texts of Marx. He also made the difference between domination and determination, while studying the base and the superstructure relationship. Bruce Brown (1973) studied the psychoanalytic critique of the critical theorists and the New Left. Martin Kalin (1974) depicted Marx's idea of progress as utopian and Freud's as anti-utopian. Isaac Balbus (1982) examined the impossibility of integration of Marxism with psychoanalysis. Szymanski (1978) and Lichtman (1982) brought out the common ground to synthesize Marxism with psychoanalysis and they explained Freud's contributions to the study of the problems of false consciousness and capital accumulation. Fred Alford (1988; 1991) examined the relevance of psychoanalysis to the study of political theory. Naville (1948), Kunzli (1956), Kalidova (1968), Fraenkel (1969), Sankuhler (1970), King (1972), Jacoby (1975), Zaretsky (1975), Lucian Seve (1978) and Kovel (1986) also brought out the subjective factors in interpreting Marxism and the problems of consciousness. These studies illuminated the uses of formal Freudian structure to explore the unconscious foundations of reality and their determining effects.

The objectives of the present study include, (1) to study how psychoanalysis understands and reconstructs Marxism by eliminating its text-distortion; (2) to examine Marx's conception of man and the theory of alienation; (3) to explicate the problems of class consciousness and the possibilities of class conflict; (4) to discuss the relation between the economic structure and the psychic determination; and (5) to describe the relation between the state and political power and the conception of human emancipation.

These objectives are formulated with a view to search for the validity of the following arguments or hypotheses: (1) the normative-emancipatory tendencies of the latent content of the Marx's thought has been condensed and displaced in order to search for appropriation in

Hegel's logic and in economic determinism; (2) Marx's conception of man is incompatible to comprehend the phenomenon of alienation; (3) the emergence of class consciousness and class conflict requires a deliberation on the energies of eros and thanatos and it depends upon the expansion of the love-hate relationship of the Oedipal sources; (4) the unconscious repressed wishes of man and his nonrational tendencies undermine the determining relation between the sub-structure and the superstructure; and (5) the continuity of state can be justified since state provided an object of identity for the eros longing for libidinal ties which binds the subjects.

The present study has been organized in seven chapters. The first chapter states the summary of Marx's writings, objectives, the hypotheses and the review of literature. The second chapter explains the conceptual and theoretical framework of Freudian psychoanalysis to the critique and the reconstruction of Marxism. The psychoanalytic critique is envisaged in two ways: (1) to study the text-distortion, Freud's dream interpretation is used as a paradigm exploring the latent text from its manifest text with the help of the dream-work process: condensation, displacement, representation and secondary revision (Freud, 1900; 1917; Habermas, 1971); and (2) to apply Freud's ontogenetic and philogenetic theories ranging from individual mind to civilization, religion and politics (Freud, 1921; 1923; 1927; 1930) . The relation between hermeneutics and Freud's interpretation of dreams is also discussed (Ricoeur, 1970; Habermas, 1971). Considering the heterogenous and rigorous methodological theorization of Marx's texts rather than artistic and literary nature, the first type of psychoanalytic critique has limited application. The second type of psychoanalytic critique has been widely used in the present study. The third chapter examines Marx's conception of man and the theory of alienation in the light of Freud's libido theory and his structural analysis of mind. It studies the inherent conflict in the mind and the historical conditioning of the ego and the superego and the formation of character structure in which the internalization of domination and the maintaining of class society are carried out. It also examines how the pleasure principle weakens the relation between the economic categories and the notion of alienation. It studies the role of family in transforming the social existence into consciousness and the formation of character structure. The fourth chapter studies the role of love-hate relationship of individual in creating class consciousness. It also studies the inherent aggressiveness of man and the role of leader in transforming class-in-itself to class-for-itself. It examines the problem of false consciousness and false needs and how the conformity to the established system is accomplished. The fifth chapter explains the changing relationship between the sub-structure and the superstructure. It studies the influence of unconscious repressed wishes on ideology, religion and politics. It also examines the archaic heritage and the intention to return to authority to maintain libidinal ties. It examines how the class based superstructure is maintained on the non-rational pleasure principle. The

sixth chapter examines the role of political power and state in liberating the subjects from its material and non-material repression. It analyses the Marxian conception of civil society and state and the circumstances to transcend the state. It also studies the implications of classless and stateless society for the emancipation of mankind. The importance of the sublimation of eros and thanatos is also discussed. It also discusses the relation between eros and state. The seventh chapter tries to reconstruct Marxism in the light of Freudian psychoanalysis.

For the present study, the English texts alone have been followed. Terms such as repression, oppression; psyche, mind; instinctual structure, psychic structure, subjectivity; ego, rationality; thanatos, death instinct, aggressiveness; superego, ego-ideal, conscience; bourgeoisie, capitalist, dominant class, ruling class, are interchangeably used. As the methodological premises presumed, Marx texts have been clarified by his own writings in different places and Engels' works are referred wherever necessary. Moreover, as the title of the thesis implies other ways of interpretation can be envisaged, the present study is not an exclusive one.

2

Methodological Premises

The relation of political theory to human subjectivity and rationality necessitate the study of psychic structure of man as well as the outer world. The study of man is the prerequisite before creating political theories, and the endeavours of Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau and Marx illuminate this situation. Human predicaments between instinct and reason; between unconscious and conscious mind; and between self and political order search for a correlation to avoid disharmony. Psychoanalysis studies these dichotomies and with political theory, it "seeks to capture the correlation of psyche and polis; instead of simply reducing one dimension to the other, it aims to highlight the peculiar interlacing between psychic drives and social contexts, between inner human nature and public institutions or norms" (Dallmayr, 1989, 467). Psychoanalysis provides new rules of interpretation and provides a set of concepts of psychic structure and its manifestation in all human endeavour. According to Freud, Psychoanalysis is a method as well as a therapy to cure neurosis and psychosis through the exploration of the unconscious mind which is the store house of traumas and past experiences of the repressed. In order to explore the patients' unconscious mind, Freud resorted to use certain techniques: hypnosis, free association, study of parapraxes and dream interpretation. His therapy involves the interpretive and emancipatory process in terms of his endeavour to interpret the utterances and dream material of the patients' and to liberate the patient from his repression (Freud, 1900; 1917). Freud developed a general theory of individual mind as well as religion culture and politics out of his case histories and clinical facts.

Dream Interpretation

The psychoanalytic critique is envisaged in two ways: (1) to study the text-distortion, Freud's dream interpretation is used as a paradigm exploring the latent text from its manifest text; and (2) to apply Freud's psychoanalytic concepts and theories ranging from individual mind to civilization, religion and politics. According to Freud, dream is the fulfillment of a wish (PFL. 4, 200) and designed to take the place of some other process of thought (PFL. 4, 169). Dream as a whole is a distorted substitute for unconscious material. The distortion in dreams is the result of a censoring activity which is directed against unacceptable unconscious wishful impulses (PFL. 1, 182).

Freud believed that the interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind. The dream-work is a process which has four successive activities: condensation, displacement, representation and secondary revision. The first achievement of the dream-work is condensation. The manifest dream has a smaller content than the latent one and an abbreviated translation of it. Condensation is brought about by the total omission of certain latent elements; by only a fragment of some complexes in the latent dream passing over into the manifest one; and by latent elements which have something in common being combined and fused into a single unity in the manifest dream. The second achievement of the dream work is displacement. It manifests in two ways: a latent element is replaced not by a component part of itself but by something more remote - that is by an allusion, and the psychical accent is shifted from an important element on to another which is unimportant so that the dream appears differently centered and strange (PFL. 1, 205-8). By the operation of the dream-work the latent-dream which is condensed is distorted by the displacement of physical intensities and is arranged with a view to being represented in visual pictures; and besides all these, before the manifest dream is arrived at, it is submitted to a process of secondary revision which seeks to give the new product something in the nature of sense and coherence (PFL. 15, 138). Freud discovered in the expression of dreams that there are struggles between two trends, of which one is unconscious, repressed and strives towards satisfaction, while the other belonging to the conscious ego, is disapproving and repressive. The outcome of this conflict is a compromise formation in which both trends have found an incomplete expression (PFL. 15, 138-9).

Freud described two different methods of dream interpretation (1900), (Grinstein, 1983); symbolic dream- interpreting method and decoding method. The symbolic dream-interpreting method considers the content of the dream as a whole and seeks to replace it by another content which is intelligible and analogous to the original one. The decoding method treats dreams as a kind of cryptography in which each sign can be translated into another sign having a known meaning in accordance with a fixed key of sign and meaning. The decoding method takes into account not only the content of the dream but also the character and circumstances of the dreamer; so that the same dream element will have a different meaning for different person. The essence of the decoding procedure, however, lies in the fact that the work of interpretation is not brought to bear on the dream as a whole but on each portion of the dream's content independently (PFL. 4, 170-2). Freud also stated the limitations of these two methods. The symbolic method is restricted in its application and incapable of being laid down on general lines. It is difficult to decipher certain symbolic structure which has complicated unconscious tendencies. In the case of the decoding method everything depends on the trustworthiness of the sign- meaning key (PFL. 4, 173). Freud also recognized the

inevitability of subjective factors in interpreting dreams. Freud imposed the task of interpretation upon the dreamer himself. This technique is not concerned with what occurs to the interpreter in connection with a particular element of the dream, but with what occurs to the dreamer. What Freud emphasized is not the interpretation of the dream as it is but the representation of the dream. Like the decoding method Freud employed interpretation `en detail' and not in `en masse' and regarded dream as being of a composite character, as being conglomerates of psychical formations (PFL. 4, 178). Since psychoanalysis is a retrospective science, i.e., from present to the past, introspection is the basis of true empiricism because it is a combination of internal and external perception, and of reflection upon what is experienced. Another important instrument is empathy, the recognition of the self in the other. Introspection and empathy are essential rules to understand the dreamer to reconstruct through the actions of psychoanalyst (Thoma and Kachele, 1975; Kohut, 1951).

Dream and Text

Freud's method of dream interpretation draws its source after the hermeneutic model of philological research. It provides theoretical perspective and technical rules for the interpretation of symbolic structures. Freudian interpretation reduces all thoughts to objectification and all objects to symbols. The task of interpretation remains a discovery of equivalence of symbols and actions through perpetual analogies.

As the reservoir of psychic life in which contradictory attitudes and impulses coexist in mute turmoil, the unconscious has no way of speaking for itself. It can be approached only so far as it is represented, and at the same time distorted in dreams, art, text and the act of everyday life. The product of a text can be studied in analogous with the dream-work process. And the relation between the patient and the psychoanalyst also illuminates the relation between text and interpreter. The paradigm of dream-work explains that the author himself objectifies his own subjectivity through the text which has distortion and omissions. It also highlights the acknowledged beliefs and overt intentions. In text, the messages are systematically distorted and the distortions, omissions are put by the author intentionally so that his own product becomes unintelligible to him (Habermas, 1971; Lorenzer, 1970). The task of psychoanalytic interpretation is to work back through expressive statements to the repressed motive hidden especially from its carrier. For Lacan, discourse or literary product is in a sense a slip of the tongue. Lacan argued that one can never mean precisely what one says and never say precisely what one means. The unconscious is just a continual movement and activity of signifiers(words), whose signifieds(meaning) are often inaccessible because both are repressed. The unconscious is a sliding of the signified beneath the signifier, as a constant fading and evaporation of meaning, a bizarre modernist text which is almost unreadable and

which will certainly never yield up its final secrets to interpretation (1977, 264). In the dream-work process, condensation and displacement have been even reinterpreted by Roman Jakobson and Lacan as homologous with the rhetorical procedures of metaphor and metonymy (Wright, 1982, 115). In psychic texts discrepancies i.e., breaks in continuity and distortions of content are always presumed to disclose intention. Freud understood these discrepancies as a compromise between the demands of nature and the denials of culture.

Psychoanalytic interpretation and Hermeneutics

Psychoanalytic interpretation and hermeneutics have certain resemblance (Palmer, 1969; Rabinow and Sullivan, 1979,; Horden, 1985). The aim of hermeneutics is to increase the human understanding by questioning how one comes to misconstrue, misunderstand, disagree, agree and reach consensus. It also seeks an understanding of the present and future in terms of the past which is a fundamental inclination of human consciousness. The paradigmatic hermeneutic situation is the interpreter questioning a text. The aim of hermeneutic procedure is to understand the author better than he has understood himself, a proposition which is the necessary consequence of the doctrine of unconscious creation. It is concerned with reading the text of unconscious by uncovering the process of dream-work. For that, it focuses in particular the symptomatic places in the dreamtext -distortions, ambiguities, absences and elisions - which may provide a mode of access to the latent content or unconscious drives, which have gone into its making (Eagleton, 1983, 182).

The dialogue between analyst and analysand, is a model for hermeneutic inquiry. Hermeneutics, like psychoanalysis, is concerned with self-reflection and its method assumes that people individually and collectively carry on a continuous dialogue about themselves and by thinking reach provisional understanding of themselves. When questions confront them they block the flow of experience and set reflection in motion. Reflection diverts one's interest from involvement in the present and turns it on one's past, relation with others and the world, and requires a reordering, rerouting and rethinking of existence (Steele, 1979; 1982). The process of reaching understanding by establishing shared meanings through dialogue can be represented in the image of a circle. The text becomes intelligible through a scrutiny of all the individual words of which it is composed and of the way in which they are connected together and yet the full understanding of the individual parts of the text already presupposes some prior or anticipatory comprehension of the whole. Understanding then is circular because in the complex interrelatedness of parts and whole meaning comes to exist. Hermeneutics also emphasizes the awareness of interpreters' historical and cultural position. Gadamer argued that the encounter of tradition with its parts and whole and the whole and the parts would unravel the mystery of understanding (1975). Dilthey claimed that while making

interpretation, the sympathy with the individual could be raised to the level of objectivity (Connerton, 1976). The attempt to understand the intersubjective meaning and to explain the causal connection at the same time, hermeneutics and the method of psychoanalysis bridge the gap between explanation and understanding. Understanding is entirely mediated by the whole of explanatory procedures which precede it and accompany it. The correlation between explanation and understanding; between understanding and explanation is hermeneutic circle (Ricoeur, 1970; Radnitzky, 1973). Habermas believed that the technique of dream interpretation goes beyond the art of hermeneutics in so far as it must grasp not only the meaning of a possibly distorted text, but the meaning of the text distortion itself, that is the transformation of a latent dream thought into the manifest dream. For the meaning structure of the texts studied by hermeneutics is always threatened only by the impact of external conditions. Meaning can be destroyed through the capacity and efficiency limitations of the channels of transmission, whether of memory or cultural tradition. Habermas termed psychoanalytic interpretation as `depth hermeneutics' which is concerned with the self-deceptions of the author. Beside the manifest content, such texts document the latent content of a portion of the author's orientations that has become inaccessible to him and alienated from him and yet belongs to him nevertheless. The object domain of depth hermeneutics comprises all the places where the text of everyday language games are interrupted by incomprehensible symbols. These symbols cannot be understood because they do not obey the grammatical rules of ordinary language, norms of action, and culturally learned patterns of expression. But psychoanalytic interpretation tries to decipher these somatic expressions (Habermas, 1971, 216-26). In other words, in psychoanalysis the speech and actions of the patient are viewed as a system of symbols whose meaning must be reconstructed; the problem is to reconstitute a coherent meaning which has become unintelligible to the author of the text himself. This can be accomplished by leading the patient through a process of self-reflection, to become conscious of needs and motives that were previously repressed, so that he comes to acknowledge that these needs and motives are in fact his own. The aim of the psychoanalytic interpretation is to break down the distortions erected by the censor and in this way to reconstruct the hidden connection of the symbols by means of which the subject deceives himself about himself (Habermas, 1971, 102).

Generally the interpretive project is criticized on two grounds: one, it creates a dichotomy between explanation and understanding, and the other, it reduces all inquiry into linguistic analysis. The attempt to understand the intersubjective meanings embedded in social life is at the same time an attempt to explain why people act the way they do. And explanation in terms of intersubjective meanings leads to greater understanding. Language cannot be understood outside of the practices and institutions within it grows. The interpretation of intersubjective meanings is an interpretation of practices, institutions and political life as a

whole. It is not divorced from the practices within which that language exists (Gibbons, 1987, 3). However, the psychoanalytic interpretation does not claim universality and it can be applied only in limited sphere.

Metapsychology and Unconscious Mind

The second approach of psychoanalytic critique is envisaged to apply Freud's concepts and theories to study Marxism. Freud's conceptual framework is fundamentally dualistic which might contribute to a conception of reconciliation. His concepts were formulated as a pair of opposites which generate conflicts: the conscious and the unconscious mind; the ego and the id; the life and the death instinct; and the reality and the pleasure principle (Voloshimov, 1987). Freud was able to formulate a general theory of psychoanalysis, as he himself called metapsychology, out of his case histories and clinical facts. Freud believed that the unconscious mind determines human behaviour and its manifestation profoundly influences all social phenomena. The division of the mind into conscious and unconscious is the fundamental premise of psychoanalysis. The concept of unconscious is derived from the idea of repression. The repressed is the prototype of the unconscious. Freud described two kinds of unconscious; one which is latent but capable of becoming conscious called preconscious; and the other which is repressed and which is not in itself capable of becoming conscious. Freud stated that in the descriptive sense there are two kinds of unconscious, but in the dynamic sense only one (PFL. 11, 358).

Freud proposed a new structural account of the mind in which the uncoordinated instinctual trends are called the `id', the organized rationalistic and realistic part of the `ego', and the critical and moralizing function of the `superego' (1923). Freud believed that the driving energy innate in man is libido which has, sexual and aggressive tendencies lying dormant in the `id'. The `id' is governed by the pleasure principle. i.e., it seeks pleasure indifferent to morality and restrictions. The unconscious is attached to the `id' and the conscious is attached to the `ego'. The `ego' operating according to the reality principle, supervises all its own constituent processes and exercises the censorship on dreams. From this ego proceed the repressions, too, by means of which it is sought to exclude certain trends in the mind not merely from consciousness but also from other forms of effectiveness and activity. Freud discovered that the ego, which begins to develop in the infant at about the age of six months, mediate between the pure drive of the id and the reality of external environment. The ego, though it operates according to the reality principle, seeks the mode of expression that would gratify the `id' and at the same time not endanger the organism or the environment. The ego is also capable of postponing the immediate pleasure hoping to gratify in the near future (PFL. 11, 355). The superego which develops much later is the conscience and internalized morals

learned primarily from the family. It is the remnant of the Oedipus complex which was eradicated by the fear of castration and by sublimation of sexual drive. The superego serves the function within the ego of demanding restriction and rejection, and it therefore follows that repression is the work of the superego. It expresses the child's moral imperatives, ideals and makes the child feel guilty. The `id' and the `superego', both represent the influences of the past - the id is influenced by heredity and the superego is influenced by what is taken over from other people. Whereas the `ego' is principally determined by the individual's own experience, that is by accidental and contemporary events (PFL. 15, 378). The operation and fixation of libidinal energy can be explained by Freudian theory of instinct and libido which in turn explains the theory of personality development and character formation.

Instinct and Libido Theory

According to Freud, man has fundamentally two kinds of instincts: one, the life instinct or the eros and the other, death instinct or thanatos. The `id' provides the reservoir of these instincts, while the life instinct strives for the binding of living substance into ever larger and permanent units, the death instinct strives for the annihilation of life, the desire to regress into inorganic matter. Freud discovered that the psychic dynamic takes the form of a constant struggle of three basic forces: the life instinct, the death instinct and the outside world. Corresponding to these three forces are the three basic principles which determine the functions of the psychic apparatus, the pleasure principle, the nirvana principle and the reality principle. If the pleasure principle stands for the unlimited unfolding of the life instinct, and the nirvana principle for regression into the painless condition before birth, then the reality principle signifies the totality of the modifications of those instincts compelled by the outside world and it signifies reason as reality itself. Freud argued that the analogy of eros and death instinct extends from the sphere of living things to the pair of opposing forces - attraction and repulsion - which rule in the inorganic world (PFL. 15, 380). The eros and the thanatos or death instinct originate from the energy of libido. Libido is regarded as a closed energy system regulated by the physical law of conservation of energy. Libido, withdraws from one area, and must inevitably produce effects elsewhere. It is centered on a specific erotogenic zone and has a specific aim of gratification. Each component instinct is unalterably characterized by its source. They are also able to replace one another and to transfer their libidinal cathexis to one another, so that the satisfaction of one instinct can take the place of the satisfaction of others. The most important vicissitude which an instinct can undergo seems to be sublimation; here both object and aim are changed, so that what was originally a sexual instinct finds satisfaction in some achievement which is no longer sexual but has a higher social or ethical valuation (PFL, 15, 153-55). Freud understood the character formation in terms of libidinal drives which under the influence of social pressures, have changed their aim or been otherwise modified by

learning in the course of upbringing. He explained the character formation in three stages: oral, anal and phallic. The oral stage extends from birth to second year and the mode of pleasure finding is expressed in sucking and swallowing or incorporating ,i.e., symbolically making objects part of oneself. At early stages, the infant makes no distinction between world and ego. Libidinal energy is entirely narcissistic and directed toward himself but without awareness that there is a separation of self and the world. Self and social awareness develop hand in hand, when the world and ego begin to be distinguished from each other - when the child's needs are not met immediately. During the second year, in the anal stage, pleasure is obtained from the sheer act of expelling and from the feeling of retaining a full lower intestine. The child's ego, equipped with self-awareness by the oral stage extends its powers in the anal stage away from passive function toward actively directing his own behaviour according to his changing environment. The child no longer must induce others to do for him, but begins to do for himself. He learns to keep clean, to walk and to talk. Freud argued that the triad of characteristics that are associated with the anal character is orderliness, parsimoniousness and obstinacy. The libidinal energy is shifted to the genital zone at about at the end of the third or beginning of the fourth year in the phallic stage. In this stage, the child experiences Oedipus complex, i.e., the child loves one and becomes jealous and strong hostile feelings towards other. Due to castration anxiety, his feeling of hostility is replaced by identification. For girls, castration has already occurred. In this way the situation of ambivalence is produced. Freud classified three libidinal types of personality. The man who is predominantly erotic will give first preference to his emotional relationships to other people. The narcissistic man who inclines to be self-sufficient, will seek his main satisfaction in his internal mental processes. The man of action will never give up the external world on which he can try out his struggle (PFL. 7, 359). Freud believed that neurosis was the result of regression of libido which had been damned up by a frustrating environment and therefore flowed back to an earlier stage at which during the course of development it had been partially fixated.

Group Psychology

Freud analyzed the group mind like the individual mind. His *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921) is concerned with the individual man as a member of a race, of a nation, of an institution or as a component part of a crowd of people who have been organized for some definite purpose (PFL. 12, 96). Freud began with a premise that in the individual's mental life someone else is invariably involved as a model, as an object, as a helper or an opponent (PFL. 12, 95). Following Le Bon's ideas, Freud argued that a group is characterized by the eruption of unconscious desires and by intense emotional ties which deprive individual's independence and initiative. He added that a group is an obedient herd,

which could never live without a master. The leader, acting like a hypnotist, must himself be held in fascination by a strong faith and he must possess a strong and imposing will, which the group can accept from him (PFL. 12, 108). Eros provides to bind the group as well as the leader. Freud also distinguished homogenous, heterogeneous, artificial, primitive and highly organized groups, with or without a leader (PFL. 12, 122). Freud described `identification' as the mechanism for emotional ties. The emotional tie will be in two ways and it depends upon whether the subject or the object of the ego. The object-choice tie is `to have' and the identification is like `to be', that has been taken as a model (PFL,12, 135). Freud explained with the concept of ego-ideal which comprises the conscience, a critical attitude towards the ego, gradually gathers up from the influences of the environment the demands which the environment makes upon the ego and which the ego cannot always rise to; so that a man when he cannot be satisfied with his ego itself; may nevertheless be able to find satisfaction in the ego-ideal which has been differentiated out of the ego (PFL. 12, 139-40). In a group the individual is brought under conditions which allow him to throw off the repressions of his unconscious instinctual impulses. The conscious personality has entirely vanished and the will and discernment are lost. The suggestion of leader turns the feeling and ideas in an identical direction. Freud also analyzed the herd instinct in studying group psychology. The individual feels incomplete if he is alone. The fear shown by the infant would seem already to be an expression of this herd instinct. The herd instinct would appear to be something primary which cannot be split up (PFL. 12, 149). Thus the libidinal ties, the unconscious wishes and identification, ego-ideal, the suggestion of the leader and the herd instinct explain Freudian idea of group psychology. Freud further argued that, the in-group ties can be strengthened by channeling the hate and aggressive instinct to the other groups. In the formation of a group accepting the leader and his authority as a father image is also due to archaic heritage of the mind, i.e., the memory traces of the past generation and a sort of mass psyche through which the sense of guilt and psychic determination occurred. Fixed symbols found in mythology, fairy tales, art and religion have been acquired by man through this archaic heritage.

Archaic Heritage and Psychic Determinism

Freud analyzed the psychic determinism in *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901). It was devoted to study the symptomatic acts, the unconscious significance of common errors; forgetting names, errors in speech and writing, forgetting intentions, etc., and Freud called these acts as parapraxes. For Freud, these accidental acts seem meaningful expressions of unconscious aims. The unconscious process is intentional human action enacted unconsciously. Determinism in the psychical sphere is carried out without any gap (PFL. 5, 254). Freud frequently spoke of persons choosing to repress certain unpleasant ideas in order

to evade anxiety or preserve self-esteem . The human agent is very often lived by the unconscious myths and metaphors that in a fundamental sense determine the very definition of the situation upon which he leases the actions in which he chooses to engage. While explaining the concept of archaic heritage, Freud developed the concept of cultural superego in an analogous way to the individual superego (1913; 1939). According to Freud, just as the individual mind preserves all its past experiences, so the cultural superego retains elements remembered from the dawn of civilization. Freud described that the prehistoric man lived in small hordes and one powerful leader dominated them by force. The primal father or group leader tyrannized all the males and monopolized all the females. The group males joined together and killed the primal father as well as the authority and domination. But this physical liberation from the authority of the primal father was not accompanied by a psychological liberation. Since the primal father was loved as well as hated by the group or primal brothers. Eventually the conflicting emotions of triumph and remorse within each brother are resolved by the introjection of the dead primal father. In this way the primal father became the first ego-ideal and the source of sense of guilt (PFL. 13, 132-137). This archaic heritage also determines the foundation for religion and state. Freud inquired the scope of psychic determinism and the freedom from the determinism. He discovered one mere phenomenon called `repetition compulsion'. The unconscious repressed offers no resistance whatever to the effort of the therapy. The patient is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of remembering it as something belonging to the past. The compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences which include no possibility of pleasure, and which can never have brought satisfaction even to instinctual impulses which have since been repressed. This perpetual recurrence of the same thing - repetition compulsion would find expression in all areas.

Civilization and Repression

The basic theme of Freudian theory is the conflict between the psychic structure and the external world. *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) highlights the constant struggle between man and civilization, i.e., between pleasure principle and reality principle. Freud assumed that society arose out of the need to curb man's unruly sexual and aggressive drives. The work of civilization is to repress these primordial drives but these nevertheless continue towards satisfaction and fulfillment. Civilization, by an ever-increasing tendency to repression, makes man more and more unhappy and he seeks relief in substitute gratification. In the *The Future of an Illusion* (1927), Freud argued that religion is a `substitute gratification' which tries to reconcile man's unconscious wishes and the reality by way of creating an illusion. He tried to explore the possibility of a way out of the endless progress and endless Faustian discontent of man. He also warned that the repression required to

establish social order also leads to a vast and potentially dangerous accumulation of unconscious forces which would make destruction. The therapeutic process explains the implications of liberation. Freud argued that the liberation of an individual from the authority of his parents is one of the most necessary though one of the most painful results of development. It also stands for an infinitely freer sexual life and strives to restore the ego, to free it from its restrictions, while the patient should be educated to liberate and fulfill his own nature, not to resemble the others (PFL. 15, 205). Freud warned the possibility of continuous repression by saying `where id was, there shall ego be` (PFL. 2, 80).Therapy believes in the liberating power of self-understanding and dispossessing the self of community, of tradition, religion and of the Oedipal sources of family. Freud expected the patient to understand one's self in the past and the present contemporary world. He believed that the liberation depends on rational reconciliation of reason and desire. However, Freud argued that constant reconciliation is not possible and man is destined to be repressed by the civilization. Freud also argued that civilization not only repress but sublime the destructive forces into creative and socially acceptable way. Though Freud stated the eternal unhappiness of man, he provided due place for the work of sublimation which has also relative value and conditioned process of socialization. These again, are determined by the unconscious forces. These conceptual framework of individual mind, group psychology, psychic determinism and the idea of liberation from repressive civilization became the second approach of psychoanalytic critique.

Epistemological Status and Limitations

Freudian psychoanalysis has been criticized as conservative, reductionist , positivistic and also unscientific (Popper, 1963; Fromm, 1962; Grunbaum, 1983). The validity of the influences of unconscious mind is also questioned (Ellenberger, 1970). The epistemological status of psychoanalysis is illuminated by two different arguments: whether it is a science or hermeneutic system envisaged to help the therapeutic and interpretation orientation of scholars (Wallerstein, 1988; Strengar, 1990). The scientific claim based on empirical question arises from the therapeutic considerations as a healing endeavour with necessarily a theory of therapy of change and cure. The scientific claims of psychoanalysis has been challenged by Karl Popper and Graunbaum. Popper argued that psychoanalytic theory is untestable, unfalsifiable and hence unscientific. (1963, 50) Graunbaum argued that psychoanalysis clearly does fulfill the falsifiability criterion, and on that basis it cannot be put down as a pseudoscience. Freud himself did change from his original traumatic theory of the neurosis to his subsequent inner psychology of vicissitude of drive and defense. Graunbaum conceded that psychoanalysis has been remarkably heuristic and continues to be so, but he distinguished from its lack of probative value and its propositions can be

satisfactorily tested and validated within the psychoanalytic situation (1984, 167). He cited Freud's own words to weaken the scientific claim. Elsewhere Freud writes,

> "Psychoanalysis is nothing more than a particularly well-disguised and particularly effective form of suggestive treatment. Anyone who has himself carried out psychoanalysis will have been able to convince himself on countless occasions that it is impossible to make suggestions to a patient in that way. For his conflicts will only be successfully solved and his resistance overcome if the anticipatory ideas he is given tally with what is real in him. Whatever in the doctor's conjectures is inaccurate drops out in the course of the analysis; it has to be withdrawn and replaced by something more correct" (Freud, 1917, 452).

The movement within psychoanalytic theory, i.e., hermeneutics and linguistically based conceptualization represent the major assault upon the claims of psychoanalysis to the attributes of the natural science theory model. In discovering that the symptom and dream had meaning and basing his treatment on this hypothesis, Freud took the psychoanalytic study of neurosis out of the world of science into the world of humanities, because a meaning is not the product of causes but the creation of a subject (Home, 1966,43). This argument drawing upon the Verstehende Psychologie was developed by Wilhelm Dilthey, Gadamer (1975), Ricoeur (1970) and Habermas (1971). Rycroft (1966) and Klauber (1968) argued that psychoanalysis should indeed not be considered a scientific discipline at all, but rather a humanity like history, literary criticism or the Biblical exegetical interpretation from which the term `hermeneutic' derived in the first place, all these clearly governed by the logic of their own internal conventions. Gill (1976), Klein (1976) and Schafer (1976) have preferred to see psychoanalysis a very different kind of science from the natural science, a science bound and governed by its own set of evidential standards and criteria for proof, criteria intrinsically related to the tally subjectivist nature of its data base and therefore different from the usual canons of natural science. Laplanche and Pontalis considered that interpretation is at the heart of Freudian doctrine and technique. Psychoanalysis itself might be defined in terms of it, as the bringing out of the latent meaning of given material (1973, 222). These arguments illuminate that Freudian psychoanalysis has its own scientific techniques with the important endeavour of interpretation.

The popular conception of Freudian theory is that it is rooted in sexual drives. Contrary to this, Freud has never believed that the whole of man's instinctual endowment was sexual. His theory of psycho-neurosis rests on a duality of instinct. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), he announced the discovery of the death instinct and from then onwards, human psyche and by extension, human society and history are seen as the warring instincts of eros and thanatos. Freud's later works explored the ego development and its controlling power on eros and thanatos (Jones, 1953; Wollheim, 1987). Freud himself explained,

> "it is a mistake to accuse psychoanalysis of `pan- sexualism' and to allege that it derives all mental occurrences from sexuality and traces them all back to it. On the contrary, psychoanalysis has from the very first distinguished the sexual instincts from others which it has provisionally termed `ego instinct'. It has never dreamt of trying to explain everything, and even the neurosis it has traced back not to sexuality alone but to the conflict between the sexual impulses and the ego" (PFL. 15, 150).

The implications of Oedipus complex are also recognized something more than sexual (Fromm, 1955; Brown, 1959; Carveth, 1984). Oedipus complex is an interpersonal phenomenon involving social processes such as competition and rivalry and such emotions as love, hate, envy, guilt, fear of punishment and these influences upon which later stages of life is metaphorically conceived as the process of internalization and the formation of character structure.

The present study uses the two approaches for the critique and reconstruction of Marxism. However, considering the nature of Marxian texts, it is difficult to follow all the rules of the dream interpretation and hermeneutic model. Marxian text contains more socio-economic theories and rigid methodological rules rather than artistic and literary nature. Hence this approach has limited application. The second approach, using the metapsychological conceptual framework, has been extensively applied to study Marxism. Moreover, the critique and reconstruction are not carried on every aspect of Marx's writings. As the organization of chapters show, they have been accomplished in selected aspects, however, encompassing the essence of Marxism. Sources include the individual texts as well as collected and selected works of both Marx and Freud.

3

Homo Faber and Psychic Structure

The conception about the nature of man is rooted both in factual statements and value judgements. More often, conception of human nature becomes an important factor to justify certain economic or political system. The study of human nature also requires a mediation between man-in-real nature and man in historical context. The need to understand human nature is often viewed to defend the status quo or to change the social conditions to harmonize human nature. In other words, human subjectivity is largely irrational and not affected by the circumstances, whereas the rational subjectivity tries to change the circumstances in order to fulfill its authentic needs. The relation between subjectivity and the outer-world and the estrangement of subjectivity from the outer-world illuminate the phenomenon of alienation which occupies important place in the discussion of human nature while transcending the dichotomy between subject and object.

Marx presented his notion of the concept of man in the early works, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, The Holy Family, The German Ideology* and some places in *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. There are studies about Marx's reflections on the conception of man without an awareness of the early works of Marx (Lukacs, 1971; Korsch, 1970; Gramsci, 1971; Venables, 1945). However studies exist encompassing both the early and later works of Marx with a view to providing an integrated aspect of human nature and self-realization often upholding the humanist interpretation (Fromm, 1961; Kamenka, 1962; Schaff, 1970; Ollman, 1971; Meszaros, 1970; Plamenatz, 1975; Lethbridge, 1992). Marx explained the nature of man in three aspects: "man in general encompassing natural and species attributes, man in capitalist society and man in future communist society. He presented these aspects based on two premises: one, the human essence, and the other, man's relation to external nature or objective economic condition. However, Marx did not present his conception of human nature in a more ordered way. He recognized that talk about human nature is too often a means of putting an end to discussion (Ollman, 1971, xi).

Marx's Conception of Man

Marx believed that every man is endowed with natural as well as species characteristics. The natural characteristics exist as tendencies and abilities as impulses; and they seek their

fulfillment in objects outside his own body. Man feels impulses to realize the object and he carries tendencies which directs this realization towards the particular objects. Moreover, the object - the need, exists outside of man and it makes indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of man's natural powers. Marx wrote,

> "Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on the one hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers - he is an active natural being. These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities - as instincts. On the other hand, as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his instincts exist outside him, as object independent of him; yet these objects are objects that the needs - essential objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers. To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being full of natural vigour is to say that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being or at his life, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects. To be objective, natural and sensuousness and at the same time to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or oneself to be object, nature and sense for a third party, is one and the same thing.... Hunger is a natural need; it therefore needs a nature outside itself, an object outside itself, in order to satisfy itself, to be stilled" (EPM, 121-22).

Marx referred to man's self-consciousness by species being. Man's natural powers, and needs are those he shares with every living entity. But species powers and needs are those man alone possesses. They are what make him unique in nature and what set him apart as a species being from the rest of the animals. Marx argued that man manifests himself as a species being through activity of a kind, quality and pace that could only be done by human beings. His species power establishes particular relationship with other human beings just as the natural power establishes particular relationship with nature or objects. Marx included all five senses as species powers even though animals also possess them, because man uses his senses in a human fashion(Ollman, 1971, 86). Marx wrote,

> "Man is a species being not only in the sense that he makes the community his object both practically and theoretically, but also in the sense that he treats himself as the present, living species, as a universal and consequently free being.... Plants, animals, minerals, air, light, etc. constitute, from the theoretical aspect, a part of human consciousness as objects of natural science and art; they are man's spiritual inorganic nature, his intellectual means of life, which he must first prepare for enjoyment and perpetuation. So also, from the practical aspect, they form a part of human life and

> activity. In practice man lives only from these natural products, whether in the form of food, heating, clothing, housing etc. The universality of man appears in practice in the universality which makes the whole of nature into his inorganic body; as a direct means of life; and equally as the material object and instrument of his life activity" (EPM, 60).

By emphasizing the species character of man, Marx explained the significance of productive life of man. Marx also argued,

> "…free and conscious activity is the species character of human beings. Man has always been a social being because he must work in order to live, and the production of the means of subsistence is always a collective, social activity. Men produce only by co-operating and mutually exchanging their activities and products. Society is not an aggregate of individuals but the product of men's reciprocal action and the science of man is the study of the interaction among individuals in society. For labour, life activity, productive life itself, appears to man in the first place merely as a means of satisfying need - the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species.... man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness. In creating a world of object by practical activity, in his work upon inorganic nature, man proves himself a conscious species - being, i.e., as a being that treats the species as its own essential being or treats itself as a species - being.... The object of labour is, therefore, the objectification of man's species - life; for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created" (EPM, 61-62).

Marx believed that the conditions in which labour manifests itself provide the key to the understanding of human history. Moreover, the consciousness is determined by the productive activity. Marx argued, "the mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity, a definite form of expressing their life. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production." (G1, 31-2). He further argued, "man is characterized by his labour and conditioned by historical epoch. The process of labour is real and objective, occurring in the external world, not merely in man's self-consciousness. Labour becomes an historical process only when it leaves an impression on a world external to human self-consciousness. Man's consciousness of his own needs is a product of his historical development and attests to the cultural values

achieved by preceding generations. Needs will relate to material objects, but the consciousness that will see the need for these particular objects as a human need is itself as a product of a concrete historical situation and cannot be determined a priori" (G1, 41-2). In *Capital* Marx viewed that labour, in the first place, a process in which both man and nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and nature. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature (C.1., 177-80). Thus Marx recognized the power of changing by human subject rather than entirely by external world.

At the same time, Marx pointed out the influence of the external world through its material intercourse.

> "The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men - the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men at this stage still appear as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of the politics, law, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas etc., that is real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms", (GI, 36).

Marx himself was ambivalent with regard to the conception of man. He argued that, "the essence of man is not abstraction but the ensemble of social relations". (GI, 29). He also viewed that circumstances makes men just as much as men make circumstances (GI, 54). He further stated that it is not the consciousness of man that determines their living, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness (SW.1, 181). For Marx, `human' is purposeful and intentional activity which transforms nature and so becomes social. `Nature' should be seen here as what is passively given, the social as what actively transforms it in a human way. The labour-process is thus the human essence of the human condition itself. That is why Marx defined man as Homo laborans - man defined by the labour process. However, Marx gives priority to the self- conscious, spontaneous activity of man, Homo Faber - man defined by his self-creation.

Marx wrote, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living" (EBLB; SW.1, 97). Marx's view of

history as shaping man who simultaneously impresses himself on the world makes it quite impossible to ascribe to man any priori essence. On the other hand, man's world-shaping function itself becomes the empirical content of human existence. Man as creator of himself and of his world also provides a criterion for the analysis of the conditions of his contemporary historical existence. Man's relation to members of his species thus determines not only the means of his existence but its contents as well. Man's objective living and his other-directedness and sociability serve as criteria for the evaluation of economic theories and social structures (Avineri, 1968, 85-6; Schaff, 1970). In other words, Marx's conception of man is a material, sensuous being dependent on nature and at the same time capable of transforming nature, however, conditioned by historical epoch of productive activity.

Marx believed that man is sensuous and he has needs and natural powers to fulfill in the objects. Marx perceived the one side of the natural being in terms of positive self-preservation fulfilling his biological needs from the material world. Marx did not conceive the duality of instincts like Freud which creates ambivalence and dialectical conflict in the individual mind. From natural being, Marx tried to add human quality by the concept of social being which explains what is possible only by man, the productive activity. Moreover, Marx argued that the essence of man is labour and man's activity is self-conscious and spontaneous. Freud differed considerably by arguing that the formation of `ego' makes man to be conscious about the external world and fellow beings and about the social norms and impediments. The life instinct, the eros itself compels man to associate with fellow beings and change the natural man to social man. Further by the function of ego, man is forced to adopt and adjust to reality. However, the ego is not as much rational to accept the social control. It awaits to fulfill the wishes of the id - though the ego is conscious of the social norms. At the same time the ego actively represses the inclination of the id and gratify what is acceptable by society. Thus, the rationality appears when man is subjected to the control of ego.
For Marx, rationality appears when man objectifies his subjectivity through his labour. Labour is the means to realize the material needs of man. For Freud, man seeks for straight-away gratification and fulfillment of his needs. Labour is the essence of reality principle. Freud is skeptical about the self-conscious and spontaneous activity of man. Freud held that once the ego is formed, it represses the wishes of the `id' and from then onwards, man's activity is neither self-conscious nor spontaneous. Repression creates the existence of the unconscious mind. All further activities of man are subjected to the interplay of his unconscious wishes and the external arrangements.

Marx, however, analyzed the characteristics of natural as well as social being in the pre-class society. In the pre- class society, man is conscious of his own needs and his productive

activity is not determined by class relation and external coercion. What is self-conscious and spontaneity for Marx is free-playing of `id' the pleasure seeking activity, for Freud. Freud argued that the child is made to gratify directly and in later years, reality teaches him to render his labour and engage in production activity which is `en route' to fulfill his needs. Marx believed that man in the pre-class society is inherently good and later the circumstance shaped by mode of production corrupts man. Freud did not classify man as good or evil, instead man exists to seek pleasure and he must be sublimated for the common good instead of irrational arrangements of repression. Freud suggested that beyond labour there is eros and it must have been the hidden force supplying the energy devoted to labour and to make history. For Freud, work and economic necessity are the essence of the reality principle, but the essence of man lies not in the reality principle but in repressed unconscious desires. The repressed eros is the energy of history and labour must be seen as sublimated eros. Norman O. Brown argued "no matter how stringently economic necessities press down on him, he is not in his essence `Homo economicus' or `Homo laborans'" (1959, 17). Freud realized the importance of coercion since men are not spontaneously fond of work (PFL. 12, 186). Thus Freud understood that the natural being is wholly governed by biological needs not altruistic and rational. The social being emerges from the inclination of eros as well as the formation of ego. And labour is the essence of reality principle out of economic necessity and coercion rather than self-conscious and spontaneous.

Theory of Alienation

Marx in his early writings especially, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* and *The German Ideology* analyzed the phenomenon of alienation, a condition prevailing in capitalist society as Marx believed. Marx added a new dimension to the phenomenon of alienation propounded by Hegel. According to Hegel, alienation is inherent in the nature of all spiritual creation. It is therefore inevitable that men who are creators of the world, also experience it as something beyond their control, a force dominating their will, frustrating their desires and confronting their expectations. Hegel further argued that alienation is a state of consciousness as it acquaints itself with the external, objective, phenomenal world. At this stage objects appear to man external and alien, and consciousness feels itself estranged and alienated in this otherness. Thus the spirit is at war with itself and it has to overcome itself as its most formidable obstacle. The essential purpose of historical progress is to overcome the alienation in and through the process of knowledge. Hegel believed that the overcoming of alienation is bestowed with the self-consciousness of man by recognizing what appears as an external object.

Marx explained the phenomenon of alienation with the help of production activity and labour-process in capitalist society. Marx wrote, "The object which labour produces - labour's product - confronts it as something alien, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object, which has become material; it is the objectification of labour. Labour's realization is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realization of labour appears as loss of realization for the workers; objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation" (EPM, 57).

Marx further explained,

> "first the fact that labour is external to the worker; i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content and but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when is working he does not feel at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the external character of labour for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another.... It is the loss of his self"(EPM, 59-60).

Marx analyses the problem of alienation in relation to the product of his labour, in the process of production itself; and the relation between man and man. He argued that private property and division of labour are the consequence of alienated or estranged labour. Marx wrote,

> "estranged labour turns man's species-being, both nature and his spiritual species-property, into a being alien to him, into a means for his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his human aspect. An immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life activity, from his species-being is the estrangement of man from man. If the product of labour does not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, then this can only be because it belongs to some other man than the worker.... We must bear in mind the previous preposition

> that man's relation to himself only becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to the other man. Thus, if the product of his labour, his labour objectified, is for him an alien, hostile, powerful object independent of him, then his position towards it is such that someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him. If he treats his own activity as an unfree activity, then he treats it as an activity performed in the service, under the dominion, the coercion, and the yoke of another man. .... Through estranged, alienated labour, then the worker produces the relationship to this labour of a man alien to labour and standing outside it. The relationship of the worker to labour creates the relation to it of the capitalist as whatever one chooses to call the master of labour. Private property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence of alienated labour, of the external relation of the worker to the nature and to himself ....Later this relationship becomes reciprocal"
> (EPM, 62-64).

Marx further argued that the division of labour is also the effect of estranged labour. He provided a historical account of division of labour from tribal through ancient communal to feudal or estate properties (GI, 32-4). For Marx, as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood (GI, 47). Marx believed that the division of labour within the society brings into contact independent commodity, producers, who acknowledge no other authority but that of competition, of the coercion exerted by the presence of their mutual interests (C.1, 356). The division of labour whereby people do only one kind of work and rely upon others to do whatever else is necessary to keep them alive in a more inclusive social expression of man's alienated productive activity. Private property is the material summary expression of alienated labour. For Marx, alienation exists in all societies where the division of labour is the operative principle of economic organization. Marx related the phenomenon of alienation to the worker, and not to an undifferentiated condition of man. Marx displayed the devastating effect of capitalist production on human beings, on their physical and mental states and on the social processes of which they are a part. Alienated man is an abstraction because he has lost touch with all human specificity. He has been reduced to performing undifferentiated work on humanly indistinguishable objects among people deprived of their human variety and compassion. Marx held property, industry and religion as alienated life elements (HF, 157).

In the *Manuscripts*, Marx wrote, "the capitalist's relation to the labour is something to sell and make a profit with. The outstanding qualities of capitalists are greed, cruelty and hypocrisy.

Greed is seen as the motive of most capitalist actions, cruelty as its all too willing handmaiden, and hypocrisy as the mask capitalists wear to hide their motives and means from others". Marx considered greed as the subjective means through which capitalists appropriate nature as well as an omniscient and unruly passion. Elsewhere Marx argued that the capitalist's greed, cruelty and hypocrisy emerge from their dealing with competitors and customers as well as with workers (EPM, 116). The consequences of alienation are focused through the class structure, and are experienced by the proletariat. In the early stage, Marx believed that man is essentially a creative being whose natural propensities are denied by the restrictive character of capitalism. However, Marx realized that the enormous productive power of capitalism generates possibilities for the future development of man which could not have been possible under prior forms of productive system. Marx viewed capital as accumulated labour is conceived as a form of human subjectivity (EW, 147).

Man in Civil Society

Marx analyzed the condition of man in civil society (Burgerliche Gesellschaft) which embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces (G1, 48). The civil society in which each individual is a totality of needs and only exists for another person, as the other exists for him, in so far as each becomes a means for the other (EPM, 181). Marx portrayed civil society as the terrain of individual egotism. It is also used in Marx's early writings as a yardstick of the change from feudal to bourgeois society. Marx viewed civil society as a site of cross materialism, of modern property relations, of the struggle of each against all, of egotism arose from the destruction of medieval society. Marx argued that in civil society the old bonds of privilege were replaced by the selfish needs of atomistic individuals separated from each other and from the community. The fragmented, conflictual nature of civil society with its property relations necessitates a type of politics which does not reflect this conflict but is abstracted and removed from it. In modern society the most universal, moral, social purposes as embodied in the ideal of the state are at the service of human being in a partial, depraved state of individual egotistical desires, of economic necessity. It is in this sense that the essence of the modern state is to be found in the characteristics of civil society, in economic relations. For the conflict of civil society to be truly superseded and for the full potential of human beings to be realized, besides property and division of labour, both civil society and its product political society must be abolished, necessitating a social as well as political revolution to liberate mankind. Thus Marx analyzed the phenomenon of alienation in the process of objectification of labour in the context of capitalist society of private property and division of labour.

Alienation and Repression

Freud did not analyze the phenomenon of alienation out of the objectification of labour in the production process. But the concept alienation would appear to be analogous to Freud's concept of repression of libidinal energies (Schacht, 1971). Norman O. Brown wrote, "I do not see how the profundities and obscurities of the *Philosophic - Economic Manuscripts* can be elucidated except with the aid of psychoanalysis" (1959, 318). Freud understood the phenomenon of alienation as sense of non-identity and powerlessness and loneliness. He argued that the phenomenon or experience would happen throughout the life of human beings and not confined to any historical situation. Freud offered a different interpretation by narrating his own experience in his *Autobiographical Study* (1925), "The university, which I entered in 1873, brought me, to begin with, several palpable disappointments. Above all I was struck by the presumption that I should feel inferior and not a member of the `volk' because I was a Jew. The former notion, I rejected quite decisively, I have never comprehended why I should be ashamed of my descent or, as one was then beginning to say my race. The membership in the `volk' that was denied to me I renounced without much regret. I thought that for an eager fellow worker a small place must be found within the framework of humanity even without such acceptance. But these first impressions of the university had one consequence that remained important later on; early in life I became familiar with a lot of standing among the opposition and being placed under a ban by the compact majority. This laid the foundation for a certain independence of judgement". Freud justified Hegel's emphasize on responsibility of the self to overcome its own alienation. When eros in the state of alienation, i.e., when the libidinal energy is repressed, it forms a substitute gratification. Private property and religion can be seen as a substitute gratification of the estranged man. At the same time, when the object is denied to the eros, the libido turns inward and becomes narcissistic.

Marx ignored the importance of family and the socialization process of child during the early years in the formation of character structure and its determining influence on human nature. Freud explained the formation of character structure by studying the fixation of libido on the erotogenic zones of the body and he named as oral, anal and phallic. He argued that character trait is a function or sign of displacement of a bodily interest in the early childhood. He believed that generosity and narcissism are associated with oral stage and stubbornness, hoarding, avarice and pedantry are associated with anal stage. In the phallic stage, the child experiences the problem of Oedipus complex and castration threat and from then onwards the child internalizes the ambivalent love-hate relationship in all dimensions of life (CP II, 45-50). Freud developed those theories out of his clinical practices. According to Freud, the repression of libido is actively carried on in the phallic stage. Thus at the age of three, the

child starts to experience the phenomenon of alienation and recognizes `otherness' in the outerworld and tries to adopt the existing environment with the fear of rejection and punishment.

Freud discovered these kinds of character structures even in the primitive societies. In other words, libidinal repression and displacement of libidinal interests and formation of substitute gratification prevailed in the primitive societies. Alienation, a check on the eros and libidinal repression associated with capitalist mode of production and its consequence private property and division of labour requires transhistorical interpretation. However, there are arguments that the class society under capitalism would produce certain character structure to maintain class society and to continue the state of alienation (Adorno, 1950; Fromm, 1955; Szymanski, 1978). In other words, the psychic structure of individual can be used to internalize the essence of capitalism. To Freud scarcity was a transhistorical truth, the perpetual reality of the human condition. If scarcity is not inevitable, however - if abundance is a human possibility - then the transhistorical truth of his entire instinctual system is shattered. The instincts would then define man only relative to the level of production in any particular historical epoch (Friedman, 1988, 179). O' Brown wrote, "there is something in the structure of the human animal which compels him to produce superfluosly, but obviously the compulsion will apply only so long as the human animal draws no distinction between the necessary and the superfluous. It is an integral part of the money complex and the complex to work to confuse the superfluous with the necessary, the confusion still reigns in all the vague talk about economic necessity" (1959,256-7). He further added that the effect is to substitute an abstraction, Homo economicus, for the concrete totality of human nature, and thus to dehumanize human nature. Capitalism has made us so stupid and one-sided that objects exist for us only if we can possess them or if they have utility (1959, 238). For Freud, scarcity forces man to renounce self-conscious and spontaneous activity and he submitted to, with the repressive element of the ego, the external regulation of the production process.

Freud also illuminated that each period of the individual's life has its appropriate determinant of anxiety There is, first, the fear of birth; secondly, the fear of separation from mother; thirdly, the fear of castration; and finally, the fear of the superego. Freud recognized the fact that the external world is not evolved to fulfill the needs of the eros. Instead it represses through the inherence structure of the ego and in turn man creates substitute gratification in a distorted way. However, man's unconscious inclination is to reconcile the conflicting tendencies of the ego and the id.

Marx believed that the abolition of private property and division of labour would eliminate estrangement and it is possible only in communist society. Marx defined communism as the

positive abolition of private property, of human self- alienation and therefore as the return of man to himself as a social, i.e., really human, being a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development (EW, 155). Elsewhere, Marx wrote, "Communism is fully developed naturalism, equals humanism and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man - the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self- confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species" (EPM, 81). Marx also argued that in communist society of the future where society regulates production and make it possible for everybody to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt, fish or critical critic to suit his inclination, without ever becoming a hunter, fisherman or critic. In other words, man would achieve all round development of all his abilities by escaping subjection to the division of labour (G1, 32).

Marx did not mean an anarchical situation by eliminating division of labour. The sense and needs of the species being would define the nature of work which is conducive to his self-conscious, spontaneous creativity. The very activity of his work would enable him to enjoy his personality and realize his natural capacity and spiritual aims. He further believed that the ideal relationship to the mutual objects of man's production is of course his mutual objects. Marx presented the charateristics of ideal relationships of man as to his product and his relationship to
his fellow men through that product in the absence of private property and division of labour. These imply a view of human nature that does not consist in something inherent in each member of the species, but in the relation among the members. Marx intended to present a human relation embedded in rationality which in turn referring to self-conscious, deliberate ambition free from the determining forces of economic structure. Moreover, Marx upheld the intersubjective relation which did not consider the other human beings as one's object instead as part of subject. Hence Marx recognized the impact of human subjectivity on the material conditions. According to Schmidt (1971), Marx referred to nature which encompassed both matter and mind.

Marx's theory of alienation rooted in the historical process of production under capitalism. However Marx traces the existence of private property and the division of labour in the Asiatic, the Greco-Roman, and the Germanic, (the three basic) pre-capitalist agricultural structures. In the Asiatic economic formation, it was the despotic state unity which actually possessed the soil, rather than the individual or the particular communities. Thus, man's relation to the soil, the objective conditions of his own labour, was not direct, not immediate, but mediated through the despotic state. He remained in a state of alienation. In the

Greco-Roman pattern, before man could have access to the communal soil he had to be a member of the state. The existence in the state was a pre-condition of man's possession of the soil, and so his relation to the objective conditions of his activity was not direct, not immediate and not spontaneous. Among the Germans, where families were separated by the geographical contours of forests and hills, the community only existed by the action of the individual members. The German community suffered from a dearth of unity and union, since it only manifests by the agreement of its individual constituents. Individual alienation from the community, rather than alienation from the conditions of labour, was the characteristic fault of the German pattern (PCEF, 69-80). Marx himself stated that human alienation has always existed even not in relation to labour process. However Marx explained the phenomenon of alienation in Capitalism with economic categories.

Marx maintained that the private property and the division of labour are the consequences of human alienation and later they became reciprocal. In the capitalist society, private property and division of labour further intensify the problem of alienation and hence Marx proposed to abolish private property and division of labour. Towards the end of his life, Marx became doubtful as to whether the phenomenon of alienation is indeed inherent in capitalism alone and would thus disappear with the abolition of private property and class relations. Marx came to believe that alienation is an unavoidable consequence of the necessity to work. Since there is no escape from this necessity, alienation is bound to exist, to a lesser or greater degree, in every system of production. Marx assumed that the goodness of men would assert itself automatically when the economic changes had been achieved. Marx did not see that a better society could not be brought into life by people who had not undergone a moral change within themselves (Fromm, 1955, 223). Marx believed that man by nature is self-conscious, species-being and stands for freedom and creativity. And largely these categories are defined by the productive process and his relation with other men. Marx recognized the reciprocal impact of both the consciousness of man and the social existence. Marx indirectly accepts the inherent categories of human nature which should be unfolded by external arrangements free from private property and division of labour. However, his conception of man is not adequately comprehending the problem of alienation. The human subjectivity often encounter the external arrangements which are strange, hostile and unyielding for the expectations of the psyche. This problem of subject-object dichotomy, from philosophical to practical, opens for various discussion and solution aiming to seek for a correlation. Freud argued that the eros is always seeking for pleasure and binding the human beings irrespective of the external arrangements. The other being rational, structure of the mind, the ego, takes the responsibility to find a mediation by way of repressing the socially unacceptable aspirations of the "id" and at the same time, the ego paves the way for rational

arrangement of the society. This process of interplay between id and ego is not determined by historical stage and this process is continuous one since the dawn of civilization.

However, how the structure of the ego is determined is a significant discussion of psychoanalysis. For Marx, repression is not caused by an inner structure of the mind rather it is completely external relating to production process. But Marx himself recognized the inner categories while arguing false consciousness in maintaining class society. For Freud, family is the first repressing element which opens an internalization of domination and thus creates a character structure through which all later forms of repression and domination of society has taken place. Hence, the ego is shaped gradually and conditioned by history. However, for Freud, the contradiction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle could not come to an end. Freud admires that the abolition of private property and division of labour would bring reconciliation. Freud himself appreciated the abolition of private property which is a substitute and distorted gratification (PFL, 12, 303-5). Freud also argued that the aggressiveness of man, the death instinct cannot be surpassed by changing the social institutions. While commenting on the nature of war, Freud does not see any artificial inclination but the necessary dispossessions of the innate aggressive instinct of man (PFL, 12, 305).

For Marx, the primary concern is how political economy degenerates the human subjectivity and how this process has been carried out historically. Marx did not see any inherent evil tendencies of consciousness. However he explained the greed and selfish tendencies of the capitalist which creates the degeneration of subjectivity. Marx held subjectivity in abeyance, and focused only on that which is alienable. It follows therefore that only those aspects of mind which directly mirror the objective world can be regarded as psychologically crucial (Kovel, 1976, 231). Marx provides a limited conception of man and it is inadequate to justify the compatibility of communism. As he himself was aware that the problem of alienation could not be entirely overcome by a system of production. Freud believed that the complete elimination of repression and free from unconscious desires are impossible. Moreover, Freud argued that human beings are striving for, most of the time, pleasure and irrational aspirations. What is irrational for Freud is the striving of the id to gratify irrespective of the environment. In the family, through which all later authority and domination is carried on, where the child learns the ambivalent relation and experiences the subject-object dichotomy which precedes the problem created by the productive process. Freud believed that man cannot be wholly brought under the control of the reality principle (Yankelovich and Barrett, 1970; Leiss, 1972). Thus, man is hardly compatible to the organized society. But the ego subjugates him to adopt to the organized society by renouncing the pleasure principle.

Freud tried to state that when society satisfies the irrational and unconscious desires or by way of substitute gratification, human beings are supposed to be bound and in this way the legitimacy attained. A complete rational appeal and demystification are difficult for the irrational man. According to Freud, though the ego internalizes reason, social norms and collective good, it often looks for a way to gratify the "id". Hence the natural man is hardly compatible with any system of society or production unless it makes myths or substitute gratification which must satisfy the irrational longings. Freud himself analyzed very limitedly the constituents of the unconscious mind. And he himself left open further exploration.

Marx was inconsistent when he argued about the problem faced by man in the pre-capitalist society and his resolve in the communist society. Marx accepted the reciprocal activities of both the inherent structures of man and the production process. However, in his early writings the autonomy of subjectivity is more often emphasized, Freud denounced the autonomy of subjectivity which would often serve the irrational, repressed and unconscious longings. He not only analyzed the problem created by capitalism but also the problem of various stages of society and tried to formulate a society of communism which, he believed, would eliminate alienation. Freud conceived that the phenomenon of alienation could be traced from early childhood and preceded and universal rather than merely objectification of labour. The pleasure principle of the unconscious mind desires to live in myths or substitute gratification rather than in organized society which would be repressive and creates further tension between the conscious and the unconscious mind.

4

Class Consciousness and Group Psychology

The human condition, for Marx, is degenerated by the system of private property and the division of labour and the problem of alienation of man from himself, from his own product, and from his fellow-beings. These conditions created the whole society to fall apart into the two classes: the property owners and the propertyless workers. The concept of class occupies important place in analyzing Marx's theory of social change since he discovered that the proletariat is the idea in the real itself, a new political force engaged in a struggle for emancipation. But Marx did present controversial statements which are difficult to reconcile and also he did not define clearly the concept of class. For class conflict he showed the inevitability of the dialectical process of change. Class conflict requires class consciousness, i.e., from class-in-itself to class-for-itself. Marx did not adequately explain the necessary process of arousing class consciousness. However he presented his views on the obstacles to create class consciousness in capitalism.

Theory of Class

Marx believed that every form of human society presupposes some rudimentary division of labour and classes came into existence when the surplus of privately appropriated wealth became crystallized by small groups. He further argued that, classes are an aspect of the relation of production; classes emerge where the relations of production involve a differentiated division of labour which allows for the accumulation of surplus production that can be appropriated by a minority group, which thus stands in an exploitative relationships to the mass of producers. Marx wrote, "The capitalist mode of production is more and more to divorce the means of production from labour, and more and more to concentrate the scattered means of production into larger groups, thereby transforming labour into wage-labour and the means of production into capital" (C. 3, 862). For Marx, the ordering of classes change considerably with the emergence of successive forms of society. With the advent of capitalism, which depends upon the expropriation of a mass of labourers who have nothing to save their labour power to offer in exchange for the means of obtaining a livelihood, that market relationships appear as the determinant of human productive activity. And the opposition between ownership and non- ownership of the means of production is the source of classes.

Elsewhere Marx wrote, "the separate individuals form a class only in so far as they have to carry common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors. On the other hand, the class in its turn achieves an independent existence over against the individuals, so that the latter find their condition of existence predestined - and hence have their position in life and their personal development assigned to them by their class, and become subsumed under it" (GI, 69). Marx viewed that the labourers who are deprived of the means of production and property themselves stand as a class. The awareness of class is developed when they find out a common battle against the exploiters. Marx wrote,

> "the history of all hitherto - existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and Slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word oppressor and oppressed stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.... Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature; it has simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat" (MCP, 33-4).

Marx identified two kinds of opposing classes in capitalism. He referred bourgeoisie as the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of production and employers of the wage-labour. Proletariat is referred to the class of modern wage-labourers who having no means of production of their own are reduced to sell their labour-power in order to survive (SW. I, 113). Marx argued that the capitalists form a class only to the degree that they are forced to carry on a struggle against another class. Otherwise capitalists are in economic competition with each other in the pursuit of profit in the market (GI, 69). Marx explained both the positive and the negative aspects of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie begins with a proletariat which is itself a relic of the proletariat of feudal times. In the course of its historical development, the bourgeoisie necessarily develops its antagonistic character, which at first is more or less disguised, existing only in a latent state. The bourgeoisie whenever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal and patriarchal relations. It has converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet and the man of science into its paid wage-labourer. It has reduced the family relation to a mere money relation. Marx also explained the economic development envisaged by the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption. It, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations

into civilization. The bourgeoisie keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization (MCP, 35-7). Under these processes, the bourgeoisie produces both wealth as well as poverty. There is a development of the productive forces as well as there is a force producing repression. These relations produce bourgeoisie wealth only by continually annihilating the wealth of the individual members of this class and by producing an ever-growing proletariat (PP, 118). Thus, Marx viewed that the bourgeoisie through its own activity paves the way to form its opposing class, the proletariat under the capitalist mode of production. In proportion to capital developed, the proletariat is developed who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labour increases capital. Marx wrote,

> "of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class.... All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation.... The modern labourer instead of rising with the progress of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth" (MCP, 42-3).

Though Marx explored the origin and the development of classes out of the mode of production, he declared that those findings had existed before. In a letter to Joseph, L. Weydemeyer in 1852, Marx wrote, ".... Now as for myself, I do not claim to have discovered either the existence of classes in modern society or the struggle between them. Long before me, bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this struggle between the classes, as had bourgeois economists their economic anatomy. My own contribution was, (1) to show that the existence of classes is merely bound up with certain historical phases in the development of production; (2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship itself constitutes no more than a transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society...."(SW. I, 546-7). Thus, Marx visualized a class conflict in capitalism as the previous historical stages experienced class antagonism. Marx argued that alienation, private property, division of labour, poverty, exploitation and the oppression of the bourgeoisie necessitate the proletariat as a historical necessity to transcend the deteriorating situation and to overthrow the bourgeoisie class and to create a classless society. The proletariat is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself and thereby its opposite, the condition for its existence, what makes it the proletariat, i.e., private

property" (HF, 51). After the crystallization of the proletariat class, Marx argued, the class struggle is inevitable. He justified the class struggle on the ground that the dialectical process of history as well as the nature of things necessitate to overthrow one class by its antithesis class. Marx believed that the class antagonism and struggle was determined by specific relations of production which intensified the hostility between the owners of labour and the owners of the means of production.

Marx argued that the struggle of the exploited class against the exploiting class will appear superficially to be merely a political struggle. The bourgeoisie is found to be entrenched behind the current political regime and to be utilizing it both as a weapon of exploitation and as a power to keep down the impeding revolt of the masses. The overthrow of the existing political regime is therefore a necessary step which the oppressed class must take in order to achieve economic emancipation. Marx in *The Class Struggles in France*, explained that it is necessary for the proletariat to win political power. Marx used for the first time the term dictatorship of the proletariat and formulated the idea of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry with the leading role of the former. Marx also emphasized the universal nature of the proletariat. Elsewhere Marx wrote,

> "the class making a revolution appears from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society; it appears as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class. It can do this because, to start with, its interest really is more connected with the common interest of all other non- ruling classes, because under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class.... When the French bourgeoisie overthrew the power of aristocracy, it thereby made it possible for many proletarians to raise themselves above the proletariat, but only in so far as they became bourgeois. Every new class, therefore, achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously, whereas the opposition of the non-ruling class against the new ruling class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly" (GI, 60-2).

Marx explained the process of class struggle in *The Poverty of Philosophy*. Marx argued that, "a common situation and a common interest is required to articulate the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. The first attempt is to associate the workers themselves in the form of combinations. Though large scale industries concentrate in one place and divide a section of workers from others, the maintenance of wages, the common interest against the capitalists unites them in a common thought of resistance-combination. This combination stops competition among workers, so that they can carry a general competition with the capitalist.

If the aim of resistance is merely the maintenance of wages, combinations at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups as the capitalists in their turn unite for the purpose of repression, and in the face of always united capital, the maintenance of the association becomes more necessary to them then that of wages. Thus economic condition has first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The combination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle this mass becomes united and constitute itself as a class-for-itself.

An oppressed class, argued Marx, is the vital condition for every society founded on the antagonism of classes. For the oppressed class to be able to emancipate itself, it is necessary that the productive powers already acquired and the existing social relations should no longer be capable of existing side by side. Of all the instruments of production, the greatest productive power is the revolutionary class itself. The condition for the emancipation of the working class is the abolition of every class, just as the condition for the liberation of the third estate, of the bourgeois order, was the abolition of all estates and all orders. The working class, in the course of its development will substitute for the old civil society an association which will exclude classes and their antagonism, and there will be no more political power properly so-called, since political power is precisely the official expression of antagonism in civil society. The antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a struggle of class against class, a struggle which carried to its highest expression is a total revolution (PP 165-8). For this class antagonism, class consciousness is important to make aware of the real situation of the proletariat and the historical role to accomplish by way of the formation of classless society.

Class Consciousness

Marx, from an early stage, made a distinction between the objective situation of a class and subjective awareness of this situation , that is, between class membership and class consciousness. Marx viewed that the emergence of class consciousness in the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as a consequence of the increasing political struggle with the ruling class. Class consciousness is not only a feeling of unity but also a hostility towards other class which involves a struggle for one's own interests and against the interest of others. Class consciousness also includes a distinctive philosophy, a view of the world and a programme of action whose aim is to change the existing state of affairs. Marx argued that the proletarian class potentially existed in the capitalist mode of production, that as a class-in-itself. But this class is not well developed as a force to change and to overthrow the bourgeoisie, that is, proletariat is not developed as a class-for-itself. Marx is quite aware that the understanding

and active pursuit of the common interests of the whole class can often come into conflict with particular interests of individual workers or group of workers. At the least it can lead to conflicts between the short term and short sighted interests of individual workers in their own social advancement, and those of the class as a whole. However, Marx approached the question of classes from the standpoint of conditions in Britain (Kolakowski, 1978, 354). Consciousness of real condition of the class is a must in transferring the class-in-itself to class-for-itself.

False Consciousness

Marx himself did not discuss the problem of class consciousness in detail. Marx pointed out that there is an `inverted' form of consciousness which would undermine the real situation to proletariat. Religion and ideology perform these false consciousness among the working class in the interests of the bourgeoisie.

Marx wrote, "It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines the consciousness. For the first manner of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; for the second manner of approach, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness" (SW. I, 25-26). Marx argued that, the real material activity and life process must constitute the structure of consciousness. In the class society, i.e., estrangement, exploitation and private property must intensify the proletariat to arouse the consciousness to transcend the existing situation. However, Marx also explained that every form of class society produces a system of ideological justification. Marx wrote, "consciousness can never be anything else than conscious being, and the being of man is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside-down as in a `camera obscura', this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life- process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process" (SW. I, 25-26). The ideological justification of the bourgeoisie make the proletariat not to be aware of the problems of private property, estrangement, exploitation, inequality and the oppression of the ruling class. Elsewhere, Marx wrote, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. he class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it" (SW, I, 49).

The differentiation in wages and the temptations of increasing affluence have also brought about a weakening of class solidarity and consciousness (Parkin, 1979; Cohen, 1982;

Poulantzas, 1975). Capitalist mode of production could maintain its oppressive and exploitative tendencies by creating infinite consumer, deep-seated commodity fetishism and false needs (Lukacs, 1971; Marcuse, 1964). Capitalism manipulates the preferences of the consumer, creating within him a set of false needs that guide him in a pattern of endless consumption. Human beings are manipulated to desire and to want commodities that they do not truly need. It diverts the human beings from their own alienation in the sphere of work. Marx wrote, "under private property.... every person speculated on creating a new need in another, so as to drive him to fresh sacrifice, to place him in a new dependence and to seduce him into a new mode of enjoyment and therefore economic ruin. Each tries to establish over the other an alien power, so as thereby to find satisfaction of his own selfish needs. Private property does not know how to change crude need to human need. Its idealism is fantasy, caprice and whim... He puts himself at the service of the other's most depraved fancies, plays the pimp between him and his need, excites in him morbid appetites, lies in wait for each of his weaknesses - all so that he can then demand the cash for this service of love..."(EPM, 91-2).

Marx did not give explanation how to relate the working class to the objective situation. Marx believed that the dialectical process of historical necessity would make the class struggle possible. Marx argued that the self-conscious proletariat could transcend the powerful hold of religion and ideology which created an inverted consciousness in the interest of the ruling class, and the emancipation process is a deterministic one. The crisis between labour and capital is inevitable. Lukacs (1971) argued that the incurability and deterministic concept could not be ended in class struggle rather it has not developed the class consciousness. He tried to relate the objective situation of the working class, determined by the crisis tendencies of capitalism, to its subjective potential for formulating a class conscious account of domination and liberation. In fact, Marx deals with the problem of class consciousness very little because of his belief in historical necessity and dialectical materialism. Marx derived the inevitability of contradiction from dialectics. This dialectical contradiction could also be applied to the study of history. Marx referred the deterministic functions of the forces and relations of production in the historical stage as materialistic interpretation of history.

Dialectics and Class Conflict

Marx's dialectic and his materialistic interpretation has philosophical roots in the Hegelian philosophy that was the preoccupation of his early student life. For Hegel, the dialectic is a principle and structural pattern of development started from abstract being as Mind or Spirit. For Marx the dialectic of development had started from Nature and from Man initially as an

integral part of Nature. But while part of Nature and subject to the determinism of its laws, man as a conscious being was at the same time capable of struggling with and against Nature - of subordinating it and ultimately transforming it for his own purposes. This, he did by consciously devising productive and creative activity. This human activity that differentiated Man from Nature and from most other animate creatures was productive labour. Human history accordingly began from this dialectic of Man's struggle with Nature, and essentially consisted in the various forms and stages assumed by productive labour in its development and progress. A principal feature of this dialectic of Man versus Nature was the invention and use of productive instruments which were simultaneously durable embodiments of labour and aids to productive labour. It makes the production a collective and social process. In production men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by co-operating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. Hence the division of labour, which starts as a division between various crafts and callings, under capitalism was to become the intricate division into separate productive operations in a mechanized collective process within a factory. Production at this stage takes the form of separation or objectification of labour from its product in a society based on private property and exchange; this in turn implying alienation of man as a producer from other man. Marx argued that political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature of labour by not considering the direct relationship between the worker and production (EPM, 58).

Marx argued,

> "at a certain stage of development the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or - this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution.... In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production.... the Asiatic, ancient feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last

> antagonistic form of the social process of production - antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individual's social conditions of existence - but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation" (CPE, 25-56).

Thus Marx had put an end to the dialectical process of history. For Hegel it is an everlasting process of development in all arenas of life and ideas. Marx wrote, "my dialectical method is not only different from the Hegelian but it is direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of `the Idea', he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of `the Idea'. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.... The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right upside again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell" (SW. 2,98). To what extent Marx followed or used the dialectical materialism in presenting his texts is a problematic one. The strangeness is that Marx wanted to end the conflict once for all through the class struggle in capitalism. The dialectical process and its application to history justifies the inevitability of class conflict in capitalism. But Marx did not present any methodological, philosophical or ideological justification for the continuity of classless society. The formation of class, and the possibility of class conflict require further interpretation rooted in the psychology of the individual as well as group.

Class and Group Psychology

Marx did not present a consistent definition or nature and structure with regard to term `class'. In *The Class Struggle in France*, Marx presented almost six type of classes: financial bourgeois, industrial bourgeois, petty bourgeois, peasant class, proletarian class and lumpenproletariat. *In Manifesto of the Communist Party* and *Capital*, he listed seven types of classes: feudal nobility, bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, rich and middle peasants, poor peasants, agricultural labourers and industrial workers (Ossowski, 1963; Aron, 1975). Moreover Marx used `contradiction', `antagonism', and `conflict' as interchangeable terms. The nature of class and class consciousness can be interpreted with the help of Freud's group psychology and the class conflict is rooted in the very instinctual structure. Freud reduced all types of classes in the terms of group. His group psychology is concerned with the

individual man as a member of a race, of a nation, of an institution or as a component part of a crowd of people who have been organized into a group at some particular time for some definite purposes (PFL, 12, 96). With the framework of group psychology, Freud raised three questions: what is a group; how does it acquire the capacity for exercising such a decisive influence over the mental life of the individual; and what is the nature of the mental change which it forces upon the individual (PFL, 12, 98). Freud argued that the presence of eros requires libidinal ties with the fellow beings. Freud began with a premise that in the mental life of individual some one else is invariably involved as a model, as an object, as a helper, and as an opponent (PFL, 12, 95). For group psychology, Freud has taken some of the views of Le Bon (1896). Le Bon argued that, "in a crowd, the individual is no longer himself, but has become an automation who has ceased to be guided by his will. Isolated he may be a cultivated individual, in a crowd, he is barbarian - that is a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity, and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive beings" (1896, 35-36). Following this, Freud argued that, "group is characterized by the eruption of unconscious desires and by intense emotional ties which deprive individual members of which could never live without a master. The group submits instinctively to anyone who appoints himself its master. Moreover the leader must himself be held in fascination by a strong faith in order to awaken the group's faith and he must possess a strong and imposing will which the group can accept from him" (PFL, 12, 108). Freud also analyzed the concept of herd instinct in the formation of groups. He argued that the individual feels incomplete if he is alone. The fear shown by the small children would seem already to be an expression of herd instinct which is primary and cannot be split up (PFL, 12, 149). Freud analyzed the concept of ego-ideal, which he later called super-ego, comprises the conscience, a critical attitude towards the ego, gradually gathers up from the influences of the environment the demands which the environment makes upon the ego and which the ego cannot always rise to; so that a man, when he cannot be satisfied with his ego itself, may nevertheless be able to find satisfaction in the ego-ideal (PFL, 12, 140). The ego-ideal is initially inherited from the primal father and has the inclination to obedient the authority. Thus Freud explored that the eros with its unconscious desires, the herd instinct and the go- ideal are the causes for the formation of groups.

For Marx, the contradiction between capital and labour and the oppression and exploitation of the labourers necessitate the formation of class. For Freud, the repression envisaged by the bourgeoisie makes the proletariat to identify the same kind of repressed people and in this way to form a group identifying same living conditions. Marx explained that the degenerated conditions make the proletariat class-in- itself. However, Freud argued that the libidinal ties with a leader is required for the continuation of a class". Freud explained that the libidinal ties on the one hand to the leader and on the other hand to the members of the

class. This is because the instinctual structure of the individual necessitates to identify with the leader. By the formation of class, the repressed proletariat is brought under conditions which allow to throw off the repressions of the unconscious impulses. Here the unconscious impulses include the aggressive instincts towards the oppressor. At the same time, the oppressed class is weak in terms of the absence of a leader as well as the non-identification of the ego-ideal. The repressed class is looking for a primal father, an authority, a suggestion and a direction. Freud discovered that the purpose of a class could be fulfilled by the libidinal ties with the leader. The relation with a leader also strengthens the class solidarity. Freud explained the process with the help of hypnotic relation. Freud himself saw no qualitative difference between the hypnotic relation in the clinic and the emotional organization of society. The hypnotic relation is the unlimited devotion of someone in love; the hypnotist is the sole object, and no attention is paid to any but him. In fact that the ego experiences in a dreamlike way whatever he may request (PFL, 12,145). Hence the repressed proletariat is potentially available for a leader or an authority to channelise the unconscious desires. For Freud, the class is formed only out of pleasure principle and unconscious and irrational inclinations and submission to authority are predominant. Whereas for Marx, the reality forces the labourers to form a class and rationality plays a vital role in appropriating the class struggle. Freud suspects the possibility of conscious personality in the class and how far rationality can make a group without a libidinal bond. However, Freud justifies the possibility of class conflict by his theory of instincts and Oedipus complex.

Oedipal Situation and Class Conflict

According to Freud, the libido has both life instinct for self-preservation and death instinct for destruction. However both are ruled by the pleasure principle irrespective of the environment. The outer world always represses the libido and the individual is always waging a war against the civilization and all kinds of authority: family, state, etc. Moreover, the ambivalent relationship, that is, love-hate relationship of the Oedipus complex at the macro level makes possible the class antagonism. The Oedipus complex implies a reaction against all oppressive authorities. To restrict freedom appears to Freud, the aim of authority in all its forms - as horde, as family, as government. For the freedom that human seek is still the freedom to become master. The Oedipus complex explains the ambivalence not only in the childhood but also the matured human beings. It explains the inherent tension between love and hate. If man feels the other as his rival and threat to his sources of pleasure and self-preservation, the feeling of hate is formed and envy is carried with the death instinct for the destruction of the other. In a repressed condition, all gestures of submission are ambivalent and the respect and affection for the authority must conceal unconscious hostility

(Rieff, 1959, 227). Since the bourgeoisie is identified as an oppressive authority, the unconscious impulses of rebellion and aggression are directed towards the bourgeoisie. For Freud, the in-group bond can be strengthened only on the condition that there is an opponent group to hate. Marx also held that the separate individuals form a class only in so for as they have to carry on a common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other (GI, 69). The intact unity of the proletariat is possible only in the presence of an oppressive bourgeoisie.

Marx believed that the class antagonism requires an objective situation and the contradiction between capital and labour necessitates this situation. For Marx, contradiction is created in the character of class society. Capitalism maximizes the contradiction inherent in class relations, and at the same time prepares the stage for the transcendence of contradiction in a classless society. The clash of reciprocal contradictions is the pitting of capital against labour. The proletariat is radical negativity, suffering from a total loss of humanity, the accumulated weight of contradictions; in redeeming itself, the proletariat redeems the whole of society from the contradictory nature of class society (EPM, EW, 144). Contradiction and negativity for Marx reflect not the finitude of being, as a universal ontological condition of the real, but refer instead to the finitude of class society, as a transitional, not a universal type of human social order (CHPR, EW, 58-9). The objective situation such as alienation, the internal contradiction of capitalism between capital and labour and the falling rate of profit of the capitalist forcing to reduce the workers create a situation of class struggle. The objective-historical situation of the capitalism provides the crisis tendencies and paves the way for proletarian emancipation through class struggle.

For Freud, the contradiction is inherent in the very instinctual structure of the individual. Aggression and hate at the individual level can be extended to the group level, that the aggression of the proletariat can be utilized for class antagonism and to overthrow the bourgeoisie. The reaction against the personal authority is also valid for social authority. The death instinct can be made socially useful by directing outwards, that is, the goal of the death instinct is no longer the annihilation of one's own life through regression, but of other life, the socially sanctioned enemies inside and outside the nation (Marcuse, 1971, 35), Moreover, the revolt against the oppressing authority would be a therapeutic effect on the proletariat. Fanon who studied the reaction of the oppressed colonized native, finds its sublimated release in dreams, myths and magic. According to him, the oppressed native achieves liberation through the fantasies of dreams: ".... the dreams of the native are always of muscular powers; his dreams are of action and of aggression; I dream I am jumping, swimming, running, climbing: I dream that I burst out laughing, that I span a river in one stride, or that I am followed by a flood of motor cars which never catch up with me. During

the period of colonization, the native never stops achieving his freedom from nine in the evening until six in the morning" (Fanon, 1966, 41). Revolutionary violence is seen by Fanon as therapeutic. Striking back at the humiliating oppressor eliminates the infantilizing and degrading aspects of the personality of the oppressed and restores self-respect (1966, 73). In the Oedipal situation, the father enforces the child subordinate to the reality principle which undermines the pleasure principle of the child. In the class society, the bourgeoisie subordinate the proletariat to their own reality principle of alienation and exploitation. The continuation of repression also increases the aggressiveness which opens the way for conflict. Though Freudian instinct theory and the Oedipus complex justifies the class antagonism, it also gives explanation for the non-formation of the class consciousness.

Character Structure and Domination

Marx did not explain how the material conditions are transformed into consciousness. The bourgeoisie has to justify and maintain the class society in order to continue exploitation and capital accumulation process and thereby undermine the formation of class consciousness. In other words, the bourgeoisie produces certain character structure which reduces the radical tendencies of the proletariat. Marx himself explained that there exists an inverted form of consciousness to the material existence. And Engels termed as false consciousness in which the real motive force impelling remain unknown to the proletariat (SW. 3, 523). The class society has succeeded in altering the psychic structure of the proletariat in such a manner that they think, feel and act against their material interest. Since human beings are interested in the unconscious wishes and ruled by pleasure principle, the bourgeoisie manipulate through their products and superstructure such as art, literature, ideology, religion and state which would web the proletariat not to think against the bourgeoisie. Character structure, formed as a way of coping with parental authority, is later generalized as a way of dealing with all authority. Submissiveness and lack of independence, will-power and critical faculties are developed by children to deal with their parents' demands. These traits later become the way of dealing with all authorities in society, the ideal of a good child - submissiveness and compliant - leaves its mark on the adult. It is libidinal suppression and the anxiety and guilt that its release or threatened release involves, that is the dynamic in this process. For Wilhelm Reich, "the goal of sexual suppression is that of producing an individual who is adjusted to the authoritarian order and who will submit to it in spite of all misery and degradation. At first, the child has to adjust to the structure of the authoritarian miniature state, the family; this makes it capable of later subordination to the general authoritarian system" (Reich, 1946, 25).

The Frankfurt School members and the so-called Freudian- Marxists developed the concept, authoritarian character by which domination can be carried on to maintain class society (Robinson, 1972; Sheoyer, 1973; Poster, 1979). Moreover, the repression is seen not in the interest of the masses of people, but rather in the interests of maintaining class society. Fromm argued, ".... the authoritarian character structure is the character structure of a person whose sense of strength and identity is based on a symbiotic subordination to authorities, and at the same time a symbiotic domination of those submitted to his authority. That is to say, the authoritarian character feels himself strong when he can submit and be part of an authority which is inflated, is defied, and when at the same time he can inflate himself by incorporating those subject to his authority" (Fromm, 1963, 153). The development of this authoritarian character results in passive and dependent people who have internalized the necessities of class society. The character structure of the oppressed resists rational impulses to freedom, dignity and self-determination by evoking anxiety and guilt whenever these impulses try to achieve consciousness. Conservatism and reaction in all its forms - religion, nationalism, fascism etc. - on the one hand ward off these rational impulses and of the other offer substitute gratification in aggressive behaviour towards other races and nations or against the very groups and individuals which advocate liberation. Racism, Fascism and extreme nationalism are thus firmly rooted in the character structures of the oppressed. These phenomena are consequently far more than mere attitudes, values, norms, or prejudices, they are based in the organization of the psychic energies (Szymanski, 1978, 36). The process of internalization and domination is accomplished through the character structure.

Freud argued that in the Oedipal situation, the child is threatened by the parental authority by way of punishment and rejection. This phenomenon internalized by the ego and the super ego is called castration fear. This castration fear together with the `sense of guilt' restrict the revolt against the authority. For Freud, these phenomena have been passed from generation to generation as archaic heritage. Though internalization is carried on through the ego, that is according to the reality principle, the rationality is structured in the interest of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, human being is inevitably lived with an ego-ideal or superego which internalizes morality and the acceptance of authority and tradition. When the immediate gratification is denied, substitute gratification is formed in order to fulfill the pleasure principle. This pliable human subjectivity and its inclination towards pleasures is fixed in the vicious circle of false needs through which the commodities produced and the consumer is forced to buy irrespective of real human satisfaction. As Marcuse puts it, false needs are the specific forms of domination in capitalist society (Marcuse, 1964).

Lukacs emphasized on the implications of reified human consciousness in which the alienation of labour extends to consciousness itself, turning human relationships into

relations between things, rendering the workers unable to rebel against alienation. With the concept of reification he explained why the proletariat failed to recognize and act upon the historical mission laid out for it by Marx. ".... the class consciousness of the proletariat does not develop uniformly throughout the whole proletariat, parallel with the objective economic crisis. Large sections of the proletariat remain intellectually under the tutelage of the bourgeoisie; even the severest economic crisis fails to sake them in their attitude. With the result that the standpoint of the proletariat and its reaction to the crisis is much less violent and intense than is the crisis itself.... With the entry of capitalism into its imperialist phase, this stratum came into being everywhere and is without a doubt an important factor in the general trend in the working class towards opportunism and anti-revolutionary attitudes.... the subjective development of the proletariat has in many ways lagged behind the tempo of the objective crisis.... These truths only acquire real significance in the context of a non-fatalistic, non-economistic theory" (Lukacs, 1971, 304-305).

The problem between the objective economic crisis and the subjective awareness identified by Lukacs is later developed by Horkhiemer, Adorno and Marcuse. The bourgeoisie creates the entire superstructure to maintain the false consciousness, since the human subjectivity is irrational enough and the predominance of the pleasure principle. Horkhiemer and Adorno applied the concept of reification to the subjective human being as well as to the working class as a whole. On this basis they created a theory of domination that joined Marx's theory of alienation with Lukacs' concept of reification (Agger, 1979, 150). Domination expresses the way in which the human being fails to perceive his own alienation and relishes capitalist productivity and its material abundance. Reification in Lukacs' sense could be eliminated by careful, rational analysis. Domination resisted this careful analysis because it appeared not to be domination at all. The `decline of the individual' is unable to separate the appearances of capitalist social reality from the alienating character of that reality. The Frankfurt School thinkers also introduced one more concept used by Max Weber, instrumental rationality which is the framework with which domination is carried out. The human being is seen to be motivated not by a clear conception of ultimate purposes or a systematic definition of personal happiness but merely by the spirit of efficiency and technical competence. This type of person consumes merely in order to possess, not in the interests of improving his life. Consumption becomes an addiction for exceeding the requirements of a relatively comfortable lifestyle and instead of being carried out for its own sake and for the sake merely of possessing things. They work not to fulfill a deep need to express themselves creatively but to achieve a certain consumerist lifestyle made possible by the expectation of a wage. For Marcuse, the people recognize themselves in their commodities. This recognition of essential self-hood in commodities anchors modern social control in the new needs which it has produced. The preconditioning, a life-long process comprised of numerous experiences of

childhood and adult socialization, creates these new needs. It indicates that there is no longer an inviolable core of personal autonomy capable of resisting this sort of preconditioning (Marcuse, 1964, 4-9). They are all a specific form of domination. For Freud, the superego absorbs the authoritarian models and internalizes the commands into individuals' conscience and the individual could not be aware of the domination. The possibility of revolutionary character is manipulated into authoritarian character which creates an illusion of autonomy (Fromm, 1963).

However, Freud argued that the conflict between the pleasure principle and reality principle is permanent and also in the case of eros and death instinct. The `ego' is not the passive structure which accepts the existing norms and system. In the initial stage the class society creates through the ego the necessary fantasies, myths and substitute gratification to appease the `id'. Though the ego is historically structured, it has the rationality trying to reconcile the conflict between the id and the ego. For Marx, the proletariat also endeavours to create a classless society in which the hitherto contradiction disappeared. For that ego should be freed from the influences of bourgeois values and instrumental rationality, and the proletarian class consciousness should be developed in parallel with objective economic situation.

5

Economic Foundation and Psychic Determinism

Marx's treatment of political economy and conceptual emphasis varies from his early works to later works. The early works give importance to such concepts as alienation, private property and the division of labour, and human emancipation. The later works emphasize on labour power, exploitation, surplus value, profit and capital. However, the central problem for Marx is to transcend the capitalist mode of production through which the possibilities of human emancipation can be contemplated. Marx is convinced that the economic structure would determine all other superstructures which foster bourgeoisie civilization and maintain the class society. Marx did recognize the importance of the non-economic factors and his texts imply a reciprocal relation between economic structure and superstructure.

According to Marx, political economy tries to discover the laws by which the production of wealth is determined. However, it regulates the importance of studying of class relations in production and studying of how the change of mode of production determines the social and political change. Marx began his study of political economy with the analysis of labour in general and conditions of labour in capitalism in particular. In the early years, Marx could not give adequate explanation to the accumulation of capital or of private property with the conceptual framework of estranged labour. Later he shifted the conceptual framework to labour power and surplus value. Capitalist production in Britain provided the necessary materials for him to analyze surplus value, profit and the antagonism between labour and capital.

Private Property

Marx concentrated more on private property while analyzing feudal mode of production. He then used the term capital while analyzing the capitalist-bourgeoisie mode of production and held that industrial capital is the accomplished objective form of private property. Marx wrote,

> "just as landed property is the first form of private property, with industry at first confronting it historically merely as a special kind of property - or, rather, as landed property's liberated slave - so this process repeats itself in the scientific analysis of the subjective essence of private property, labour. Labour appears at first only as

> agricultural labour; but then asserts itself as labour in general.... All wealth has become industrial wealth, the wealth of labour, and industry is accomplished labour, just as the factory system is the perfected essence of industry, that is of labour, and just as industrial capital is the accomplished objective form of private property" (EPM, 78).

Elsewhere Marx wrote,

> "private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours when we have it - when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc. in short, when it is used by us. Although private property itself again conceives all these direct realizations of possession only as means of life, and the life which they serve as means is the life of private property - labour and conversion into capital" (EPM, 85).

Meanwhile Marx visualized the change from feudal system to capitalism. Following Adam Smith, Marx argued that the rent of land must fall and the interest of money must increase, so that eventually the competition between landowners and tenants has the consequence that a large part of landed property falls into the hands of the capitalists. The final consequence, is that the abolition of the distinction between capitalist and landowner, so that there remains altogether only two classes of the population -the working class and the class of capitalist. This huckstering with landed property, the transformation of landed property into a commodity, constitutes the final overthrow of the old and the final establishment of the money aristocracy (EPM, 50). Thus Marx viewed that changes in the ownership of property underlie the transformation of one mode of production to the other. Moreover, Marx recognized the importance of money in modern political economy.

Commodity and Money

Marx viewed that the first chief function of money is to supply commodities with the material for the expression of their values, or to represent their values as magnitudes of the same denomination, qualitatively equal, and quantitatively comparable (C.1, 97). Marx explained the exchange relation between commodity and money, and money and commodity as metamorphosis of commodities (C.1, 106-115). The money does not vanish or lose the store of value on dropping out of the circuit of the metamorphosis of a given commodity. It is constantly being precipitated into new places in the arena of circulation vacated by other commodities. Marx wrote,

> "by possessing the property of buying anything, by possessing the property of appropriating all objects, money is thus the object of eminent possession. The universality of its property is the omnipotence of its being.... Money is the procurer between man's need and the object, between his life and his means of life" (EPM, 108).

Marx ironically explained the powerful hold of money on the life of man by citing Goethe and Shakespeare.

> ".... The extent of the power of money is the extent of my power. Money's properties are my - the possessor's - properties and essential powers.... I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the most beautiful of women.... I am brainless, but money is the real brain of all things and how then should its possessor be brainless!.... Does not my money, therefore, transform all my incapacities into their contrary? .... the distorting and confounding of all human and natural qualities, the fraternization of impossibilities - the divine power of money - lies in its character as men's estranged, alienating and self- disposing species-nature. Money is the alienated ability of mankind.... Money as the external, universal medium and faculty for turning an image into reality and reality into a mere image, transforms the real essential powers of man and nature into what are merely abstract notions and therefore imperfections and tormenting chimeras, just as it transforms real imperfections and chimeras-essential powers which are really impotent, which exist only in the imagination of the individual - into real essential powers and faculties. In the light of this characteristic alone, money is thus the general distorting of individualities which turns them into their opposite and confers contradictory attributes upon their attributes" (EPM, 109-111).

Apart from this explanation of money as distorting of individualities, Marx intended to explain relationship free from the dimension of money. He wrote,

> "assume man to be man and his relationship to the the world to be a human one: then you can exchange love for only love, trust for trust, etc.... Every one of your relations to man and nature must be a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life" (EPM, 111).

Thus, Marx viewed that private property and money are the symbolic structure of estranged and degenerated individualities .

Labour Power, Surplus Value and Capital Accumulation

Marx argued that the transformation of money into capital is based on the purchase and sale of labour power. The capital accumulation process requires the study of labour power and the theory of surplus value. The theory of surplus value provides the mainstay for the whole elaborate system presented in Capital (Gamble and Walton, 1972; Rosdolaky, 1977). It helps to explore that the profit of the capitalist comes from the exploitation of the workers; as there could be no profits without exploitation. Capitalism, is by its very nature, a system of exploitation. Moreover, this theory plays an indispensable part in demonstrating the fall of capitalist mode of production.

Marx argued that labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and nature participate and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates and controls the material reactions between himself and nature. The elementary factors of the labour-process includes the personal activity, the work itself; the subject of that work; and its instruments. The instruments of labour not only supply a standard of the degree of development to which human labour has attained, but they are also indicators of the social conditions under which that labour is carried on. In the labour-process, therefore man's activity, with the help of the instruments of labour, effects an alteration and this process disappears in the product and transferred into use-value (C.1, 177-81). By labour-power or capacity for labour, Marx understood the aggregate of those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any description. The value of labour power is determined, as in the case of every commodity, by the labour-time necessary for production, and consequently also the reproduction of the commodity. The value of labour-power resolves itself into the value of a definite quantity of the means of subsistence. It, therefore varies with the value of these means or with the quantity of labour requisite for this production (C.1, 167-72). In other words, the value is the quantity of labour socially necessary for the production of commodity in a given state of society, that, the average time required for its production as determined by the productive powers of labour.

Marx further argued that capitalism treats labour-power as commodity something to buy and pay in the market. And the workers have to sell their labour-power and it is paid in the form of wages. Marx argued,

> "the product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is the objectification of labour. Labour's realization is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realization of labour appears as loss of realization from the workers, objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it; appropriation as estrangement, as alienation" (EPM, 57).

He further argued that the worker is the subjective manifestation of the fact that capital is man wholly lost to himself, just as capital is the objective manifestation of the fact that labour is man lost to himself. But the worker has the misfortune to be a living capital, and therefore an indigent capital, one which loses its interest, and hence its livelihood, every moment it is not working. The value of the worker as capital rises according to demand and supply, and physically too his existence, his life, was and is looked upon as a supply of a commodity like any other. The worker produces capital, capital produces him - hence he produces himself, and man as worker, as a commodity, is the product of this entire cycle (EPM, 68). Marx attempts to prove these situations empirically in Grundrisse and Capital. For them he discovered the term surplus value. He outlined these tendencies in Grundrisse but he himself stated that the work was written for self-clarification and awaited for result and not intended for publication (CPE, 7). Marx argued

> "the capitalist wants to produce a use-value that has a value in exchange, that is to say, an article destined to be sold, a commodity; and he desires to produce a commodity whose value shall be greater than the sum of the values of the commodities used in its production, that is, of the means of production and the labour- power, that he purchased with his good money in the open market. His aim is to produce not only a use-value and commodity but also a surplus value" (C.1, 181).

Marx gives mathematical calculation from the data of spinning industry to prove the existence of surplus value. Marx wrote,

> "... by paying the daily or weekly value of the spinner's labouring power, the capitalist has acquired the right of using that labouring power during the whole day or week. He will, therefore, make him work say, daily, twelve hours. Over and above the six hours required to replace his wages, or to value of his labouring power, he will, therefore, have to work six other hours, which I shall call hours of surplus labour, which surplus labour will realize itself in a surplus value and a surplus produce.... By repeating this same process daily, the capitalist accumulated and pay no equivalent. It is this sort of exchange between capital and labour upon which capitalistic production, or the wages system, is founded, and which must constantly result in reproducing the working man as a working man, and the capitalist as a capitalist" (WPP, 57-8).

Marx just explained his contemporary experience in Britain. However Marx himself faced difficulty in determining the exact value of the labour, however it is reduced in terms of hours and money value. The continuous process of taking advantage of the surplus value by

capitalist is called exploitation and this becomes the basis for profit. Since the capitalist production depends on ever increasing amount of surplus labour, the worker has to give more and more of his labour free (G, 498). And this unpaid labour constitutes the profit. Marx further argued that, "rent, interest, and industrial profit are only different names for different parts of the surplus value of the commodity, or the unpaid labour enclosed in it (WPP. 61). Employing surplus-value as capital, reconverting it into capital, is called accumulation of capital. The surplus value is convertible into capital solely because the surplus-product, whose value it is, already comprises the material elements of new capital (C.1, 544-45). Marx argued that The accumulation of capital presupposes surplus value; surplus value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labour-power in the hands of producers of commodities. The whole movement therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which a primitive accumulation can be inferred. It refers to an accumulation not the result of the capitalist mode of production, but its starting point (C.1, 667). The so-called primitive accumulation is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the pre- historic stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it (C.1, 668). Marx explained the role of primitive accumulation in political economy, in analogous with original sin in theology. Marx wrote,

> "....The legend of theological original sin tells us certainly how man came to be condemned to eat his bread in the sweat of his brow; but the history of economic original sin reveals to us that there are people to whom this by no means essential" (C.1, 667).

Economic Structure and Superstructure

The continuation of capital accumulation process through the exploitation of the surplus value requires certain sort of superstructure which fosters this process and maintains class society. For Marx, the materialistic conception of history depends on the ability to expound the real process of production starting out from the material production of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by the mode of production, as the basis of all history; and to show it in its action as state, to explain all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics etc and trace their origins and growth from that basis (GI, 49). Marx wrote,

> "in the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of

> these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions, the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness" (CPE, 25).

For Marx, the superstructure is not autonomous, it does not emerge out of itself, but has a foundation in the relations of production. Consequently any particular set of economic relations determining the existence of specific forms of state and social consciousness which are adequate to its functioning and any change in the economic foundation of a society leads to a transformation of the superstructure.

Marx argued that the economic structure implies forces and certain relation of production. A contradiction accounts for history existing as a succession of modes of production, since it leads to the necessary collapse of one mode and its supersession by another. In capitalist mode of production, a contradiction between forces and relations of production is present. Marx applied his dialectics in terms of contradiction and necessary change from one mode of production to the other. Moreover, Marx argued that the material production is itself not a general category but a definite historical form. The productive forces were conceived by Marx as including means of production and labour power. This development encompasses such historical phenomena as the development of machinery, changes in the labour process, science and education of the proletariat. Relations of production are constituted by the economic ownership of productive forces. Under capitalism, the most fundamental of these relations is the bourgeoisie's ownership of means of production while the proletariat owns only its labour power. The basic difficulty in understanding the connection between forces and relations of production is that whereas the two are seen as necessarily compatible with each other within a mode of production, one of them has to develop in such a way that a contradiction or incompatibility matures. It could mean that the relations develop, causing development of the forces, which then react back on the relations but in such a way that the effect of relations is muted which characterize the contradiction. Marx explained this hypothesis by the process of change from feudal mode of production to capitalist mode of production.

Despite his emphasis on the contradiction between forces and relations of production, he did not go for economic reductionism. Marx wrote,

> ".... at the historical dawn of capitalist production - and every capitalist upstart has personally to go through this historical stage - avarice, and desire to get rich, are the ruling passions.... But along with this growth, there is at the same time developed in his breast, a Faustian conflict between the passion for accumulation, and the desire for enjoyment" (C.1, 593- 4).

Marx himself underlines the effectivity of superstructure where the economic determination of the superstructure applies only to capitalism, not to feudalism or classical antiquity where catholicism or politics played the main role. Marx regards that the Greek art is incompatible with the materialistic interpretation (G, 30-1).

Marx showed that the bourgeoisie has to create a certain kind of consciousness which would justify their interest and maintain the class society. The class-based superstructure reflects in the form of ideology, philosophy, religion, morality and state (Nielson, 1989). Hence it is the bourgeoisie's deliberate attempt to produce ideological forms which undermine the reality of proletariat and justify the class society of bourgeoisie. In other words, the mode of production determines the superstructure, it implies that the bourgeoisie foster such kind of ideological consciousness to maintain exploitation and repression and create a false consciousness in order to divert the attention of the proletariat from reality. Marx showed the existence of a necessary link between inverted forms of consciousness and man's material existence. It is this relationship that the concept of ideology expresses by referring to a distortion of thought which stems from and conceals social contradictions. By concealing contradictions, the ideological distortion contributes to their reproduction and therefore serves the interests of the ruling class. Engels used the term false consciousness in order to explain Marx's inverted form of consciousness while interpreting the meaning of ideology as a superstructure. Engels wrote to Mehring in 1893 that,

> "Marx and I always failed to stress enough in our writings and in regard to which we are all equally guilty.... Ideology is a process accomplished by the so- called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces impelling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process. Hence he imagines false seeming motive forces. Because it is a process of thought he derives its form as well as its content from pure thought, either his own or that of his predecessor. He works with mere thought material, which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, and does not investigate further for a more remote source independent of thought; indeed this is a matter of course to him, because, as all action is mediated by thought, it appears to him to be ultimately based upon thought" (SW. 3, 522-3).

Marx and Engels argued that ideology provides the bourgeois to undermine the rationality of the proletariat by changing the consciousness itself. Thus, though Marx believed in the direct relationship between the material existence and consciousness, he pointed out the inverted relationship between them. What Marx and Engels emphasized was that the economic structure ultimately determines the course of the change even if other factors influence history. Marx argued that, feudalism develops because of the break-down of the economy of the ancient society. Early capitalism forms from the urban middle classes co-ordinating feudal craft production more rationally, while industrial capitalism arrive out of the expanded needs of world trade. They imply change in the productive forces.

For Marx, religion is an expression of man's imperfect self-awareness. It is a distortion of man's being, because society is distorted. The powerful forces of nature were the most important elements in the lives of the early primitives. The personification of natural forces represented merely the first stage in the historical evolution of religion. The second stage came into being when the economic structure of society which is identified with the appearance of private property. At this period, the superstructure began to be determined by the current mode of production with the coming of private ownership and exploitation entered society. And just as the exploitation resulting from private ownership necessitated the creation of state power to protect the ruling and possessing class, so did it necessitate the creation of religion to serve the same purpose. Marx argued that,

> "religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless condition. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for their real happiness" (CHPR, 43).

Religion is justifying and rendering permanent the economic setup which brings with it the exploitation of the masses. In other words, religion is the opium of the people because it intoxicates the minds of men and prevents them from viewing life as it actually is. Elsewhere Marx wrote, "Religion is from the outset consciousness of the transcendental arising from actually existing forces" (SW. 1, 83). Marx and Engels wrote in the *Manifesto of the Communist Party,*

> "nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the State? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and poverty, celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat" (SW.1, 134).

The major concern for Marx is how religion is used by the bourgeoisie and the ruling class to exploit and manipulate the masses. While commenting on the British rule in India, he wrote,

> "..... That religion is at once a religion of sensualist exuberance, and a religion of self-torturing asceticism: a religion of the Lingam and of the Juggernaut; the religion of the Monk, and of the Bayadere.... take the mythological chronology of the Brahman himself, who places the commencement of Indian misery in an epoch even more remote than the Christian creation of the world.... We must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life, that this passive sort of existence evoked on the other part, in contradistinction, wild, aimless, unbounded forces of destruction and rendered murder itself a religious rite in Hindustan. We must not forget that these little communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to be the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social state into never changing natural destiny and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact the man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Hanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow" (SW. 1, 506-11).

Marx argued that in primitive stage fear and irrationality made men to personify the natural forces and created self-made asylum. But when the productive forces and the contradiction between labour and capital developed, religion was used by the bourgeoisie as an ideological form to undermine the rationality of the people and to maintain class society.

Like religion, morality is also a form of ideology arising out of a particular stage of the development of productive forces and relations and determined by the class interest. It is destined to preserve the mode of production through which the exploiting class maintain its dominance. Law, morality, religion are to proletariat, so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which luck in ambush just as many bourgeois interests (MCP, 44). Marx believed that in a class society all sorts of superstructures would serve the interests of the dominant class and all moralizing elements are envisaged to oppress the proletariat.

Marx argued that the first and most basic ideological element created by the mode of production in the superstructure is the state. For him, the state originates from the necessity of protecting private property. He believed that the private ownership came into being only after society has passed through a primitive period of communism. A new mode of production necessarily created definite property relations and property relations immediately created classes, owners and non-owners of the means of production. When class antagonism grows,

it becomes necessary for the exploiting class to create an organ of power and legal system whose purpose will be to maintain law and order which maintain the exploited class in a position of subservience. Marx argued that, at every stage of mode of production a single class is dominant and it controls the state and uses its machinery to further its exploitation of the proletariat. Under capitalism, the executive of modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (MCP, 35). Though the concept of state is termed as a superstructure, Marx intended to conceive state as a necessary ingredient of economic structure. Marx argued in The Civil War in France that state formation was inseparable from , and indispensable to the making of the capitalist mode of production. The state is an essential relation of bourgeois society. Civil society (bourgeois society) must assert itself in its external relations as nationality and internally must organize itself as State (CWF, 35-6).

Marx offered a break in his writings about the process between the forces and relations of production and the superstructure. For Marx, the bourgeoisie consciously and deliberately created certain kind of consciousness through their ideological forms and institutions. The objective situation in the form of superstructure so created as to reify the subjectivity of the proletariat which would be long-lasted in continuing the class society. Marx considered that the economic structure determines the evolution of society. However, there are other factors which would determine or partially contribute to determine the changes in society. The central problem of discussion is how far or to what extent the economic structure determines the social change and whether the superstructures are passive elements. This problem is first encountered by Engels, In a letter to J. Bloch in 1890, Engels wrote,

> ".... According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life" (SW, 3, 513).

Engels pointed out many factors influencing, however the economic structure ultimately determines the change. In a letter to Kugelmann in 1871, Marx himself wrote observing the civil war in France,

> ".... world history would indeed be very easy to make if the struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favourable changes. It would in the other hand be of a very mystical nature, if `accidents' played no part.... But acceleration and delay are very much dependent upon such `accidents', including the `accident' of the character of the people who first head the movement" (SW. 2, 421).

Thus, for Marx and Engels, capitalistic mode of production is more important in determining the superstructure and social change than the preceding modes of production.

Political Economy and Psychoanalysis

Freud's concepts and theories would be useful in interpreting the economic structure as well as the superstructure. Freud in The Psychopathology ofEverydayLife shows that the so-called symptomatic acts are the interference with conscious functioning by unconscious process. He emphasized the unconscious significance of common errors; forgetting names, making errors in speech, reading and writing, forgetting intentions, and clumsy actions. Such acts, according to Freud, reveal unconscious desires (PFL, 15, 136-7). Having demonstrated that a range of human phenomena such as parapraxes, dreams and neurotic symptoms hitherto miscategorised as purposeless or nonintentional happenings are in fact meaningful expressions of unconscious aims. The unconscious process is intentional human action enacted unconsciously. Freud often argued that psychic determinism is a kind of `possession' of the mind by the unconscious ideas and fantasies. The human agent is very often lived by the unconscious myths and metaphors that in a fundamental sense determine the very definition of the situation upon which he bases the actions in which he chooses to engage. Freud considered that determinism in the psychical sphere is carried out without any gap (PFL. 5, 254). Freud's remarks on psychic determinism override difference between an act without a cause is also an act without a purpose and an intended act is also a caused act.

Freud does not deny Marx's emphasis on the importance of the economic factor in history. He formally praises Marxism for `its clear insight into the determining influence which is exerted by the economic condition of man upon his intellectual, ethical, and artistic reactions' (Freud, 1917, 228). But the incompatibility between psychoanalysis and economic determinism arises in the tacit psychological assumptions behind economic determinism that the concrete human needs and drives sustaining economic activity are just what they appear to be and are fully in consciousness; self-preservation and pleasure as understood by the utilitarians, summarize the psychological theory implied by the ingenuous invocation of categories like economic necessity and human needs. The Faustian restlessness of man in history shows that men are not satisfied by the satisfaction of their conscious desires: men are unconscious of their real desires (Brown, 1959, 17-18).

Character Structure and Capital Accumulation

According to Marx, the bourgeoisie political economy is based on private property, money, exploitation and devoid of humanistic principles. Freud considers that the desire in private

property, money and in accumulation of wealth are due to certain type of personality and character structure in which the instinct to possess, to hoard and all pecuniary interests are rooted. For Freud, a character results from the contradiction of organic drive and is function or sign of displacement of a bodily interest and a fixation of libido. The possessive nature is invariably from anal character (CP II, 45-5) Freud himself does not explain in detail the nature of character structure in relation to society. Freud explains the character structure developed in the early years of the child in the family. Taking sources from Freud, Norman O' Brown argued that there is a connection between money and quantifying rationality. The apparent accumulation of wealth is really the impoverishment of human nature, and its appropriate morality is the renunciation of human nature and desires asceticism. The effect is to substitute an abstraction, Homo Economicus, for the concrete totality of human nature, and thus to dehumanize human nature. Measured by rational utility and real human needs, there is absolutely no difference between the gold and silver of modern economy and the shells or dog's teeth of archaic economy, and they are perhaps symbolic identification with Sun and Moon. For Aristotle, the science of economy and use-values must be based on a science of human nature able to identify real human needs. For him, money- making is an unnatural perversion. It is an integral part of the superfluous with the necessary (Brown, 1959, 235-57). For Marx, the instinct to possess and accumulate wealth are the result of alienation. Whereas for Freud, wealth may provide a substitute gratification for the oppressed person psychologically.

Marx argued that the capital accumulation process can be understood by pre-supposing surplus value and the capitalist mode of production where the capitalists own the means of production and the proletariat merely labour-power. For Freud, libidinal repression is the starting point in creating a disciplined labour force as well as the capital accumulation process. Instinctual renunciation is universal necessity if human beings are to co- operate in production. However, such renunciation is historically specific to class societies. The libidinal repression is systematically institutionalized at the beginning of class society at the same time as large differences in power, privilege and private property. Libidinal repression was a necessity on the one hand to stabilize the new institution of patriarchal monogamy, itself required by the necessity of guaranteeing paternity and thus inheritance, and on the other to repress the striving for self-determination, dignity and equality, now repressed by the newly developed ruling class and its state. Freud also argued that the libidinous development of the individual follows like the evolution of man's conception of the universe, from animistic through religious, to scientific. The animistic phase would correspond to the stage of object-choice of which the characteristic is a child's attachment to his parents, and in the scientific phase the individual renounced pleasure principle and adjusted himself to reality and turned to the external world for the object of his desires (SE, XIII, 90). The libidinal development also

shows the repression of the family and later of society. Repression among the proletariat is intensified with the development of industrial capitalism. It was strengthened with the development of the capitalist class who if it is to successfully accumulated capital must consume little and reinvest much of the surplus occurring to it. Certain instruments such as religion and ideology are used as repressive measures and in this way the capitalist class created its own superego.

Fromm showed the role of the Protestant ethic in the formation of capitalism. He argued that the petty bourgeois life experiences of the new commercial classes led them to reject Catholicism which was a reflection of the life experiences of the feudal classes, and develop Calvinism, a religion which was a reflection of the anxieties and needs of the new petty bourgeoisie which was to develop into capitalist class. The Calvinist doctrine of predestination was in fact a reflection of this class's subjection to the logic of impersonal markets. Fromm argued,

> "Although this was one condition for selling them, the unpredictable laws of the market decided whether the products could be sold at all and at what profit. The mechanism of the new market seemed to resemble the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, which taught that the individual must make every effort to be good, but that even before his birth it had been decided whether or not he is to be saved. The market day became the day of judgement for the products of human effort" (Fromm, 1941, 61).

The character structure developed in capitalist class reflected its objective conditions of life and provided the impetus for the compulsive behaviour necessary for the efficient accumulation of capital. The compulsive drive for activity was channeled into work among both the nascent capitalist class and the growing proletariat. The motivation for accumulation on the part of the capitalist class and for sustained menial labour on the part of the proletariat was now internalized in the character structure of both classes.

> ".... Protestantism has the function of continually reproducing and strengthening the drive structure that is necessary for a particular society. The patricentric complex - in which fulfillment of duty and success are the major driving forces of life, while pleasure and happiness play a secondary role - represents one of the most powerful productive forces behind the enormous economic and cultural efforts of capitalism. Until the capitalist era, people had to be compelled by physical force to dedicate every ounce of energy to economically useful work. Through the influence of the patricentric complex, people began to show the same total dedication of their own free

> will, because the external compunction was now internalized. The internalization was effected most completely among the ruling classes of bourgeois society, who were the authentic representatives of the specifically bourgeois work ethos" (Fromm, 1934, 133).

For Freud, repression is a continuous process and even if the objective conditions are suspended, the ego and the superego, already internalized ethos, would continue to carry out the repression. However, Fromm and Marcuse argued that repression is historically specific form in capitalist society to accumulate capital and its need is both a product of the technological necessities of industrialization and the requirements of maintaining distinctively capitalist social relationships. As the capital accumulation process proceeds, the purely technological necessity of repression diminishes while the social necessity of repression grows. The inclination to accumulate wealth and submit the labour-power for survival are internalized in the character structure of bourgeois and proletariat respectively. The character structure developed deliberately by the bourgeois, in order to be permanent requires on the part of bourgeoisie to create a superstructure to maintain the capital accumulation process and class society.

Contradiction and Overdetermination

Marx argued that social change is the result of the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production. In other words, the economic structure determine the change and all other superstructures. However, Marx showed the problem of economic determinism and the incompatibility of base - superstructure relation in certain phenomena such as Greek art, primitive institutions and also the inverted relation between material existence and consciousness. Althusser explained the nature of contradiction with the help of the term `overdetermination'. Freud used this term to describe the representation of the dream-thoughts in images privileged by their condensation of a number of thoughts in a single image, or by the transference of psychic energy from a particularly potent thought to apparently trivial images, i.e., by displacement. Althusser has made a distinction between determination and dominance, according to which the economy is always determinant in the last instance but does not always play the dominant role, it may determine that either of the two superstructural levels be dominant of a certain period of time. He used the term `overdetermination' to describe the effects of the contradictions in each practice constituting the social formation on the social formation as a whole, and hence back on each practice and contradiction, defining the pattern dominance and sub-ordination, antagonism and non-antagonism of the contradictions in the structure in dominance at any given historical moment. The overdetermination of a contradiction is the reflection of its condition of

existence within the complex whole, that is, of the other contradictions in the complex whole, in other words its uneven development (Althusser and Baliber, 1970, 186).

The contradiction between the forces and relations of production is expressed in the uneven relations of the levels of the totality. But these in turn reverberate upon one another to multiply contradictions, which then can play back through the forces and relations of production contradiction. In so far as these contradictions are displaced, there is not an impetus to revolutionary change. If they become fused on the other hand, a rupture with the pre-existing constitution of the social formation may be brought about. Uneven development is thus made not just incidental to a social formation, but integral to it. Althusser justified his application of `over-determination' by generalization of Lenin's analysis of Russia as the weakest link in the chain of the capitalist countries, that the forces and relations of production does not directly initiate social change but an accumulation of other contradictions which fuse into a ruptural unity and the revolutionary break is over-determined.
Considerations on the development of productive forces are also important in creating contradiction with the existing relations of production. Cohen (1978) argued that the development of the forces is primary because it results from a factor which is exogenous, that is a motive force which lies outside the forces and relations of production and acts first upon the former. This motive force is human rationality, a rational and ever-present impulse of human beings to try to better their situation and overcome scarcity by developing the productive forces. Marx failed to realize that intellectual causes underlie every change in the mode of production. It follows upon the invention of new tools and machinery. It represents a triumph of mind over matter. For Marx, the base is equated with economic structure. However for Habermas, this is true only of capitalist societies. The relation of production determines the distribution of social wealth. In primitive societies this function was performed by kinship systems, and in civilizations, by systems of domination. Only in capitalism when the market along with its steering function also assumed the function of stabilizing class relationships, did the relations of production come forth as such and take on an economic form. The post-industrial society even envisions a state in which the determination would pass from the economic system to the educational and scientific system (Habermas, 1979, 144).

Freud's Critique

For Freud, society with its all institutions continuously repress the subjectivity. Though Freud explained the biological dimension of subjectivity, he emphasized later on the social relationship. The theory of the Oedipus complex is based in the logic of social relationships. The social relationships of the family - specifically the logic of the triadic relationship

between mother, father and child - channels instinctual energies and forms the child's character structure. It implies that families in different societies and different classes would have different logic and consequently would produce different typical character structures. And the capitalist mode of production would produce specific character structure and transform the material forces into consciousness through the family.

Freud argued that the repression necessarily produces unconscious mind which would manifest in the behaviour of the human beings as well as in the social institutions. At the same time the contradiction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle does not so easily give one-sided autonomy. Instead, the ego mediates and tries to fulfill both the aims. If the ego is fully structured by a dominant class, the rationality suffers and it will be completely submitted to the capitalist reality principle. But ultimately, the unconscious mind must determine and the id has to be satisfied in accordance with the pleasure principle. The functioning nature of the mind could be manipulated deliberately by the bourgeoisie. In other words, the very structure of mind is used to repress by the bourgeoisie without the awareness of repression and in this way domination is established. For Freud, the mind has its own structure of rationality. However, the other part should live with irrationality, pleasure, myths, and fantasies.

Marx's treatment of ideology as an inverted form of consciousness as well as such superstructures as art, morality, religion and state can be interpreted with the help of Freud. Freud understood ideas as being deeply rooted in the needs of character structure. Thus people are often immune to logical arguments that do not correspond to such needs. People need to believe certain things, and will pretty much hold to their beliefs until their needs change or ideologically different, but emotionally similar ideas replace them. Freud viewed the infant as an uninhibited instinctual being motivated at first by the drive to find immediate gratification for its instinctual needs. In the course of the first years of the infant's life its demands on its parents are systematically frustrated by the parents acting on the basis of their own needs and interests structured by their class position. In order to be able to cope with the systematic denial of its instinctual needs by its parents, the child develops certain mechanisms of coping with the conflicting demands of its biology and parents. These mechanisms, in good part established by the end of the Oedipal period, become the adults' characteristic way of handling emotions and dealing with both frustration and the pursuit of pleasure. This characteristic way has the equally important function of providing for substitute gratification of instinctual impulses in ways which do not result in anxiety or guilt, i.e., were encouraged during early childhood or atleast nor negatively sanctioned by parents. "The combination of instinctual prohibitions and approved behaviour is the emotional basis for morality, religion and nationalism. It is the intensity and general form of ideologies held by people that is

determined by character structure" (Szymanski, 1978, 33). The tenacity of religious ideas among the masses can be understood in this light.

Religion for Freud is an illusion powered by the need for illusions in a world of suffering. He argued that,

> ".... the establishment of a moral world order ensures the fulfillment of the demands of justice, which within human culture have so often remained unfulfilled, and the prolongation of earthly existence by a future life provides in addition the local and temporal setting for these wish-fulfillments.... we call a belief an illusion when wishfulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, while disregarding its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself does" (Freud, 1927, 52-4).

Just as the primitive man had created religion for the purpose of lessening the sufferings caused by natural forces, so now did man instinctively turn to religion for a possible escape from the economic exploitation. Although religion first arose as a superstitious means of allaying the terrific effects of natural forces, it still exists because a similar fear of the action of economic forces renders religion attractive to man. What is true for religion is equally true of the functional substitutes for religion such as nationalism and, in part, for sexism and racism as well. Since the strong appeal of such irrational ideologies in the working classes is based in deeply felt emotional needs, which in turn stem from fundamental oppression, such ideas are very difficult to uproot without substituting an ideology which, while scientifically sound, appeals to the same emotional needs, i.e., offers a rational rather than an irrational solution to oppression.

Freud argued that religious ideas have arisen from the same need as have all the other achievements of civilization, from the necessity of defending oneself against the crushingly superior force of nature. Everything was the son-father relationship. God was the exalted father, and the longing for the father was the root of the need for religion. Since then, the factor of human weakness and helplessness, to which indeed the chief role in the formation of religion is generally assigned. The terrifying impression of helplessness in childhood aroused the need for protection which was provided by the father; and the recognition that this helplessness lasts throughout life made it necessary to cling to the existence of a father, but this time a more powerful one. Thus the benevolent rule of a divine providence allays one's fear of the dangers of life. The establishment of a moral world-order ensures the fulfillment of the demands of justice which have so often remained unfulfilled in human civilization. The prolongation of earthly existence in a future life provides the local and temporal framework in which these wishfulfillments shall take place. It is an enormous relief to the

individual psyche if the conflicts of its childhood arising from the father complex - conflicts which it has never to wholly overcome - are removed from it and brought to a solution which is universally accepted (PFL. 12, 201-212). The primary feeling of fear and helplessness and man's innate inclination towards father figures generate the institution of religion. Religion fulfills the early childhood's wishfulfillment and later it provides a substitute gratification in the world of suffering and seldom it makes rational appeal. At the same time, if the repression of the civilization is less, the powerful hold of religion will decrease. Freud considered that what is characteristic of illusions is that they are derived from human wishes. Freud also recognized that religion has contributed much towards the taming of the asocial instincts.

However, Freud argued religion would be the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity, like the obsessional neurosis of children aroused out of the Oedipus complex. If, on the one hand, religion brings with it obsessional restrictions, exactly as an individual obsessional neurosis does, on the other hand it comprises a system of wishful illusions together with a disavowal of reality, such as in amnesia, in a state of blissful hallucinatory confusion (PFL, 12, 226-7). Freud further argued,

> "the technique of religion consists in depressing the value of life and distorting the picture of the real world in a delusory manner which presupposes an intimidation of the intelligence. At this price, by forcibly fixing them in a state of psychical infatalism and by drawing them into a mass-delusion, religion succeeds in sparing many people an individual neurosis.... If the believer finally sees himself obliged to speak of God's inscrutable decrees, he is admitting that all that is left to him as a last possible consolation and source of pleasure in his suffering is an unconditional submission" (PFL, 12, 273).

While interpreting Romain Rolland's conception of all- embracing, indefinite consciousness and an oceanic feeling, Freud argued this sense of belonging inseparably to the external world as a whole is nothing but a survival of the primitive ego-feeling which is normal to infancy. When the growing individual finds that he is destined to remain a child for ever, that he can never do without protection against strange superior powers, he lends these powers the features belonging to the figure of his father; he creates for himself the gods whom he dreads, whom he seeks to propitiate, and whom he nevertheless entrusts with his own protection (PFL, 12, 204-205). The infant's drive, the instinctual structure and the continuation of longing for primal father because of the archaic heritage necessitate the existence of religion which consequently creates illusions since it produces hardly rational appeal to appropriate the objective world and makes the indifference of subjectivity. That is why Marx argued that the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for their real happiness.

The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a call to abandon conditions which require illusions (CHPR, 44). For the illusion creating and the illusionary freedom to subjectivity, institution of religion could be used as an ideological form of the dominant class to preserve their status quo and maintain the class society and in this way they undermine the radical characteristics of the subjectivity.

In the case of art and literature, Freud viewed as the expression of unconscious wishes and mostly connected with childhood drives and sexual satisfaction. Freud considered that these are very well utilized as the irrational expression and often creates fantasies. He described the artist as a neurotic. Freud interpreted the art of Michelangelo and Leonardo-de-Vinci in this manner (PFL, 14, 87). Sexual appeal, creating myths and fantasies and dream like wishfulfillments, these provide the foundation for the dominant class to foster the irrational system of culture to undermine the radical characteristics of the subjectivity. Morality, for Freud, is essentially sexual morality and the controlling the drives of the `id'. In other words, to control and channel the energies of eros and thanatos into socially acceptable and useful ways. This moralizing process is carried out by the ego and the superego. However, what is socially acceptable and useful is often defined by the dominant class. Though the ego has innate rationality acquired by the life experiences and the constant struggle between the pleasure and reality principle, the rational and conscience system are internalized, partly, by the existing dominant class through family, and the ideological forms. The inherent sense of guilt and the fear of punishment and rejection carried by the superego through generations, due to the castration fear, necessitate the acceptance of the moral system of the dominant class.

Marx argued that the first and most basic ideological structure is the state. Its main aim is to protect the institution of private property and the interest of the dominant class. For Marx, in capitalist society, the state makes the sectional interests of the bourgeois as universal. Its main function is to maintain the class divisions and suppress the freedom of the proletariat. Freud viewed that all kinds of authority are rooted in the instinctual structure of the human beings. `Return to authority' is the unconscious wishes of men. Freud argued in the *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* that the presence of eros necessitate libidinal ties initially with parental authority and later with an authority of a person or an institution. State equally performs to bind the eros of the individuals and makes the collective being. But the state also creates an illusion to the individuals that the oppressed people think that they are also a part of authority. In `group psychology', Freud maintains that their are two kinds identification, one to identify the authority as an object of love and protection and other to identify as oneself. These inclinations make the working class unconsciously to support the bourgeois and acting on the interest of the authority. Marx viewed the state as an ideological

form, since it penetrates the psyche of the proletariat and alters the consciousness without the awareness of the domination.

It is a mistaken idea to consider that the forces and relations of production mechanically and directly determine the superstructure - the ideological forms. It is the will and deliberation of he bourgeois create a sort of `consciousness' on the basis of the pleasure and irrational longing of the individual in order to maintain the class society and exploitation. The alienated and reified subjectivity is not capable of creating its own rationality rather to submit itself to the existing authority. For Marx, human subjectivity is distorted by the class society with the economic structure. Hence his main preoccupation was to free the subjectivity from its class bound economic conditioning. Though he analyzed the capitalist society with economic categories, he intended to produce an autonomous - rational subjectivity to regulate all the outer-world structures through the classless society. The so called humanist-Marxists argued that Marx was never really interested in economics. His correspondence with Engels in later years revealed that he continued because, for him, economics was the practical side of philosophy; and because he had found in the critiques of political economy the material expression of alienation, the process of economic exploitation (Schaff, 1970; Fromm, 1955). Whereas Meikle explains the methodological significance of Marx that Marx's understanding of the historical process embodied categories of essence, law and necessity. Marx explicitly endorsed the view that what he sought were the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development and death of a given social organism and its replacement by another higher one (1985, 3-4). Though Marx did predict the inevitable decline of capitalism in Capital he also visualized contradictions in other structures and entertained multilinear concept of history (Levine, 1972). It implies that society may progress on separate paths of developing, depending on the system of economic and social variable, however intrinsically linked with contradiction. In a letter to the editor of the Russian Journal Otechestvenniye Zapisky in 1877, Marx indicated that Russia did not have to pass through capitalism in order to arrive at communism (SC, 291-4). Marx understood that every society must be appreciated in terms of its own indigenous structure. But what is important is that the proletariat must contradict themselves with the existing structure in order to create a socialist system. That is the human subjectivity, after experiencing the dehumanized forces of economic and ideological structure, should determine the nature of contradiction which is implied in Marx's treatment of proletarian antagonism with bourgeois.

The inter-determinant reciprocity between individuals and social relations is always the presupposition that underpins Marx's critique. For him, productive activity is both a social and an individual activity, social in the sense that it is social relations that defines the producers and the content of this production activity; individual in the sense that such activity is a fundamental aspect of any human agent's life-process. Freud considered that human

beings are constantly neither rational nor prudent enough to question the authority or the ideological forms. Hence, the very instinctual structure is deliberately utilized by the ruling class to create an inverted form of consciousness which assault the determining nature of economic structure.

6

State and Human Emancipation

The political philosophy of Hegel inspired Marx to study the nature of political power and state. His interest in politics is also reflected in his life-long political activities which were devoted to educate and organize the international working class movement and his observation of French political movements. In *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx evaluated Hegel's political principles which helped him to criticize the existing political institutions and to discuss the relationship between politics and economic structure. He argued that there is a need to recover the social dimension of man that had been lost ever since the French Revolution leveled all citizens in the political state and accentuated the individualism of bourgeois society. He even proclaimed universal suffrage as the solution to the split between the civil society and political state. In *On the Jewish Question*, Marx favoured the abolition of the gap between civil society and state by making the civil society as universal, communal or species essence of man inherent in the state. In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx put forth the working class movement which would abolish class antagonisms and political power. *In Manifesto of the Communist Party*, he justified the proletarian revolution through his materialistic conception of history. In *The Class Struggles in France*, drawing on the practical experience of the mass revolutionary struggle, Marx developed his theory of revolution and for the first time introduced the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For him, it is necessary for the working class to win political power and economic crisis is the precondition for any revolution. Marx wrote a series of articles when Louis Napoleon seized political power in 1851. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* emphasized the breaking of bourgeois state machinery by the proletariat. *The Civil War in France* further discussed the main tenets of class struggle, state, and the dictatorship of the the proletariat on the basis of the experience of the Paris Commune. In *Critique of Gotha Programme* Marx criticized the vagueness in the concept of equality and free state envisaged by the draft programme of the future united worker's party of Germany.

Marx's Conception of State

Defined as an instrument of exploitation and coercion, the state is regarded by Marx as the product and manifestation of the irreconcilable class antagonism. At every stage of its development, a single class is dominant and this dominant class controls the state and uses its

machinery to further its exploitation of the proletariat. Under capitalism, the executive of modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (MCP, 34-5). Marx considered state as the most basic superstructure as well as an ideological form to create an awareness among the proletariat to justify the bourgeoisie political right and freedom (EBLB). Engels explained the origin and development of state more clearly. He argued that the private ownership came into being only after society has passed through a primary period of communism. A new mode of production necessarily created definite property relations, and property relations immediately created classes, i.e., owners and non-owners of the means of the production. Authority, liberty, and social status enjoyed by men are directly dependent on their ownership of means of production. When class antagonism had grown, it became necessary for the dominant class to call into being an organ of power whose purpose will be to maintain the exploited class in a position of subservience. Thus the state has as its highest purpose the protection of private property, it is an institution which perpetuates class divisions in society and forcibly maintains the rights of the possessing class to exploit and rule the non-possessing class (Engels, 1884, 130).

Marx in his early years began his public career with the express purpose of restoring ancient political freedoms rather than as a social revolutionary. His overall perspective and often inexplicit outlook was firmly rooted in the institutions and theories of the ancient, particularly Athenian Greeks (Arendt, 1963, 57). When Marx spoke of politics, he used Greek categories, terms like the public and the private realms which constitute, respectively the realm of active human freedom and the realm of biological, animal necessity. Following Greek tradition, Marx not only identified the public realm as the space for human freedom but as the space for glorious deeds, heroic resolve and greatness. For him, it was evident that there is not a big blank between the past and the future, but rather it is a matter of realizing the thoughts of the past. Mankind does not begin any new work but performs its old work consciously (McLellan, 1970, 128).

The central insight that emerged from Marx's critique of politics and society was the fact that under the conditions of modern society, it was not the will of persons acting but the objective nature of relationships that proved to be the explanation of everything. The novel conditions of modern society had succeeded in totally changing the nature and conditions of politics, thus making a simple restoration of ancient politics almost impossible (Mewes, 1976, 279). For Marx, modern bourgeois society and its politics constituted the worst form of regression from enhancing the universal in man to the particularistic existence of animals, determined solely by their physical needs. In other words, politics, rather than being a realm of freedom, becomes the means to enhance the particular egoisms of the bourgeoisie. And state as a superstructure legitimized this practice.

In his earlier writings, Marx is preoccupied with reviving the ancient supremacy of the political life. He wrote, "the feeling of self in man, freedom, will have to be awakened again in these (German) men. Only this feeling, which disappeared from the world with the Greeks, and with Christianity vanished into the blue mist of heaven, can again transform society into a community of men to achieve their highest purpose, a democratic state" (McLellan, 1970, 115).

Civil Society and State

Marx intended to see the dichotomy between the public and the private sphere of life as well as the universal and particular interest of the people. He argued that in true democracy, the constitution of law, the state, so far as it is political constitution is itself only a self-determination of the people. Only a constitution returned to its real ground, actual man, the actual people, and established as its own work is truly democratic. In other words, modern bourgeois political democracy which creates a legal definition of a citizen role, or a republic merely as a political constitution while real life remains essentially private life, is merely a formal or abstract democracy. Only true democracy or the people acting for itself by itself, combines formal and material freedom, and thus is the first true unity of the universal and the particular, i.e, private and public life (CHPR, 30-31). Marx identified the civil society as bourgeoisie society and explained the difference from the state. Marx argued,

> "in the past, the political sphere was the sole sphere of the state within the state, the sole sphere in which the content, like the form, was species-content, the true universal, but at the same time in such a way that, because this sphere opposed the others, its contents also became formal and particular" (CHPR, 32).

In the past, that in Greek, there was no dichotomy between the universal essence of state and the particular interest of the individual. The correlation always existed between the self and the state. Moreover, the political sphere may have been where man's universal nature and concerns became visible and permanent, but modern civil society under capitalism no longer ever pretends to any universality above and beyond the concerns of particular egoistic wills. Marx viewed that in Greece, the `res publica' was the real private concern, the real content for the citizen, and the private man was slave; that is, the political state as political was the true and sole content of the citizen's life and will (CHPR, 32). However, Marx recognized adverse conditions of the Greek state that man was the actual principle of the state, but he was unfree man. It was therefore the democracy of unfreedom, accomplished alienation (CHPR, 32). Marx further argued that modern society is originated in a revolt against the feudalism of the

Christian Middle Ages. In the middle ages, private unfreedom had been erected into a universal system with political status. Capitalistic society was a result of the revolutionary overthrow of these private unfreedoms, feudal serfdom, in the name of the universal rights of man. The end result of the early modern revolutionary fervour was not the renewed prominence of the political but emancipation of civil society from politics. It was the egoistic acquisitive spirit rather than public man which had been released, and with this release came civil society's emancipation from even the semblance of a general content, i.e., the general or universal concerns of men (EW, 29-30). Marx distinguished natural man from political man. Marx considered that there is unbridgeable gap between civil society and the state which produces `split' personality. Before that he explained the foundations of state from the essence of civil society. He wrote,

> " civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of individuals with a definite stage of the development of productive forces.... Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie, the social organisation evolving directly out of production and commerce, which in all ages forms the basis of the state and of the rest of the idealistic superstructure has been designated by the same name" (GI, 48).

He further explained,

> "Through the emancipation of private property from the community, the state has become a separate entity, beside and outside the civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of organisation which the bourgeois necessarily adopt both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interest.... Since the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomized, it follows that the state mediates in the foundation of all common institutions and that the institutions receive a political form" (MCP, 34-5).

Marx explored the relation between various classes and state; and between economic structure and state. Marx held that under Napoleon, bureaucracy was only means of preparing the class rule of the bourgeoisie. Under the second Bonaparte, the state seemed to have made itself completely independent. Bonaparte represented the class of small-holding peasants and at the same time, he safeguarded bourgeois order and made the lower classes happy within the frame of bourgeois society (EBLB, SW.1, 171- 178). It appears that Bonaparte as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes, but he cannot give to one class without taking from another. It implies that the state becomes independent to a certain extent from class, and no one class is ever able totally to control all aspects of society. In other words, the state is both

controlled by and at the same time relatively autonomous from the various fractions of the capitalist class, in order to perform its functions in advancing the interests of the capitalist class as a whole and maintain its legitimacy over society (Miliband, 1969; Poulantzas, 1975). Thus, the relation between class structure in the civil society and the state creates further dichotomy.

Marx maintained that the dichotomy between civil society and state cannot be overcome by the politicization of civil society but only by a synthesis of particularism and universalism brought out by the recognition of the universality of the individual. Marx illustrated that the French Revolution separated the state from civil society, but Jacobian government attempted, to overcome the antagonism by force. Thus the political drama ends necessarily with the restoration of religion, private property and of all the elements of civil society (EW, 16). Marx terms the Jacobian kind of revolution as a merely political revolution, which limits itself to the capture of political power without inquiring whether the socio- economic conditions make the retention of that power feasible. Yet such a process constitutes an attempt by the political sphere to force itself on civil society and to try to organize it according to its principles. This means the subsumption of all the spheres of private life under a political universality abstracted for its concrete conditions (Avineri, 1968, 193). Marx also conceived that any merely political insurrection of the proletariat trying to create conditions politically not yet immanently developed in the socio-economic sphere is doomed to fail. The political sphere cannot impose itself on civil society unless civil society has already developed within itself the elements that make this tour de force unnecessary. He conceived the modern state as a perpetual tension between the idea of universality, ideally against the particularistic interests of civil society, and the antagonistic interests themselves. This tension exists because the modern political state exists as such only in one segment of real life, while all the other spheres of life lie open to the bellum omnium contra omnes of civil society. The way, for Marx, to abolish this dualism cannot be found within the existing framework of the state as a separate, partial organisation, since it partially will always frustrate the attempts at universalism. The solution must be found beyond the state. The life of the individual can achieve universal content only after the framework of the state as a separate and distinct organisation has disappeared, for the separate organization of a universal sphere, presupposes the existence of particularistic interest-oriented sphere. Only the disappearance of a separate form of universality will make the realization of universality possible (Avineri, 1968, 204). However, the transcendence of the state is ultimate project for Marx, he recognized the political power in carrying out the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Marx and Engels' writings on the Paris Commune viewed,

> "the working class know that they have to pass through different phases of class struggle. They know that the superseding of the economical conditions of the slavery of labour by the conditions of free and associate labour can only be the progressive work of time.... But they knew at the same time that great strides may be made at once through the communal form of political organizations" (WPC, 154-5).

Earlier he considered that the Commune was the antithesis to the state and the Commune affords the rational medium through which the class struggle can run through its various phases in the most rational and humane way. He further added that the working class cannot simply lay hold on the ready-made state- machinery and wield it for their own purpose. The political instrument of their enslavement cannot serve as the political instrument of their emancipation. The first condition for the hold of political power is to transform working machinery and destroy it, an instrument of class rule (WPC, 196). Marx believed that the Commune was a rational form for the emancipation of labour precisely to the extent that it was not a state but specifically set out to smash it. Marx's another text The Civil War in France offers both a historical sketch of the evolution of the French state and an implicit theory of the modern state as a political form. Marx described the French state as the centralized state machinery which, with its ubiquitous and complicated military, bureaucratic, clerical and judiciary organs, entails the living civil society like a boaconstrictor lie in the period of Absolutism. It was first forged as a weapon of nascent modern society in its struggle of emancipation from feudalism. Seigneurial privileges were transformed into the attributes of a unitary state power, feudal retinues replaced by a standing army, feudal dignitaries supplanted by salaried state functionaries, and the chequered anarchy of medieval powers superseded by the regulated plan of a state power, with a systematic and hierarchic division of labour (CWF, 148). He further argued all revolutions only perfected the state machinery instead of throwing off this deadening incubus. This state power forms in fact the creation of the middle class, first a means to breakdown feudalism, then a means to crush the emancipatory aspirations of the producers, the working class (CWF, 149-50).

For Marx, the modern state form as such is intrinsically bourgeois because the boundaries of political and private, general and personal and collective and individual which it presupposes and articulates are those corresponding to the conditions of commodity production. Far from being independent of society, the state is an essential form of organisation of burgerliche Gesellschaft (civil society) itself. That is why it cannot be used by labour for its own emancipation.

Marx understood that egoism destroys fundamental human mutuality and brings about exploitation which runs counter to mutuality, since it implies subjection of man to man

instead of mutual adjustment between men. The contradiction between the interest of the individual and community emerges and the latter takes an independent form as the state, divorced from the real interest of the individual and the community. Marx believed that nothing is more horrible than the logic of self-interest. This estrangement - devoid of species essence of man - inherent in the state is at the same time an illusory communal life. "The struggle within the state, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, the struggle for the franchise and so on, are merely the illusory forms in which the real struggles are fought out among one another" (GI, 23).

The state as a camouflage is criticized by Marx, since it diverts attention and concern from concrete life and it allows hierarchy and subjection. The Hobbesian description of the state of nature comes back in a disguised form in the political state, though perhaps they are not grounded in primitive impulses of men, but take shape in organized class interests. There is no neutrality of the sovereign, since the sovereign is an instrument in the pursuit of the class interest. It is for this reason that Marx maintained the clear-cut distinctions between social life and political life; the first being based on mutuality and neutralization of interests, while the latter carries with itself the priority of one interest represented by one class over another interest represented by other class (Rotenstreich, 1973, 211). For these multiple reasons, Marx favoured the transcendence of the state as in institution and a superstructure. However, the abolition or the transcendence of the state is the ultimate outcome of a lengthy process of economic and social transformations and also is totally different from anarchist's conception of stateless society. Before that, Marx argued that the proletariat invest the state with a revolutionary spirit after the revolution. A few remaining elements of capitalism must be swept away and the minds of men purged of the remnants of capitalist mentality with which they were infected. The dictatorship of the proletariat will continue with the state, but it will be a revolutionary state invested with oppressive powers towards the bourgeois class. Once the bourgeois has been completely removed, the necessity of the state will cease to exist. That is after surpassing the class divisions and making the universalisation of the interest of the working class, the state as a political authority will cease to exist. But in the course of socialist construction, the proletarian state just as its predecessor the capitalist state, remains an instrument of class suppression. In the words of Lenin, "during the transition from capitalism to communism, suppression is still necessary, but it is the suppression of the minority of exploiter by the majority of exploited" (Lenin, 1917, 74).

Aufhebung of State

For Marx, the abolition of state aims at replacing the coercive power of the state by a legitimate form of social authority. But such an authority might interfere in the life of the

individual even more than the existing state. The difference between this social authority and the state would lie in the derivation of the legitimacy of the new authority from internal identification rather than external coercion. In fact, the concept `withering away of the state' is not used by Marx but Saint Simon and later by Engels and Lenin. While Engels in his Anti-Duhring speaks about the `state withering away', Marx always refers to the abolition and transcendence of the state. Absterben des Staates and Aufhebung des Staates are clearly two different terms deriving from quite different intellectual traditions. While Engels' Absterben is a biological smile, Marx's Aufhebung is a philosophical term with clear dialectical overtones (Avineri, 1968, 207). For the first time, Marx referred to the Aufhebung des states in his various 1843 essays. In The German Ideology, he made the abolition of the state as a separate organisation contingent upon universal suffrage (GI, 655). The Aufhebung of the state is made possible only after the political structure has utilized all of its potentialities. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels stated that the proletarian rule is connected with the attainment of universal suffrage. The first step in the revolution of the proletariat is to raise them to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. Marx argued that when in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character (MCP, 41). Once the proletariat submits the egoism of civil society to the universalism of the state the traditional dichotomy between the state and civil society will disappear. At the same time, if the proletarian revolution that would try to be realized by merely political means, it will never go beyond the formalistic egalitarianism based on an asceticism unaware of the enormous creative potentialities offered by the civil society (CWF). Marx also cited the anarchist conception of the abolition of the state. Bakunin stood for the abolition of the state since it is only a coercion. For the anarchist, the abolition of the state is a political act, decreed by law and carried out by force. For Marx, Aufhebung of the state is the ultimate result of the communist process of economic and social transformations sustained by the political power and by the reconciliation of social and political man.

Political Emancipation and Human Emancipation

According to Marx, human emancipation is the restoration of the human world to man himself. Marx introduced the concept of human emancipation as an antithesis to the concept of political emancipation. That is after the seizure of political power by the proletariat and the course of the dictatorship of the proletariat, men begin to negate the political authority and assume internalized system of regulation. Marx considered that man contains within himself not only his inherent values but also the direction of his activities. That direction is the expression of the full man unfolding the human potentialities capable of performing the

whole spectrum of human activities without reaching the point where one line of his activity makes him forever as a partial being to that line. It is in this sense that Marx presented his version of the Homo universale as hunting in the morning, fishing in the afternoon without ever becoming a hunter, a fisherman or any other kind of continued identification between man and a specialized or confined activity (GI, 22). Marx viewed freedom in terms of the removal of obstacles to human emancipation, that is to the manifold development of human powers and bringing into being of a form of system worthy of human nature. For Marx, overcoming obstacles is a collective enterprise and freedom as self-determination is collective in the sense that it consists in the socially co- operative and organized imposition of human control over both nature and the mode of production, that is the human mastery over the forces of nature as well as humanity's own nature. At the same time, Marx emphasized that the emancipation process is rested with individual's own endeavour and in terms of proletariat's own endeavour.

In a circulated letter in 1879, Marx and Engles, stressed, "the emancipation of the working class must be achieved by the working class itself. Hence we cannot cooperate with men who say openly that the workers are too uneducated to emancipate themselves, and must first be emancipated from above by philanthropic members of the upper and lower middle classes" (SW. 3,100). Earlier in On the Jewish Question, Marx has contrasted political and human emancipation and for him the Commune is the political form of social emancipation of the liberation of labour (WPC, 154). Marx believed that the state is an illusory community which exists where real community does not. So to abolish it entails more than breaking the obvious apparatus of class rule and this is because not just the class content of state power but the alienation inherent in the state form. Marx emphasized the Commune's primary significance in its being a social form through which this alienation can be challenged. He wrote,

> "the reabsorption of the state power by society as its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing it, by the popular masses themselves, forming their own force instead of the organized force of their suppression - the political form of their social emancipation, instead of the artificial force of society wielded for this oppression by their enemies" (CWF, 152).

Marx also explained the limitations of the Commune and emphasized further emancipation process of the working class. Though Marx studied in relation to French politics in 1870s, he visualized the far reaching significance in the proletarian emancipation. Marx considered that time and long class struggles would be necessary for labour to free itself from the muck of ages (GI, 53). He wrote,

> "As the state machinery and Parliamentarianism are not the real life of the ruling classes, but only the organized general organs of their dominion, the political guarantees and forms and expressions of the old order of things, so the Commune is not the social movement of the working class and of a general regeneration of mankind, but the organized means of action. The Commune does not do away with the class struggles, through which the working class strives to the abolition of all classes" (CWF, 154).

It implies that in order to abolish the state, a parallel political structure is necessary and that this parallel structure is envisaged to abolish the state power as well as class distinctions. Moreover, political emancipation is linked with the dialectical movement of class struggles, though it also implies structural change of mode of production from capitalism to communism, the concept of human emancipation requires the discussion of the ontological significance of human essence and his purpose of existence.

Marx argued that political emancipation is a reduction of man on the one hand to a member of civil society, to an independent and egoistic individual, on the other, to a citizen and a moral person. Marx thus attacked political emancipation as an ideal and as the achievement of the French Revolution, because it falls short in terms of the restoration of the human world to man himself. For Marx, man himself initially and fundamentally is not a split being who conducts his life simultaneously and concurrently according to the two conflicting norms, that of an egoistic individual and that of a moral person. It is because of the split implied in political emancipation that Marx introduced the notion of human emancipation. Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed in himself the abstract citizen, when as an individual man in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships he has become a social being, and when he has recognized and organized his own powers as social powers, and consequently no longer separates this social power from himself as political powers. Marx distinguished the spontaneity of man from the organized character of social life; between human necessity grounded in needs, and compulsion imposed on men who do have needs and create common life because they are activated by those needs. Marx intended to abolish the state or in other words, the communist society will absorb the positive aspects of state and political power rather the state absorbs the social characters. How Marx's theory of communism will resolve the incompatibility between the civil society and the state and how the human labour and subjectivity are structured towards human emancipation are the central discussion for Marx.

Communism and Human Emancipation

In *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, Marx envisaged communism as positive abolition of private property and the division of labour and thus the restoration of human devoid of estrangement. Marx himself termed as scientific communism differing from the existing utopian and German true socialism. Though he discovered the materialistic interpretation rooted in dialectics in interpreting the changes from capitalism to communism, his theory of communism is more rooted in the philosophical and emancipatory dimension of subjectivity which becomes authentic expression in the environment of communist mode of production. He also introduced the concept of praxis which bridges the gap between personal liberation and structural transformation. Marx argued that the fundamental bond between human beings and nature reveals that the emancipation of human nature would require the emancipation of non-human nature. Marx recognized that man is sensuously imbedded in nature and that human praxis always mediates between human creative purposes and non-human nature. Contrary to Hegel, Marx argued that the externalization of human potentialities, always takes place in the context of material nature (EPM, 55). Marx viewed communism as the solution to the problem of alienation. Marx believed that creativity and self-creativity of man could be unified under communism. He suggested that human creativity has a double character, on the one hand, it is productive, useful activity, externalizing objects that assumes their own separate existence, on the other hand, the things man makes remakes man, altering and deepening perception of himself and the world.

Marx indicated that productive activity which is useful to society in general terms, need not be seen as antithetical to personally fulfilling, enjoyable creativity. At the core of Marx vision of freedom lies the assumption that socially useful work can be organized democratically, without harsh authoritarian coordination or an overly refined division of labour; and that this work need not be intrinsically unpleasant, or as Marx phrased it, `external' to the worker - something to be escaped. Moreover the dichotomy between subject and object - the philosophical equivalent of the dichotomy between human and nonhuman nature - was perceived by Marx to be false and not an essential component of the social world. Marx argued that class- stratified societies produce these dichotomies because they have alienated men from their productive and creative possibilities. Under communism, productivity and creativity need not be contradictory.

Communism can be seen in abstract terms, as the resolution of certain conflicts once developed between Greek political life and Greek political philosophy, conflicts which had significantly contributed to the loss of Greek freedom lamented by Marx (Arendt, 1961). Greek political philosophy had discovered the idea or potential of perfected human nature, as the universal superior to the universality of public life in any one polis. Greek political philosophy elevated the theoretical life in pursuit of the knowledge of such idea above

political life, now seen to be merely a particularly dangerous kind of collective selfishness (Strauss, 1959, 42). But communism as the universal public life of species being, as the realization of the Greek idea of human nature, would join politics and philosophy once and for all. Marx's concept of freedom follows Greek political philosophy in so far as he identifies true human freedom not as the pursuit of private, arbitrary will but as making the essential species character of man one's object of action. For Marx, "man treats himself as a universal and therefore free being" (EPM, 61). Marx argued that the universal interest cannot be expected from politics and can therefore come only from a force inherent in civil society itself. Since obviously it cannot be expected from the particularism of the egoistic bourgeoisie, it can only emanate, if at all, from the wage labour. Since labour is not only a social, collective force, but also oppressed and alienated to appoint where a total loss of humanity can only redeem itself by a total redemption of humanity, labour according to Marx, provides a natural force within society itself which can conceivably overcome the forces otherwise intrinsic to bourgeois civil society. Only labour provides hope for human emancipation, which results when the real, individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen. The emancipation of labour from all extraneous restraints will for the first time unite the individual with his true universal standard, the human species, not as an ideal but as a concrete reality. Thus not human will, the political faculty of the past, but human needs for universal being, springing from real experiences of the proletariat, will elevate human life into the true universal human condition anticipated by the earlier experiences of classic citizenship.

For Marx, the individual worker as a member of a revolutionary association develops on the basis of his own experiences, the inner necessity for a totality of human life activities. Not only for the sake of self-fulfillment but for the sake of his very survival the worker must appropriate the totality of productive powers. Marx argued that the only real experiences of the proletariat will evoke and generate inner needs, which then must transform themselves into socially organized interest, which in turn must culminate in an express will to assert these needs politically, against the bourgeois state. Political will to universal freedom alone cannot create the inner need for a universal human condition. And without such universal need no universal will can emerge which can turn history into a conscious self-transcending act of coming-to-be (EPM, 94). For Marx, communism can be attained only consciously. He emphasized more on the part of conscious will of the proletariat as an antithesis to the existing situation. Moreover, Marx has not offered any systematic guidelines to construct communist society but he viewed as an evolutionary process determined by the rationality of the proletariat. In the words of Avineri (1968, 237), communism will bridge the gap between existing man and the potentialities inherent in his activity as an historical being. This praxis implies a reciprocal relation between man and his circumstances. Hence, in revolutionary

activity the changing of oneself coincides with the changing of circumstances. Marx never believed in a static, absolutizing blue-print for the socialist society.

Marx's conception of human emancipation revolves around his understanding of proletariat. Marx ignored the manifestation of human nature in various dimensions. While speaking about the bourgeois, he recognized that the greed and selfishness make the bourgeois to appropriate and posses the means of production which in turn crystallized their interests. Whereas, the proletariat defined by his process of labour as well as his self-creation is estranged and yet stands for potential to create universal society. Marx tried to create a society by using positively the disparity, poverty, exploitation and total alienation not only to overthrow the dominant class, at the same time not indulging in the bourgeois civilization and way of life, but also creating a society compatible to the nature of man not for class. These tendencies show that Marx clearly over-estimated moral perfection of man and his ignorance to illuminate the weaknesses of human nature.

Engels in his Principles of Communism defined that the proletariat are the products of Industrial Revolution. And Marx obviously explained and narrated the conditions of working class as they existed in the vicious circle of poverty, exploitation, despair and estrangement. However, he shifted his definition of man from his situation to man as a vision. His strong belief is that the proletariat could stand for perfect and just man which ensemble in the subjectivity which further crystallized by social relations. Hence, the existence of the state as an external coercive authority becomes unnecessary. Under these human relations, the communist principle "from each according to his capacity to each according to his needs" (CGP, 6) implies that the productivity of labour in relation to creativity is increased with an illuminating subjectivity without an external coercion of the state. Some of these paradoxes can be explored with the help of Freudian conception about authority, politics and liberation. Moreover, human emancipation requires an active sublimation of instinctual energy in order to link freedom with labour process. The communist society needs its own sublimation process, however contrary to the repressive process of capitalist society.

Unconscious Construction of Politics

For Freud politics is the Oedipal longing for love and authority and the consoling search for dependence on new father figures. The ambition of politics is the need to diminish the distance between self and other. Basically, politics counts on an attraction and obedience that is erotic and nonrational in nature, a redirection of emotions previously reserved for family towards the state (Freud, 1930). The eros calls forth the Oedipal dilemma of love versus hate and ends in the self- tormenting surrender to the parents that makes the infantile relation

between love and authority a troublesome model for politics. Freud considered that politics must lean heavily on eros, must indeed exaggerate public affection between persons so as to stave off the counterforce of aggression, makes politicized eros both an enemy and ally of human freedom (Abramson, 1984, 15- 16). Freud conceived that the reuniting many under a single authority came into existence together as the profound expression of the ambivalence of human instinct embedded in political life. He treated political society not as an artifact designed out of fear and prudence for the purpose of limiting universal egotism, but as the expression of man's irrational longing for the return of authority (Rieff, 1959, 215). According to Freud, man develops his social nature, his culture, religion and science only secondarily and modificatorily, that is by way of reaction formation or sublimation.

Freud argued that the rise of political authority occurs in two stages: first, there is horde government, the rule of primal father; then, the family authority. For Freud, the state is not simply modeled on the family, but the family itself is really chastened reconstruction of the primal horde (1913, 1921, 135). Freud found in politics a revival of the horde sentiment, reserving to the erotic claims of the family a certain humane tension with the grosser, more primitive and absolute claims of the state. From these assumptions, Freud explored the rise of authority, and man's inner compulsion to adore the authority besides the inclination of the eros to identify his species and binds him. In the family, father is the symbolic structure of authority and domination which the child once rebels later submits due to castration fear as well as the internalization of reality principle through ego and superego. Like the individual superego, Freud argued that a cultural superego has also been formed by the archaic heritage - the memory traces of the past generations. His philogenetic theory endeavours to trace the development of the cultural superego in an analogous way to his account of the development of the individual superego. The dissolution of the Oedipal complex is the triumph of love over hate, the submission to and internalization of parental authority as the child's own conscience or superego. This occurs in partnership with the reality principle which opposes the individual's pleasure principle and embodies the demands of reality and society, insisting on the renunciation or the postponement of pleasure so that greater displeasure may be avoided or greater future pleasure gained. Speaking about the philogenetic theory, the primitive Oedipal deeds of the ancestors have come to form a collective content in the individual unconscious, a memory trace in the infantile `id' of the experiences of former generations (Freud, 1939, 99). The memory of the primal killing is somehow preserved in the psyche of the species in the same way that the individual members wish to kill his own father when he is identified as a rival authority. At the same time the sense of guilt and the longing for father pave the way to restore the authority (Freud, 1939, 132-37). Not only this longing for authority but the drive of the libido binds the psyche of the individual with the authority. Freud's group psychology explains the phenomenon of identification with the leader

maintaining the libidianal ties. The ego-ideal or the superego plays a vital role in identifying the leader. Freud wrote,

> "If unity expresses the essential mystery of political society, and a group is clearly held together by a power of some kind, to what power can this mysterious unity be better ascribed that to Eros, which holds together everything in the world?" (Freud, 1921, 92).

For Freud, only the narcissistic man can live without external authority, because, the object of love and authority is his own subjectivity.

For Freud, the psychological process by which the libidinal energy is transformed into the social bonds of groups which provides the basis for politics. Freud argued that the superego creates the ideal and represents the ideal personality which the individual loves. For Freud, the concept of authority and politics is not abstract but it should be personified because the psychic structure is capable of identifying easily only through personalities. In other words, the abstract qualities must be materialized in the form of personalities or species types. In Totem and Taboo Freud explored the superimposition of abstract qualities on material things. This is why the tradition, morality and primordial sentiments are often associated with certain great personalities. Freud's theory of group psychology and his idea on archaic heritage imply that the human history is the process and development of domination and repression on the one hand, and man's inclination towards authority and submission, however the hostility is hidden, on the other hand. This recurrence can rest on the historical cycle of rebellion and remorse embedded in family life. Freud also suggested that new forms of domination symbolized in the myth of the primal horde representing modern political life can be instilled. Freud believed that restriction of freedom is the aim of authority in all its forms - as horde, as family and as state. Individual freedom has never been the aim of any authority. Freud argued that the existence of taboo indicates an ineradicable human inclination to anarchy. Moreover, the motive force of political life lies in the fact that the society is repressive and rebellion is not justified. At the same time the freedom that human beings seek is still the freedom to become master. Besides these, Freud also pointed out the role of envy and lust for power as the latent sources for conscious impulses of rebellion. Freud viewed these tendencies as distortion of libidinal energies rooted in the Oedipus Complex. Freud argued, "the desire for power is contagious. Anybody is liable to catch it; nobody is immune; everyone perhaps, would like to be a king (Freud, 1913, 33).

Freud also explored the problem of leadership and struggle for power. With the leader forced to play father-image because his followers are sons, politics becomes an unchanging strife between the generations. On the psychological pendulum of ambivalence, social changes

become recurrences and social relations are seen through to the permanent psychological needs they satisfy. Social protests are the manifestation of the ambivalence of emotions and respect and affection for privileged persons are opposed in the unconscious by intensely hostile feelings. Freud discovered the genetics of political power on the psychology of libidinal participation and the ambivalence of love-hate relationship. For Freud, the political personality is a man of neurotic agitated by ungratified cravings for affection which have been both accentuated and unsatisfied in personal relations (Roazen, 1970; Rieff, 1959, 237). It implies that political man expresses a displacement and rationalisation of private motives. For Freud, political man is only the manifest content of the modern world as citizen or man of power. The latent content is the unconscious strivings with unfulfilled libidinal energies gripped in love-hate ambivalence, incapable of breaking the tradition, impossibility of abandonment of external authority and at the maximum eros finds state as the ensemble of the authority of authorities.

Politics and Oedipal Situation

The Oedipus complex, at the root, implies certain power structure which can be interpreted in political categories. In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud anticipated the importance of the Oedipus complex when he discovered the correspondence between the fantasies of his Vienesse patients and the elements of Greek legend. From then onwards, Freud conceptualized the fundamental contradiction between individual and society in terms of the ambivalent love-hate expression towards all kinds of authority as well as one's fellow beings. It also implies that the total rejection of the authority of the past which is embodied in fathers as representatives of past generations. The Oedipus complex is peculiar to state societies, particularly those undergoing rapid social transformation. When social roles for adult males are limited, or whose the acquaintance of sons with new ideas and techniques threatens the social power of their elders, intergenerational male rivalries will be exacerbated. In fact Freud ignored father's hate towards his sons which is illuminated by the text of Sophocles. Shellef argued that the term `Lauis Complex' - fathers who hate their sons out of competitive fear - will be exacerbated in historical situations where the father's link to traditional sources of authority is disrupted through the introduction of new technology, norms, or role designations (Shellef, 1981).

Moreover this conflict needs to be understood within the cultural and historical contexts in which it appeared rather than as a timeless myth of inevitable generational hostility and preordained tragedy. The Greek poleis were the first non-dynastic states in history. The relationships between the ideals of freedom and the nagging reality of oppression characterized the Greek social formation in the classical period. The non-dynastic state is

legitimized precisely by claiming to stand above, and hence transcend - the sectorial interests of the ranked kin groupings or estates which comprise the dynastic formation and its affiliates. The poleis were the first states in which the primary producers of surplus values were slaves. The rapid development in productive forces and competition for access to economic and political power by higher civic officers and the concentration of landholdings in the hands of elite lineages created a proto-class of families. In course of time, three sorts of productive relations emerged. First, several waves of migrations settled Greek colonists throughout the Mediterranean region, from Marseilles to the Black Sea. This depopulation helped to lessen competition for land but did not undermine a class structure which required a strata of non-owning producers for its operation. Second, interstate warfare intensified. The third consequence was the emergence of tyrants. The tyrants emerged through civil strife as representatives of disenfranchised labourers and petty landholders, the demos, demanded relief from debt, political rights, and redistribution of land to the landlesss. In the ancient world tyrants were known as men who usurped traditional power for reformist ends, often killing competitors in the struggle for political power. Since they contributed to the consolidation of state power against countervailing claims of aristocratic elites, tyrants became known as antithetical to the prerogatives of kinship. For instance, the early Lydian tyrant Gyges is said to have seized the throne by killing the former basileus and marrying his wife (Andrewes, 1956, 43-65). In other words the tyrant rises above kinship in order to resolve the contradictions of class formation.

Oedipus was descendant of aristocratic ancestor associated with lameness, was prophesized to threaten the patriarchal power of elders but survived attempted infanticide by those threatened by the prophecy, and ascended to power as the reigning tyrant of his polis. In the Oedipus legend, the son's abandonment by his father alienates him from aristocratic prerogatives. Akhnaton, who ruled Egypt has often been regarded as the founder of religious monotheism. The Hebrews borrowed the idea of monotheism from Akhnaton (Freud, 1939). Velikovsky compared Oedipus and Akhnaton and found that Akhnaton married his stepmother Tiy after his father's death. The author argued that Akhnaton is motivated by psychosocial conflicts resulting from his early abandonment possibly attempted infanticide, certainly a denial of the throne by his father Amenhotep III. Moreover, the author finds that `Oedipus' literally refers to `swollen foot'. According to these comments or classics, incest is portrayed as a socially constituted symbol with its own meanings involving power and preservation of aristocratic lineage not just economic or sexual narcissism (Velikovsky, 1960). In the words of St. Augustine, who in his apology for Christian doctrine reasoned that primal incest was forgivable as necessary when there were only a few people, the children of Adam. Mythologies of incest among elites are metaphors for the concentration of state power in the hands of a narrow kin group or a tyrannical individual (Stritmatter, 1987, 54). In Sophocles'

play, there is a metaphorical enactment of the state destroying its traditional source of authority in a connection between father and son, in the process of its imperial consolidation in the hands of the son. As Humphreys has observed, "Tragedy in Athens reflected both the tension felt between the demands of private and public life and the internal conflicts generated by intra-sex and intergenerational struggles for dominance and economic resources within the family" (1978, 203). This fundamental contradiction is reflected in dynastic states as a model of social organisation, a source of their chronic instability, and stimulus to the emergence of non- dynastic states, particularly in the context of the emergence of major imperial holdings, as in Greece and Rome. The primal killing of father by son is compensated for by the son's submission to the superordinate protection of God, the father. Freud argued that the replacement of father's authority by the sons follows the psychological fear of separation and loss of protection and the sense of guilt. Freud pointed out the danger of revisitation of authority once again by the rule of sons. Freud emphasized that man carries with sense of guilt for his action due to the internalization of superego. This movement corresponds to an interpsychic regression to preconscious feeling of guilt. Unconscious guilt replaces conscious, social anxiety mediated through ritual, in which sons are able to assume the role designations of elder males. This `return of the repressed'; `return to authority' conditions the concept of progress or social change in Freud's terms. Freud also considered that man is anarchic and society restraints him. The social contract theory of the origin of state, in Freud's version, appears as a counter-revolutionary response to the overthrow of patriarchal government. Social Contract is the reassertion of the will of the father against the rebellious impulses of a chastened sonship. The law of primal ambivalence is conveniently at work, matching rebellion with guilt, aggression with submissiveness (Rieff, 1959, 221). Plato anticipated the dangers of kinship as a principle of political organization. Plato intended to repress Oedipal tensions once for all and secure social harmony through the dissolution of the nuclear family itself, the last remaining viable locus of kin relations in the classical period. Plato conceived of eros as a grave danger to political order, a great winged drone stinging the soul into the tyrannical assertion of its own insatiable appetites. Plato thus established a community where public allegiance replaces kinship loyalty and self-love, for eros to become a source of unity rather than division (Abramson, 1984, 11). In this way, for Plato, class antagonism is replaced and the reconciliation of private realm of freedom and public loyalty is established.

Repression and Sublimation

Freud discovered that the psychic structure is ensemble of contradictions between id and ego, unconscious and conscious mind, and pleasure and reality principles. Freud argued that the dichotomy, exists within the mind. In the subject-object dichotomy, the objective situation is internalized in the structure of ego. If man finds no mediation between these dichotomies,

often becomes neurotic. Because he is not capable of sublimating the libido. Increasing repression often distorts the manifestation of libido, or man can create certain substitute gratification in the form of drug, smoking, religion etc. The basis for therapy is rested with Freud who is to unravel these dichotomies and repression which could be envisaged by the patient through self-understanding. The individual therapy is envisaged to seek a meaningful correlation between id and ego, in this way the patient understands himself and changes himself as well as the circumstances. Freud rested the whole idea of emancipation with the individual himself dispossessing the past and not something superimposed from outside. But still Freud is pessimistic about the complete emancipation of mankind. He discovered that `repetition compulsion' compels men to return to the past and live in the myth and illusions besides rule of authority in the form of religion and state. For Freud, the process of emancipation is continuous and everlasting one in so far as the rationality sublimates the unconscious wishes.

Freud argued that the civilization is repressive in terms of curbing the animal and barbarian attitude of man and in order to lead life free from incest and sublime the libidinal energies into useful ways. Perhaps the primary sublimation is to turn the animal man into homo laborans, that man defined by his labour process which is the greatest achievement of the civilization. This civilization is not seen as repression but sublimation of libidinal energies teaches the ethics of human labour and man's responsibility to lead his life by his own labour. In secular terms, which would be the fundamental principle of all moral systems. State can be viewed as the sophisticated form of civilization which enforces repression which is legitimized in the interest of the elites. Here repression assumes class character and the state is the symbolic structure of civilizing agent - an authority gets concentration of power of repression. If this is the situation, personal emancipation requires political emancipation since state is the absolute authority of repression which is continuously alter the ego and the superego of the individual for their own interests. In Freudian terms, the civil society has number of repressive agents, perhaps, religion or regional norms, but under the state the repression is concentrated in one authority, and the repressed masses can easily identify its machineries. In other words, the state is a legalized version of the oppression of civil society. For Freud, in civil society, man under the rule of pleasure principle is against man, a Hobbesian version of state of nature. The emergence of state follows that the struggle would be between groups or classes. The instinctual structure itself provides the basis to love one group and to show hostility to others. Under the rule of civilization or reality principle the state and legal system being the powerful instrument of civilization repress as well as internalize the norms and moral principles, however, not in terms of universal rationality but of sectional rationality of dominant class. The awareness of the oppressed class with the intense increasing tension between id and ego starts waging war against the dominant class. Though Freud was

ambivalent with regard to the continuity of capitalism or the emergence of socialism, he anticipated class struggle against the dominant class and state. Freud argued,

> "It is to be expected that the neglected classes will grudge the favoured ones, their privileges and that they will do everything in their power to rid themselves of their own surplus of privation. Where this is not possible a lasting measure of discontent will obtain within this culture, and this may lead to dangerous outbreaks. But if a culture has not got beyond the stage in which the satisfaction of one group of its members necessarily involves the suppression of another, perhaps the majority - and this is the case in all modern cultures - it is intelligible that these suppressed classes should develop an intense hostility to the culture, a culture whose existence they make possible by their labour, but in whose resources they have too small a share.... It need not be said that a culture which leaves unsatisfied and drives to rebelliousness so large a number of its members neither has a prospect of continued existence, nor deserves it" (Freud, 1927, 15-17).

In Freud's version of culture or civilization, all institutions were included. For Freud, there must be a consciousness about the tension between the pleasure principle and reality principle which envisages the struggle against the oppressing class. Freud argued that in the primitive societies, the id had more freedom due to the weakest structure of ego and superego. But in modern society with its legal-political system as well as economic scarcity, ego and superego are structured forcefully because of fragmentation in the society and the id is submissive in order to survive.

Freud in his group psychology argued that group presupposes a leader and a ego-ideal for maintaining group solidarity. For Marx, the struggle against the state cannot be envisaged individually. The proletariat would create their own antithesis, the Commune, in order to battle against the state. The Commune provides an object of identity for the proletarian class. Before that the structure of subjectivity in civil society and state is changed in accordance with the adaptation to reality principle. In civil society, the centralized coercive authority is absent and the id presupposes the egoism and self interest. Perhaps, the absence of economic scarcity and division of labour could not create any class awareness. Yet man was capable of recognizing the existence of others and their needs. Thus the innate rationality first taught him to repress the id slightly. From civil society to state implies that the realms of freedom and repression is changed or shifted from individual to external institutions. However, the repressive measures of the external institutions could be carried out only through the subjective structure of ego. Modern society, that is, bourgeois society appropriated the state as an absolute authority of repression of the proletariat. This implies that the determinants of

subjectivity are shifted from primitive instincts through economic structure to the state. The freedom lies in the autonomous subjectivity which has been displaced into submission of subjectivity to the authority which in turn would be ultimate fatality of authority. At the same time, Freud considered that the authority cannot be abstract but should be personified through the manifestation of great men. It signifies that the authority is the symbol of protection and freedom rather than repression. Freud argued that in the family, parental authority, though it is repressive, signifies protection and the realm of freedom is defined by the parental authority. For Freud, modern man cannot lead a life of primitive man nor absolutely resolved into reality principle. He can lead a life of in between through which he himself defines freedom and men incapable of finding the mediation will often get frustration and the psychic equilibrium is distorted.

These inferences put important questions about the abolition of state or the continuity of state with regard to Marx's `Aufhebung' of state after the revolution. Freud did not envisage in his writings any system-building process nor prescribed a structured authority in terms of legal, political or religious system. He only prescribed the illuminating effect of self-understanding in order to explore the unconscious drives as well as the conscious repression, so that mediation or correlation between these two could be discovered. He did not envisage a political or economic system which could reconcile with human subjectivity where the psyche and polis could be identified as one as in the case of Plato and Marx.

Freud argued that repression is necessary to maintain the human society in peace otherwise the original state of things will be domination by brute violence or by violence supported by intellect (Freud, 1932, 136). Marx argued that the ownership of means of production by the bourgeoisie degenerate the conditions of working class who has nothing but labour power. Marx understood human essence as self-conscious and spontaneous expression of creativity which should be appropriated by labour process in the absence of private property and division of labour as well as the ideological form of creating an inverted form of consciousness. Freud himself ignored the unconscious wishes of the repressive agents.

In the bourgeois society, the state produces an illusion of autonomous and private freedom where the human individual thinks that he functions spontaneously. Through the increase of production and capitalist mode of consumption and of culture industry, the domination and the repression of the family is somewhat reduced. The capitalists are themselves aware that increasing domination will be ended in weakening of legitimacy of bourgeois power structure (Marcuse, 1964; Habermas, 1975). In order to avoid this situation, the capitalists, instead of internalizing this domination through ego and superego, begin to fulfill the needs of the id to certain extent through their superstructures which ultimately distort the human beings at the

same time the determinant is shifted from economic structure to state. Hence, in the capitalist society, the state is the symbol of preserving the class division which is being legitimized in the subjectivity of the individual. Marx anticipated this danger in which the state distorts the subjectivity as well as undermines the rationality of the proletariat. Moreover, the state is not merely functioning as a superstructure but as a intruder into private as well as public realm of individual life.

Revisitation of Authority

Marx recognized the need for highly disciplined organisation and crystallized class consciousness both before and after the revolution, because the proletariat have to eradicate the entire remnants of bourgeois. Marx intended to create the proletariat i.e., the revolution should be carried out by their own class consciousness in dialectical relation to the existing situation, the bourgeois structure. Marx did not consider the necessity of strong authority and leadership to carry out the revolution. The mode of operation of the dictatorship of the proletariat requires a libidinal tie with an authority on the part of the proletariat. Freud's notion of character structure and the emotionally rooted adoration and respect for authority necessitate for leadership and discipline. Because, the leader as a primal father or Great man, can have on the life of the proletariat, thereby like the psychoanalyst in individual therapy alleviating guilt and building up a new conscience and consciousness.

Freud also anticipated the dangers of authority concentrating in one person. In the words of Szymanski,

> "The cult of personality should not be considered to be some kind of deviation, mistake or result of power hunger, but rather an integral, necessary, and progressive aspect of the early stage of revolutionary transformation in societies riddled with conflict, economically in shambles, and full of people who are even at the moment of revolutionary triumph, mostly still psychologically incapable of taking full unguided control over their own lives" (Szymanski, 1978, 44).

In other words, the revolutionary process must be personalized, for most of the psychologically ravished oppressed, to make it real and to mobilize their energies. Just as the leader played a key role in firmly conditioning the authoritarian values of class society, a successful revolutionary leader of the dictatorship of the proletariat can play a key role in unwinding the proletariat's Oedipus complex transferring them into self- determining human beings. The personified authority of the dictatorship can restructure the character structure formed in the capitalist society for the purpose of capital accumulation and domination. Freud

(1921) argued that the individual superego evaporates along with the anxieties and guilt feelings through an intense identification with the leader. As the leader comes to act as their collective conscience, the mass accept the suggestion of the leader and the internalization process is restructured. The development of communist rationale is more important than the eradication of all bourgeois culture and the restructuring of the mode of production. Because the subjectivity which ensemble in the communist rationality can maintain the communist mode of production rather than through externally imposed control. Freud underscored the need to remold human beings in a process of massive transference and character remolding. It is imperative that the repressed libidinal energies that are manifested in anxiety, guilt and respect for authority, be liberated, and these energies tied instead in nonrepressive ways to the new classless society. These energies must be channeled into productive and creative work controlled by the producers, democratic determination of all societal processes, and love relationships with other human beings.

Freud warns of two mistaken ideas of liberation or emancipation.

> "The first identifies oneself to completely with instinctual expression, thereby confusing freedom with determinism and leaving unexplained the very fact of repression, that one is not harmonious with one's desires, that one strives to idealize ones own nature. The second identifies oneself too purely with reason, thereby seeking to deny the constraints of nature that are not open to one to deny. A truer account of liberation thus depends on a reconciliation of reason and desire" (Abramson, 1984, 137).

Marcuse accepted that in communist society certain level of repression will exist, however not surplus repression in the case of capitalist society. By surplus repression, he meant the restrictions necessitated by social domination. He sought the distinction between the libidinal repression made necessary by the scarcity of the means to satisfy needs, which is caused by the low level of the productive forces, and the libidianal repression made necessary to secure the privileges of the ruling class whose system results in technologically unnecessary scarcity and menial labour. Marcuse believed that greater development of the productive forces makes the real possibilities for a non repressive society (Marcuse, 1955, 36). He further argued that the elimination of surplus repression would not abolish work, authority and organisation as such but merely class society and the alienation of labour.

For Marx, the basic premise for the communist society is to free the labour from alienation. Moreover he considered labour is not as a means to produce susbsistence but rather as a means to express human personality (G1, 31-2). Labour is the means whereby men objectify

their subjectivity, externalize inner needs, actualize their potential and realize their human nature. Productive activity is men creating and defining themselves; it is the means whereby men obtain an identity; Work can thus be an end in itself, a joy (EPM, 75-79). For Marx, work must be to distinguish between alienated and non-alienated labour. The latter is not repressive and it constitutes human self- realization. The end of communist movement was not the elimination of the working class but rather the creation of conditions in which work is an activity of freedom and creativity. Marx did not split the homo laborans from natural man. Marx's basic premise of emancipation is the emancipation of human labour from alienation, exploitation under the conditions of capitalist mode of production. Under communism, the abolition of private property and exploitation would provide the humanization of labour. However, the role of libidinal repression in creating a disciplined labour force is also compatible with communism. A highly disciplined labour force which subordinates many of its libidinal satisfactions for the common good is necessary. The libidinal energies must be channeled into the common task of building up the material conditions that make the transition to authentic communism possible. In capitalism, the repression is carried out in the interest of maintaining class divisions, whereas in the communism, the repression is still necessary in the interest of building up of classless society. Freud wrote, "The communal life of human beings, had therefore a two-fold foundation: the compulsion to work, which was created by external necessity, and the power of love, which made the man unwilling to be deprived of his sexual object - the women -, and made the woman unwilling to be deprived of the part of herself which had been separated off from her - her child. Eros and Ananke (love and necessity) have become the parents of human civilization too" (Freud, 1930, 48). Freud argued that the libidinal drives of people had to be repressed in order to make cooperation in production possible. This is because of the innately selfish individualistic nature of the instincts, which under conditions of scarcity, if not repressed result in the war of all against all. Though Freud considered the instinctual structure and human aggressiveness as well as the repression of the civilization as permanent, he pointed out the advantages of the classless society.

He argued that "the commandment, `Love, thy neighbour as thyself', is the strongest defense against human aggressiveness and an excellent example of the unpsychological proceedings of the cultural super-ego. The commandment is impossible to fulfill.... But so long as virtue is not rewarded here on earth, ethics will, I fancy, preach in vain. I too think it quite certain that a real change in the relations of human beings to possessions would be of more help in this direction than any ethical commands" (Freud, 1930,90).

Freud discovered the fact of aggressiveness in the libido in 1920's after observing the First World War. He concluded after that human aggressiveness was an inborn and inevitable part

of human nature. The notion of Thanatos - the innate aggressive instinct creates a skepticism about the continuity of communist society. The term aggressive instinct stimulates extensive discussions in Freudian circles. Wilhelm Reich argued that all the aggressive energy demonstrated by Freud's patients could in fact be accounted for by the frustration - aggression thesis, rather than inborn, that is aggression is totally a result of the frustration of libidinal energies. Marcuse accepted the idea of innate aggression, but saw it as less powerful and less perverse than Freud (cited by Szymanski, 1978, 20-1). On this assumption, Freud is pessimistic about communism's ability to eliminate aggressiveness.

Freud's Ambivalence on Communism

Commenting on the Soviet practice, Freud argued,

> "The communists believe that they have found the path to deliverance from our evils. According to them, man is wholly good and is well-disposed to his neighbour; but the institution of private property has corrupted his nature. The ownership of private wealth gives the individual power, and with it the temptation to ill-treat his neighbour; while the man who is excluded from possession is bound to rebel in hostility against his oppressor. If private property were abolished, all wealth held in common, and everyone allowed to share in the enjoyment of it, ill-will and hostility would disappear among men. Since everyone's needs would be satisfied, no one could have any reason to regard another as his enemy; all would willingly undertake the work that was necessary. I have no concern with any economic criticism of the communist system: I cannot inquire into whether the abolition of private property is expedient or advantageous.... But I am able to recognize that the psychological premises on which the system is based are an untenable illusion. In abolishing private property we deprive the human love of aggression of one of its instruments, certainly a strong one, though certainly not the strongest; but we have in no way altered the differences in power and influence which are misused by aggressiveness, nor have we altered anything in its nature. Aggressiveness was not created by property. It reigned almost without limit in primitive times, when property was still very scanty, and it already shows itself in the nursery almost before property has given up its primal, anal form; it forms the basis of every relation of affection and love among people.... It is clearly not easy for men to give up the satisfaction of this inclination to aggression. They do not feel comfortable without it. The advantage which a comparatively small cultural group offers of allowing this instinct an outlet in the form of hostility against intruders is not to be despised. It is always possible to bind together a considerable

number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness" (PFL: 12, 303-5).

Freud believed that the human aggressiveness despite its useful purpose, exists side by side with eros. The abolition of private property could not undermine the innate aggressiveness. Freud further argued,

> "It is intelligible that the attempt to establish a new communist in Russia should find its psychological support in the persecution of the bourgeois. One only wonders, with concern, what the Soviets will do after they have wiped out their bourgeois. If civilization imposes such great sacrifices not only on man's sexuality but on his aggressivity, we can understand better why it is hard for him to be happy in that civilization". (PFL: 12, 306).

When the class antagonism and struggle is justified with the death instinct of libido, at the same time, how the death instinct can be utilized after the revolution, is a paradoxical question. For Freud, the ambivalence of man lies in the fact that there should be an object for love as well as for hate. However, Freud's concept of sublimation would accomplish to lessen the dangerous aspects of libidinal energies. While commenting on the end of war, Freud wrote,

> "some people are inclined to prophesy that it will not be possible to make an end of war until communist ways of thinking have formed universal acceptance. But that aim is in any case a very remote one today, and perhaps it could only be reached after the most fearful civil wars" (PFL: 12, 355).

Freud was very clear that only through class antagonism, communism can be achieved.

Libido and Labour Process

In the labour process, the libidinal energies, both its dimensions of creation and destruction manifest simultaneously. For instance, the man engaging in carving a sculpture, has to utilize the two contrary expressions simultaneously. He has to retain what is necessary and to remove what is unnecessary. Thus, in the production process, the labour power utilizes the two basic libidinal instincts simultaneously. This is the appropriate process of sublimation of libidinal energies manifested in the labour process. Marx considered that the division of labour between agriculture and industry; and between physical and mental etc. alienates simply because it could not express the human spontaneity and self-conscious creativity. In

the absence of external restraints, his illuminating subjectivity defines everything in the classless society. For Marx, the impetus for social emancipation would emerge from the concrete experiences of individuals living and working in social relations and productive processes, and not from the pleas of well-meaning social reformers equipped with a mystified and illusionary watertight moral indignation. However, Marx's future communist society will almost inevitably require a set of norms, standards and code of conduct. For Marx humans are homo faber, they create and recreate the means of their own existence (Smart, 1991, 160-72). Moreover, for Marx, the classless society should stop the dialectical process of class antagonism hitherto experienced by the bourgeois society. In other words, the communist society must falsify the following words of Engels (1884),

> "Since the exploitation of one class by another is the basis of civilization, its whole development moves in a continuous contradiction. Every advance in production is at the same time a retrogression in the condition of the oppressed class, that is, of the great majority. What is a boon for the one is necessarily bane for the other; each new emancipation of one class means a new oppression of another class"(SW.3, 354).

7

Conclusion

Marx applied dialectics and materialistic interpretation embedded in forces and relations of production to illuminate the hitherto evolution and predicament of man in class society. Because Marx was able to conceive that the subjectivity is structured out of the dialectical relations of production in which it experiences alienation and it has no spontaneity or self-creative praxis to externalize in the repressive - exploitative mode of production. By the same expression, Marx unconsciously defined the nature of subjectivity which need an objective situation, that is, a communist society in order to transcend the subjectivity-objectivity dichotomy. Thus Marx's central concern is to bring the subjectivity to relate to objective situation meaningfully after negating the situation of estranged, reified and dominated subjectivity. Here, the dialectics can not be taken as to view as negation of negation. Instead the subjectivity is wholly compatible with objectivity. Marx did study the condition of man during industrial revolution and ruthlessness of the capitalists towards the wage labourers. However Marx did not intend to simplify the contradictions between the owners and non-owners of the means of production. Instead, how the entire mode of production is evolved by the greed, Faustian, spirit of the bourgeois in terms of commodity, money, capital and profit which conceal the apparent value of labour. In this situation, dialectics provides Marx to create an inevitability thesis of class struggle. At the same time by, what he himself termed as, materialistic interpretation of history, Marx intended to substantiate his philosophical expression of alienation, and his empirical study of England's political economy provided the material foundation on which surplus value and the internal contradiction of capitalism were enumerated. It is said that Marx did refer the earlier writings while drafting the later works especially *Grundrisse* and *Capita*l.

Marx did give adequate attention to the problem of class consciousness and how the bourgeois create an inverted form of consciousness which undermine the dialectical relation between the exploitation and the proletarian suffering. Instead, the very dialectical and historical materialism prepared Marx to study the objective situation of the capitalist mode of production which, he believed or anticipated, breaks itself down due to crisis tendencies, that is decline in profit. Marx was not able to anticipate the role of state in determining the production process because, during the nineteenth century, the state had limited functions and

mostly dominated by the bourgeois. In his later years, Marx did regret for not explaining the reciprocal relation between the base and the superstructure. Marx himself said that the bourgeois's first and foremost superstructure - the ideological form is the state as an instrument of oppression. For Marx, state as superstructure provides the bourgeois more material expression of oppression of the proletariat and maintaining the class society. In other words, the bourgeois prepared to shift the determinant from economic structure to state which would be concentrated form of power of the ruling class. Marx did not deny the necessity of association as Commune to carry out the revolution against the bourgeois and the Commune will be an antithesis to the bourgeois state. Marx argued that after the revolution and success by the dictatorship of the proletariat, every element of mind and society were to be made classless. Marx did say that art, literature, philosophy and morality were freed from class dimensions and they all stood for the real human being. But, Marx did not believe that the state can be made classless, or state would be an unnecessary institution in classless society. Marx went to the extreme to pronounce the abolition of the state with the hidden assumption that the illuminating subjectivity did not entertain the external authority. For Marx, the possibility and the success of communism lies in the implication of dialectics and economic structure. But the justification of this is rooted in Marx's concrete faith in the proletariat's compatibility to objectify their praxis internalizing the communist spirit of existence. The fundamental distortion of Marx's project is the ignorance of grasping the dialectical relation between human rationality and instinctual substratum. Moreover, the application of dialectics created an illusion of inevitability which undermined the significance of class consciousness and emancipating praxis of the proletariat. Marx left certain categories which must also be studied with dialectical conflict, for example, the dialectical relation between subjectivity and rationality; between consciousness and material existence.

For Marx, subjectivity is structured historically but he did not explain how the material conditions are transformed into consciousness. Marx viewed that the ownership and non-ownership of the means of production split the subjectivity of the men where the bourgeois conceive political economy as profit, capital accumulation and the symbol of power and domination, whereas the non-owners must conceive the political economy as dehumanized labour, alienation, exploitation and the symbol of oppression. Thus, the consciousness stimulates the formation of classes, however internalized in the character structure. But shifting of ownership also needs rationale for common good which should be internalized in the character structure of the proletariat. Hence, formation and structuration of character structure, from family through the state or the dictatorship of the proletariat is inevitable. At the same time, communist society requires certain elements which were termed as bourgeois elements such as repression, mystification and personification of authority as supplied by Freudian psychoanalysis. Freudian psychoanalysis could be used not only to

reconstruct Marx's theory but also to offer explanation and understanding of what Marx omitted, unexplained and ignored.

Contrary to passive view of subjectivity and it is wholly structured by historically ensembling production relation, Marx implicitly expressed that the subjectivity and the social relations exhibit reciprocal encounter. In class society, alienation degenerates the self-creative and spontaneous praxis and also deludes the species nature of man. Earlier, Marx held that the private property and the division of labour were the consequence of alienation and in course of time they became reciprocal. Marx did make the solution to the problem of alienation by abolition of private property and the division of labour reflecting the class society should be envisaged. However, Marx understood in Hegelian terms that the alienation was the necessary process of externalization of subjectivity and it implied the subject-object dichotomy in work process. The system of private property widens the dichotomy and under the division of labour, man could not externalize his essence completely but partially, which was inhibited and frustration occurred. Moreover, Marx considered private property as the potential for concentrated class power. Since Marx believed that man must be defined by the labour process, under capitalist-class society, he found that the objective situation of production process was no way compatible with the essence of man or the structure of subjectivity. But Marx did accept that alienation could exist in lesser degrees in communist mode of production. It also implied that the phenomenon of alienation can not entirely be related to economic structure. Freud understood that the psychic structure could not grasp the entire dimension of the reality principle which exerted control on the inclination of the eros as well as the repressive activity of the ego. Marx's conception of alienation embraces the problem of psychic structure as repression, anxiety, sense of guilt, frustration, etc. However, Freud suspects the innate goodness of the subjectivity because it is rooted in pleasure principle which is hidden in the unconscious mind. For Marx, the proletarian subjectivity seeks to realize the essence of man which is species in nature and spontaneous, self-creative praxis. The only unconscious wish of the proletarian subjectivity is to overthrow the bourgeois domination. Marx implicitly expressed that the fulfillment of the drives of the eros and thanatos; one seeking universal affiliation, and the other towards the destruction of the oppressive class. However, the skepticism is that how long the proletariat under classless society exist without the thanatos.

Freud's group psychology explained the formation of class as well as the weakening of the proletarian class consciousness. Freud discovered that the formation of character structure and the internalization process accomplished by the family and later by societal institutions produce the child to act in the way the authority or the dominant class desired. In the early years of the infant, due to Oedipus complex, the ambivalent love-hate relationship is formed.

In later years of the adult this ambivalent relation is manifested in all kinds of relations. However, due to castration fear, the child's hate and aggressiveness against his father - as a symbol of rival and repressive authority, and all types of authority and domination have been repressed by the ego. At the same time, the child's longing for an ego-ideal in terms of his father's ideal prepares him to return to authority with much submission and obedience which is internalized in superego. Freud argued that this is also true of the history of mankind. For Marx, the condition of owners and non-owners of means of production necessarily stimulated the ambivalence inherent in man. Freud reduced the formation of class in terms of the mechanism of group psychology. However for Freud, not only the ambivalence but also the libidinal ties with the leader make possible of class solidarity. Marx held that in the capitalist mode of production, the proletariat existed as class-in-itself. In other words, the proletariat existed potentially but without knowing for what. Hence, the consciousness of class-for-itself must be created for active class antagonism and class struggle. For Freud, the existence of class requires libidinal ties on the one hand and finding an ego-ideal on the other and in this way class presupposes a leader who arouses the unconscious libidinal interests as well as appeals for the superego. At the same time, the solidarity and unity of the class depends on the degree of the hostility towards the other class. Thus for both Marx and Freud, the dialectical relation existed in the structure of class or group. However, class consciousness can be undermined through creating an inverted form of consciousness or false consciousness. In other words, alienation, repression, reification and domination can not be experienced as painful but pleasurable by creating an illusion in accordance with the non- rational pleasure principle of the unconscious mind. Moreover, submission to authority is created through the castration fear of punishment and rejection which are internalized by parental authority. At the same time, the dominant class created an illusion among the proletariat that they were part of authority. This created an authoritarian character structure, instead of revolutionary character structure, which undermine the revolutionary potentiality of the proletariat. Moreover, in the interest of maintaining a class society, the repression is followed by creating false needs among the proletariat which arouse the deep-seated pleasure seeking activities fully compatible with consumerism as a substitute gratification. In this way repression, not seen as repression, is carried out in conformity to the class society. However, the potential libidinal energies of eros and thanatos can be used for class unity as well as class antagonism with the bourgeois through presupposing leader acted as collective conscience and external rationality in which both libidinal energies simultaneously channeled for classless society.

As Marx's materialistic interpretation is rooted in the study of economic structure, he believed that the forces and the relations of production determines the superstructures which are all ideological forms of justification of the dominant class. Marx himself expressed that greed and self-interest created the bourgeois who in turn possessed and appropriated the means of

production for their profit motive. Freud held that possessive nature, longing for private property and money were the outcome of anal traits and also they provided the substitute gratification for the greedy men. In fact, Marx ignored how the economic structure determines the superstructure. In other words, how the material existence is transformed into consciousness. Marx recognized that the interest of the dominant class had to assert itself in the psyche of the proletariat. It implies in two ways: the bourgeois must create for themselves that commodity, money, ownership of means of production and profit all should be rationalized and internalized in their character structure. But for the proletariat, the dehumanized, exploitative and estranged economic conditions are made to see as no more repressive, for that art and literature ideology, religion and state could be used as creating an inverted form of consciousness. In short, the conscious will of the bourgeois deliberately created these ideological forms which structured and molded the proletarian rationality to subordinate them. However, the rationale for the continued existence of these superstructures are justified by the innate pleasure principle and the archaic heritage of the masses which offer the legitimacy. Freud argued that man's striving for primal father and authority necessitated the existence of the religion and state. In the field of art and literature, instead of repression, invoking the already repressed unconscious wishes distort the relation between economic structure and superstructure. For revolution, contradiction between the productive forces and production relation is necessary. Following, the overdetermined nature of dream thoughts in order to present a clear and intelligible representation, many elements are concentrated or dominated but ultimately one particular element determines the final outcome. In this way, various structures exhibit contradictory relations, however, ultimately economic structure determines the outbreaks. Marx himself was aware that his materialistic interpretation would be an economic reductionism. But he himself related the Greek art with aesthetic sense free from economic structure. Moreover, human subjectivity mostly conditioned by the productive process, should be freed from the determining nature of economic structure which is a symbol of capitalist class society. He envisaged in communist society that the economic structure is secondary to the spontaneous, self-creative nature of man. And capitalist system is itself determined by the psychic structure of the bourgeois which is manifested in the form of private property, money and capital accumulation. The character of the proletariat so formulated is to the requisite of capital accumulation process. Hence, for Marx the proletariat must liberate themselves from the illusions created by the capitalist mode of production through its ideological superstructure. In other words, the subjectivity is raised against the economic grip by denying its subservient relation to economism. And the proletariat, for Marx, must eradicate the bourgeois consciousness of economism from their own life too. Even, in the production process, man's aim is to externalize his species nature instead of accumulation of capital and profit. Marx himself realised that the economic interpretation would be incompatible other than capitalism.

For Marx, political power and state are the symbols of coercion and repression in the hands of ruling class. Moreover, civil society and state represent particularism and universalism respectively. However, the state originates from the very structure of civil society, that is bourgeois class society, the state invariably stands for the dominant class. Marx envisaged changes in the economic structure of civil society, so that the state will lose its political character. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat, in course of time, the classless society emerges and production activity will be carried out with wholly compatible to the human essence. Under these situations, the state as a separate institution has no role to play. However, Marx did not deny the necessity of an association in carrying out the revolution and to build the communist society. He held that the commune was the antithesis to the state and its purpose was to unite the proletariat to struggle against the state. Hence, initially before building communist society, it will be a political struggle with the bourgeois and their state machineries. Moreover, the state, under the dictatorship of the proletariat will be used to oppress the bourgeois and all their remnants. Marx visualized a community of beings where political power and a separate institution of state becomes unnecessary in which production system is not dependent on class and private property. Ultimately Marx related communist mode of production with classless and stateless society through which he conveyed the meaning of human emancipation. While writing programme for the communists Marx expressed abstractly in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, and in the Critique of Gotha Programme, he experienced the practical tasks of the construction of communism and the latter text implied his mundane and possible programmes. In German Ideology, both Marx and Engels defined the emancipated man as "hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, raise cattle in the evening, and criticize after dinner". Whereas in Capital, Marx emphasized for the shortening of the working day. Marx's vision of communist society could not be comprehended through such expressions as classless society and stateless society. Instead it implies human subjectivity with its predicament to appropriate his psyche as well as the object-world to transcend the worst situation. At the same time, it is implied that whether the human beings are rational enough to preserve the realms of freedom for all. Human mutuality and reciprocal relation, as Marx himself cited as example of husband-wife relation, are to be internalized in the psyche of the individual through which the labour process could not produce the structure for alienation and exploitation as in case of class divided society. Marx intended to restructure certain communist ways of manifestation by practical experiences instead of theorizing beforehand. Marx argued, "which desires would be merely altered under a communist organization and which would be dissolved, can only be decided in a practical way, through the changing of real, practical desires, and not through historical comparisons with earlier historical circumstance". Moreover, Marx did not equate the term equality with human emancipation.

Marx ignored the necessity of sublimation of libidinal energies and personified authority in constructing communist society. Freud argued that any endeavour of social and political reconstruction must consider the dynamic aspects of libidinal energies and the structural aspects of the individual mind. Freud was very much doubtful whether the communist society or the abolition of private property could remove the human aggressiveness. Besides that man is inherently not fond of work. Hence repression is needed to create a disciplined labour force. Communism has to find a way to sublimate both eros and thanatos. Marx implied in his writings that under communist society the labour process would be identified with realm of freedom in which the sense of creation and happiness merged, and moreover, the subjectivity is constantly aware of what is appropriate as well as inappropriate simultaneously. In this situation both eros and thanatos are sublimated. The eros itself seeks a universal affiliation and gives potential for the dissolution of the dichotomy between private and public and it also implies a classless society. At the same time, the eros needs an authority reflecting the longing for primal father as a symbolic structure of protection. Hence, the universal nature of society depends on the eros identification with authority. For Plato, the idea of good stands as absolute abstract authority where the individual soul identifies and no more fragmentation existed. However, for Freud, for the continuation of unity and universal nature, the authority should be personified. Because, at the unconscious level, the longing for authority, the archaic heritage and for the ego-ideal, the eros is striving for personified authority which can be fulfilled by the leader who glorifies the libidinal strivings and ego-ideal. Freud also warned that the authoritarian leader can manipulate the masses with the very psychic structure. Instead, the leader must in turn identify with the mass. Thus Freud complimented the necessity of personified authority, albeit it implies the existence of state instead of aufhebung. At the same time, the eros provides the potential for classless society in which the subjectivity transcend the alienation.

Freud himself held ambivalence in many aspects. Moreover his theoretical stand can be used to justify the status quo or in favour of conservatism or capitalism. However, the present study mostly utilized the radical nature and moral appeal of Freud's expression. The dialectical method common to both Marx and Freud in terms of contradiction and social relations provides a conscious search for hidden meanings. Freudian psychoanalysis conceives certain limits to social and political change and often emphasizes on finding a mediation. Marxism can also equally provide explanation of psychoanalysis. It is argued that Freud was nothing more than an inspired reader of the mind of the capitalist culture. There is a possibility for the critical appropriation of one discourse to the other.

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